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Firms accumulate patents to protect their innovations from imitation. However, patents only 
provide the option to go to court against infringers. To exclusively benefit from their 
innovations, firms have to enforce their patents by filing a lawsuit. While previous research 
concentrated on the determinants and non-financial outcomes of patent litigation, this 
dissertation examines its effects on firm performance. Strategic patent litigation is very costly, 
but it can also enable the plaintiff to exclude competitors from the market and increase sales. 
However, not all firms are equally capable of benefitting from this trade-off. Hence, there is a 
need to examine the contingencies that influence the effectiveness of firms in generating profit 
from patent litigation. To fill this gap, this dissertation sheds light on organisational, industrial 
and institutional contingencies by looking at the repeated use of the same legal personnel, multi- 
and single invention industry factors, and the institutional targeting decisions of organisations. 
Therefore, this thesis contributes by highlighting the abilities of a firm to create barriers against 
imitation and the contingencies that can explain why some firms are unable to appropriate value 
from their innovations. 
The analysis of panel data on litigation activities of U.S. manufacturing corporations matched 
with financial data showed that patent litigation can increase administrative costs and 
profitability but does not influence sales per se. These findings imply that firm-specific abilities 
can build imitation barriers which are traditionally thought to stem from asset characteristics. 
The moderating effects clarify that patent litigation negatively affects sales and profitability 
while firms significantly save costs if they rely on repeated legal representation, operate in 
single invention industries, and litigate repeatedly in the same courts. Thereby, this study 
differentiates from previous research by concentrating empirically on different measures of 
performance and firm-specific, industrial and institutional characteristics that nurture value 









Table of Contents 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 5 
1.1.1 Strategic Patent Litigation and Firm Performance ...............................................................................5 
1.1.2 Research Question 1 (Empirical Chapter 1) .........................................................................................8 
1.1.3 Research Question 2 (Empirical Chapter 2) .........................................................................................9 
1.1.4 Research Question 3 (Empirical Chapter 3) ....................................................................................... 10 
1.1.5 Research Question 4 (Empirical Chapter 4) ....................................................................................... 11 
1.2 Synopsis of the Research Questions, Design and Method .............................................. 12 
1.3 Dissertation Structure ...................................................................................................... 13 
2 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................ 15 
2.1 The Resource-Based Views’ Postulate of Inimitability .................................................. 15 
2.2 Appropriation from Innovation ....................................................................................... 20 
2.3 Definition of Key Constructs .......................................................................................... 23 
2.3.1 Innovation .......................................................................................................................................... 24 
2.3.2 Intellectual Property and Forms of Intellectual Property Protection .................................................. 25 
2.3.3 Patents ................................................................................................................................................ 27 
2.3.4 Patent Enforcement and Litigation Strategies .................................................................................... 32 
2.4 Previous Research in the Field of Patent Litigation ........................................................ 37 
2.4.1 Determinants of Patent Litigation in the Literature ............................................................................ 44 
2.4.2 Outcomes of Patent Litigation in the Literature ................................................................................. 46 
3 Research Design and Methodology .............................................................................. 47 
3.1 Philosophical Approach .................................................................................................. 47 
3.2 Quantitative Research Design ......................................................................................... 51 
3.3 Sample and Data Collection ............................................................................................ 52 
3.3.1 Step 1: Determining the Sample and Data Criteria ............................................................................ 52 
3.3.2 Step 2: The Selection of the Databases .............................................................................................. 54 
3.3.3 Step 3: Identifying and Obtaining the Variables ................................................................................ 56 
3.4 Data Cleaning and Matching ........................................................................................... 57 
3.4.1 Transforming and Cleaning TOB data ............................................................................................... 57 
3.4.2 Transforming and Cleaning the PLD ................................................................................................. 58 
3.4.3 Simultaneous Cleaning of PLD and TOB .......................................................................................... 62 
3.4.4 Internal Harmonisation of the USPTO Dataset .................................................................................. 63 
3.4.5 The Final Dataset ............................................................................................................................... 66 
3.5 Variables .......................................................................................................................... 66 
3.5.1 Dependent Variables .......................................................................................................................... 67 
3.5.2 Independent Variable ......................................................................................................................... 71 
3.5.3 Control Variables ............................................................................................................................... 72 
3.6 Research Ethics ............................................................................................................... 73 
4 RQ 1: The Influence of Strategic Patent Litigation on Firm Performance ............. 76 
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 76 
4.2 Theoretical Background and Literature Review ............................................................. 78 
4.3 Hypotheses ...................................................................................................................... 83 
4.4 Data and Methods ............................................................................................................ 87 
VI 
 
4.4.1 Sample ............................................................................................................................................... 87 
4.5 Analysis ........................................................................................................................... 88 
4.6 Descriptives ..................................................................................................................... 90 
4.7 Results ............................................................................................................................. 91 
4.7.1 Magnitude of the Effects .................................................................................................................... 94 
4.7.2 Additional Tests ................................................................................................................................. 95 
4.8 Discussion and Conclusion ........................................................................................... 107 
5 RQ 2: The Role of the Repeated Use of the Same Attorneys in Strategic Patent 
Litigation .............................................................................................................................. 110 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 110 
5.2 Theoretical Background and Literature Review ........................................................... 112 
5.3 Hypotheses .................................................................................................................... 117 
5.4 Data and Methods .......................................................................................................... 122 
5.4.1 Sample ............................................................................................................................................. 122 
5.4.2 Additional Independent Variable ..................................................................................................... 123 
5.5 Descriptives ................................................................................................................... 124 
5.6 Results ........................................................................................................................... 125 
5.6.1 Magnitude of the Effects RQ2 ......................................................................................................... 128 
5.6.2 Additional Tests ............................................................................................................................... 129 
5.7 Discussion and Conclusion ........................................................................................... 130 
6 RQ 3: The Role of the Industrial Environment in Strategic Patent Litigation ..... 134 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 134 
6.2 Theoretical Background and Literature Review ........................................................... 136 
6.3 Hypotheses .................................................................................................................... 143 
6.4 Data and Methods .......................................................................................................... 147 
6.4.1 Sample ............................................................................................................................................. 147 
6.4.2 Additional Independent Variable ..................................................................................................... 149 
6.5 Descriptives ................................................................................................................... 150 
6.6 Results ........................................................................................................................... 151 
6.6.1 Magnitude of the Effects .................................................................................................................. 153 
6.6.2 Additional Tests ............................................................................................................................... 154 
6.7 Discussion and Conclusion ........................................................................................... 155 
7 RQ 4: The Role of Institutional Targeting in Strategic Patent Litigation ............. 158 
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 158 
7.2 Theoretical Background and Literature Review ........................................................... 160 
7.3 Hypotheses .................................................................................................................... 162 
7.4 Data and Methods .......................................................................................................... 165 
7.4.1 Sample ............................................................................................................................................. 165 
7.4.2 Additional Independent Variable ..................................................................................................... 165 
7.5 Descriptives ................................................................................................................... 167 
7.6 Results ........................................................................................................................... 168 
VII 
 
7.6.1 Magnitude of the Effects .................................................................................................................. 170 
7.6.2 Additional Tests ............................................................................................................................... 171 
7.7 Discussion and Conclusion ........................................................................................... 176 
8 Integrated Discussion and Conclusion ...................................................................... 178 
8.1 Filling the Gaps from the Integrative Framework ......................................................... 178 
8.2 Academical and Practical Contributions and Implications ........................................... 180 
8.3 Limitations and Future Research ................................................................................... 183 
8.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 184 

















List of Tables 
Table 1 Integrative Framework of the Four Research Questions ............................................... 5 
Table 2 Contingencies and Firm Responses Effecting the Performance Outcomes of Patent 
Litigation .................................................................................................................................... 7 
Table 3 Definition of Key Constructs ...................................................................................... 23 
Table 4 Previous Research on Patent Litigation ...................................................................... 39 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: RQ1 .............................................................. 90 
Table 6 Multilevel Mixed Method Analysis: RQ1 ................................................................... 91 
Table 7 Magnitude of the Effects RQ1 .................................................................................... 94 
Table 8 Distributed Lag Effects of Patent Litigation on ROS ................................................. 98 
Table 9 Distributed Lag Effects of Patent Litigation on Firm Sales ........................................ 98 
Table 10 Results for Non-Linearity ......................................................................................... 99 
Table 11 The Influence of Patent Litigation on Firm Performance Controlling for 
Internationalization ................................................................................................................. 101 
Table 12 The Influence of Patent Litigation on Firm Performance Controlling for Market 
Concentration ......................................................................................................................... 104 
Table 13 Litigation Trade-Off ................................................................................................ 107 
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: RQ2 .......................................................... 124 
Table 15 Multilevel Mixed Method Analysis: RQ2 ............................................................... 125 
Table 16 Magnitude of the Effects for Sales per Employee: RQ2 ......................................... 129 
Table 17 Magnitude of the Effects for ROS: RQ2 ................................................................. 129 
Table 18 Multilevel Mixed Method Analysis Robustness: RQ2 ........................................... 130 
Table 19 Industry Classification in the Literature .................................................................. 137 
Table 20 Industry-Specific Characteristics ............................................................................ 142 
Table 21 Sales, Costs and Profitability in Multi- and Single Invention Industries ................ 146 
Table 22 2-Digit Sic code Industry Distribution of Firm-Year Observations ........................ 147 
Table 23 Frequency of Litigation ........................................................................................... 149 
Table 24 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: RQ3 .......................................................... 150 
Table 25 Multilevel Mixed Method Analysis: RQ3 ............................................................... 151 
Table 26 Magnitude of the Effects for Sales per Employee: RQ3 ......................................... 154 
Table 27 Magnitude of the Effects for ROS: RQ3 ................................................................. 154 
Table 28 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: RQ4 .......................................................... 167 
Table 29 Multilevel Mixed Method Analysis: RQ4 ............................................................... 168 
Table 30 Magnitude of the Effects for Sales per Employees: RQ4 ....................................... 171 
IX 
 
Table 31 Magnitude of the Effects for ROS: RQ4 ................................................................. 171 
Table 32 Controlling for the Effect of Court Popularity ........................................................ 173 
Table 33 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation: Link Between RQ2 and RQ4 .................... 174 
Table 34 The Link between RQ2 and RQ4 ............................................................................ 175 
Table 35 The Integrative Framework Revisited ..................................................................... 180 
 
List of Figures  
Figure 1 The Influence of Strategic Patent Litigation on Firm Performance ........................... 12 
Figure 2 Number of Infringement Suits per Year .................................................................... 32 
Figure 3 The Sample and Data Collection Process .................................................................. 52 
Figure 4 The Cleaning and Matching Process ......................................................................... 57 
Figure 5 Average Number of Litigation Lawsuits per Firm and Year ..................................... 88 
Figure 6 Predictive Margins Sales per Employee: RQ1 .......................................................... 93 
Figure 7 Predictive Margins ROS: RQ1 .................................................................................. 93 
Figure 8 Koyck Distributed Lags for ROS ............................................................................... 97 
Figure 9 Koyck Distributed Lags for Firm Sales ..................................................................... 97 
Figure 10 Predictive Margins Sales per Employee: RQ2 ...................................................... 127 
Figure 11 Predictive Margins ROS: RQ2 .............................................................................. 128 
Figure 12 Litigation Lawsuits Per Firm and Industry ............................................................ 148 
Figure 13 Predictive Margins Sales per Employee: RQ3 ...................................................... 152 
Figure 14 Predictive Margins ROS: RQ3 .............................................................................. 153 
Figure 15 Predictive Margins Sales per Employee: RQ4 ...................................................... 169 
Figure 16 Predictive Margins ROS: RQ4 .............................................................................. 170 
1 
 
1 Introduction  
In today’s fast-paced business environment firms constantly innovate to stay ahead of 
competition. However, businesses have to protect their intellectual property (IP) in order to gain 
economic rents (Ceccagnoli, 2009; James et al., 2013). Whereas IP is a legally defendable asset 
(Hall, 1992), its protection must be sufficient or imitation might impede the profit opportunities 
of the firm. According to the resource-based view (RBV), a firm cannot obtain sustained 
competitive advantage if other firms are able to imitate its valuable and rare assets or replicate 
the benefits of such (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Thereby, from a RBV 
perspective, the source of inimitability derives from the nature of the asset itself as well as its 
development and embeddedness within the firm (Barney, 1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). 
This postulate is extended by scholarship suggesting that firms can build isolating mechanisms 
to construct or secure inimitability (Rumelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993; Liebeskind, 1996; Markman 
et al., 2004). Whereby firms can obtain IP rights, such as patents, to protect their innovations 
from imitation, these must be enforced respectively to preclude others from using, selling or 
manufacturing the patented inventions (Ziedonis, 2004; Somaya et al., 2012). Hence, many 
firms protect against imitation and try to capture value from their IP by litigating their patents. 
(Strategic) Patent litigation or enforcement is hereafter used when referring to the initiation of 
a patent infringement lawsuit by a plaintiff in a court of law. Thereby, the plaintiff, i.e. the 
patent holder, sues an alleged infringer and tries to balance the potential benefits and costs of 
litigation to increase profitability. Moreover, the focus hereafter is on proactive, rather than, 
defensive litigation endeavours as infringement lawsuit initiation implies strategic behaviour. 
It is striking that research to date predominantly focused on isolating mechanism, such as 
patents, as barriers against imitation (De Carolis, 2003; Markman et al., 2004; Sherry and 
Teece, 2004; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Reitzig and Puranam, 2009; James et al., 2013), rather than 
strategic patent litigation as a vital driver of inimitability and performance. Even though, 
litigation is incredibly costly, time-consuming and risky (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; 
Shane and Somaya, 2007; Bessen and Meurer, 2008b) and its sales implications are inconsistent 
(Rudy and Black, 2015), the existing litigation literature is both scarce and inconclusive about 
the role of patent enforcement for firm performance. Previous scholarship mainly focused on 
determinants of patent enforcement and settlement (Meurer, 1989; Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2003; Choi and Gerlach, 2015), whereby only a few articles have 
paid attention to the outcomes of patent litigation (Shane and Somaya, 2007; Agarwal et al., 
2009; Aharony et al., 2015; Rudy and Black, 2015). Especially the influence of litigation on 
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sales and costs and, therefore, profitability for the firm is mainly overlooked. Hence, there is a 
need to investigate when the trade-off between sales and costs of strategic patent litigation is 
becoming beneficial for the firm.  
Even less is known about the circumstances that influence the relationship between strategic 
patent litigation and firm performance. This prompts the necessity for a contingency approach 
to identify when firms can appropriate value from their IP protection. The central thesis of this 
paper is that strategic patent enforcement is key to RBV’s inimitability of assets and firm 
performance. Thereby, this dissertation postulates, that to appropriate value from their patents, 
firms restore to patent litigation, which comes with anticipated benefit but also substantial costs 
for the plaintiff and, hence, its effects on profitability need to be considered in the unique 
context of the firm, its industrial environment and its institutional strategies.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to assess the effect of patent litigation by a plaintiff in 
infringement suits on firm performance to fill the gap on the outcomes of patent enforcement. 
Thereby, it highlights the different organisational, industrial and institutional contingencies to 
which firms respond in order to build efficiencies in litigation. These strategic responses are 
possible moderators that influence the relationship between patent litigation and firm 
performance. Hence, there are three primary aims of this study: 
The first aim is to expand the role of knowledge protection postulated in the RBV to include not 
only property rights as isolating mechanisms but also the strategic enforcement of such. To 
reach the RBV premise of inimitability of assets to achieve a competitive advantage, firms can 
resort to patents but also need to enforce them. Hence, strategic patent litigation is a vital aspect 
of rent appropriation from innovative activity. It is striking that research to date has tended to 
focus on isolating mechanism as protection of intellectual property against imitation (Sherry 
and Teece, 2004; Reitzig and Puranam, 2009; James et al., 2013) or patents themselves (De 
Carolis, 2003; Markman et al., 2004), rather than patent litigation as a vital driver of 
inimitability and performance. 
The second aim is to explore the relationship of strategic patent litigation and performance in 
terms of sales and profitability while considering costs. This is necessary because little is known 
about the financial performance outcomes of patent litigation. Aharony et al. (2015), 
concentrated on alternative outcomes of patent litigation and found that it increases executive 
turnover. Shane and Somaya (2007) detected adverse effects of litigation on licensing in 
Universities. Agarwal et al. (2009), found that it can foster a reputation for toughness which 
reduces knowledge spillover effects. Furthermore, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001), showed, 
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that litigation can decrease research and development (R&D) effectiveness for small firms. 
However, the only study on the effect of industry-specific patent litigation on sales showed 
inconclusive findings (Rudy and Black, 2015). Hence, the first empirical chapter is looking at 
litigation which comes with potential benefits and administrative costs that can influence the 
profitability of patent enforcement. Thereby, this dissertation is probably the first study to 
undertake a longitudinal analysis of sixteen years, incorporating litigation and financial data of 
U.S. companies to analyse the influence of strategic litigation on two different measures of 
performance: sales and profitability as well as costs. This is in line with previous literature, 
suggesting further research on the RBV’s premise of inimitability and its influence on firm 
performance (De Carolis, 2003).  
The third aim is to ascertain the role of strategic patent enforcement and its influence on 
performance with respect to several contingencies. Thereby, strategic IP enforcement refers to 
the firm’s abilities in building, implementing and organising suitable patent litigation strategies. 
The mentioned contingencies encompass corporate, industrial, and institutional differences, 
that firms can (and have to) use for their advantage. Therefore, the second, third and fourth 
empirical chapters of this dissertation explore when some firms are more equipped in 
appropriating value through strategic patent enforcement than others.  
The second empirical chapter follows the need to incorporate firm-specific contingencies. 
Previous literature looked at how firms can increase patenting performance by accumulating 
in-house legal expertise (Somaya et al., 2007) and discussed how to manage in-house and 
external legal personnel for cost reduction during litigation (Foster, 1986). However, 
scholarship has not addressed the role of attorneys for performance outcomes in patent 
litigation. Hence, the purpose of the second chapter is to look at how firms efficiently manage 
the litigation process by accumulating experience through the regular transaction with the same 
lawyers. It then assesses if such practices influence the strategic litigation - performance 
relationship. Firms might build on knowledge from previous work with the same attorneys on 
their cases, independently of the employment structure, for example, if the attorneys are 
employed in-house or provide their services by contracting. Thereby, reoccurring transactions 
are under scrutiny to shed light on efficiencies in managing legal structures in patent litigation.  
The third empirical chapter examines how initiating patent litigation can be valuable for some 
firms and not for others, depending on industrial contingencies. For this purpose, it then 
concentrates on multi invention and single invention industries. Although research on the 
outcomes of strategic patent litigation is almost always set in the context of specific industries 
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(mostly semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries) (Shane and Somaya, 2007; Agarwal et 
al., 2009; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010; Rudy and Black, 2015) the moderating effect of industrial 
contingencies on the strategic patent litigation - firm performance relationship is unclear. 
Whereas in multi invention industries patent ownership and technologies are fragmented, in 
single invention industries patent ownership and technologies are concentrated (Ziedonis, 2004; 
Somaya et al., 2011; Somaya et al., 2012). The purpose of this distinction is to highlight the 
“cause” and not the “symptom” of effective patent litigation. This focus also redirects research 
attention away from the usually spotlighted pharmaceutical and semiconductor industry, 
contributing to the scarce knowledge of industry factors impacting strategic patent litigation 
and its influence on firm performance. 
The fourth empirical chapter examines how firms respond to institutional contingencies, to 
strategically exploit the court system in the United States of America for patent litigation. 
Institutional targeting, also called forum shopping, is a strategy commonly used by plaintiffs in 
patent litigation. Nevertheless, its implications for firm performance are unknown. Only 
recently, research steered towards the role of institutions in patent litigation. However, Somaya 
and McDaniel (2012), Beukel and Zhao (2018) and Paik and Zhu (2016) only looked at the 
determinants of tribunal targeting. Hence, a focus on institutional targeting that can be 
employed by the firm in patent litigation is needed to further investigate performance 
implications. The fourth chapter proposes that firms that rely on  forum shopping by repeatedly 
litigating at the same jurisdictional venue(s), enhancie their knowledge on specific venues and 
their abilities to deal with them. While such practices are not new, it is contributed to existent 
knowledge in the patent litigation field by examining the effect they have on financial 
performance.  
Answering the three research aims contributes to the literature by clarifying the role of patent 
litigation in securing inimitability of assets and appropriating rents from IP rights. Scholarship 
is developed by unravelling the strategic patent litigation - performance relationship. Moreover, 
chapter two to four contribute by looking at the role of firm-specific strategies in patent 
enforcement that are shaped by organisational, industrial and institutional contingencies.  
Building on the discussed purpose and contribution of the topic, the subsequent sections are 
organised as follows. First, the four main research chapters, their connectedness and the 
underlying research questions are introduced. Afterwards, the synopsis of the research 
questions with the design and methods of this dissertation is explained. Lastly, it is concluded 
by presenting the overall structure of the doctoral project.  
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1.1 Research Questions  
This dissertation is comprised of four distinct but related chapters, each catered to a specific 
research question concerning strategic patent litigation. Considering that business nowadays is 
as multi-faceted as ever, its goal is to incorporate different angles of patent litigation into one 
coherent framework that explains why some firms profit from patent litigation and others do 
not. This framework is supposed to enrich the vast majority of single-dimensional litigation 
research with a link between different approaches to reach connectivity and depth at the same 
time. 
1.1.1 Strategic Patent Litigation and Firm Performance 
The four research gaps and research questions that address these gaps, outlined in Table 1, 
incorporate different perspectives of patent litigation strategy research and are each on their 
own necessary to address performance outcomes of patent litigation. Even though 
comprehensive in their own right, combining them offers a holistic picture of 
interconnectedness. Table 1 shows the integrative framework of the four research questions. 
Table 1 Integrative Framework of the Four Research Questions 
Research Gap Research Question 
The Outcomes of Strategic 
Patent Litigation 
1: What is the influence of strategic patent litigation on costs and firm 
performance, measured on sales and profitability. 
Firm-Specific Legal 
Contingencies in Strategic 
Patent Litigation 
2: How does the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance 
vary according to the repeated use of the same legal personnel?  
Industrial Contingencies in 
Strategic Patent Litigation 
3: How does the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance 
vary according to the industrial environment? 
Institutional Contingencies 
in Strategic Patent 
Litigation 
4: How does the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance 
vary according to the repeated litigation in the same courts? 
 
The choice of each research question did not come easily. How could one integrate all research 
approaches on patent litigation and strategies into one cohesive framework? Especially because 
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we are talking about a field of research that is not only emerging and not yet grounded with 
theoretical roots but also widespread within different branches of disciplines.  
The first research question serves as the groundwork for the other three research questions and 
helps to understand why firms litigate and what influence strategic patent litigation can have on 
firm sales, costs and profitability by building on the resource-based view of the firm. 
Characterisation of research question two to four is essential to find why some firms benefit 
from employing patent litigation more than others. Thereby, the second research question is 
directed towards firm-specific knowledge accumulated by attorneys in patent litigation. The 
third research question is concerned with the industrial differences that influence the 
relationship between patent litigation strategy and performance. The fourth research question 
sheds light on the role of institutional targeting in patent litigation, in particular: strategies 
directed towards benefitting from litigation by deciding on where to litigate. The four research 
questions offer a holistic approach which integrates firm-specific, industry-specific and 
institution-specific research areas to establish a refined understanding of strategic patent 
enforcement. All four areas present unique research gaps that this dissertation is trying to fill 
with a detailed investigation of the outcomes of strategic patent litigation and the three 
contingencies shaping these outcomes. Whereas the first research question introduces the topic 
of strategic litigation and provides a starting point on accumulating information on the possible 
outcomes of it, the last three research questions are directed towards innovative research areas 
with fewer previously build knowledge.  
From a strategic management perspective, we often look at three different theories to explain 
performance through strategy. These three theories and their interconnectedness were titled 
“strategy tripod” by Peng et al. (2009). From the 1980s up to the 2000s, the resource-based 
view of the firm (Barney, 1991), the industry-based view (Porter, 1981), and the institution-
based view of strategic management (Peng, 2002; Peng, 2003) were introduced to the field of 
strategic management and set into perspective as the three most significant theoretical drivers 
of strategy and performance. Accordingly, to reach comprehensiveness in strategic 
management research Peng et al. (2009), integrated the strategy tripod consistent of, firm-
specific resources and capabilities, the industry-based competition, as well as institutional 
conditions, and transactions as cumulatively influencing strategy and firm performance. 
Teece et al. (1986; 1997) introduced the notion to the field of strategic management, that 
although IP protection can be an effective imitation barrier, the value of its outcome is 
dependent on contextual conditions. Since then, in patent research, it is well established that the 
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advantages of patents and patent protection efficacy are context-dependent (Cohen et al., 2000; 
James et al., 2013) and firm, industry and country effects are known to influence the 
performance of the firm (Bamiatzi et al., 2016). 
The patent system is considered to be extremely variable because of its dependence on context. 
Past research concerned with the appropriability of value from innovative activity proposed 
similar integrative models to incorporate multiple contingencies. One important study by James 
(2013), investigated the effect of the exogenous conditions such as technology, firm, industry 
and institutional environment on the selection and effectiveness of appropriability mechanisms 
and, ultimately, on competitive advantage. Hence, the author distinguished between the 
technological, firm-specific, industrial, institutional and environment to understand IP 
protection behaviour. Proposing a similar research setting, Table 2 is derived from James et al. 
(2013) and Peng et al. (2009) and translated to the context of this dissertation.  
The table shows how firm-specific efficiencies can be built by responding to firm, industry, and 
institutional contingencies to appropriate value from patent litigation. Therefore, utilising a 
similar thought than Pisano (2006), this dissertation argues, that value and appropriability from 
patents are not only exogenously given, they also must be endogenously pursued by firms. 
Which presupposes that the firm has special competences to build efficiencies in patent 
litigation and respond to unique circumstances. These are defined as the abilities of an 
organisation to respond to external contingencies of the patent system by building internal 
competencies of strategic patent litigation. 






contingencies determined by the 
requirement of hiring attorneys 
for patent litigation 
Industrial contingencies 
determined by 
technological and patent 
fragmentation 
Institutional contingencies 
determined by a legal 
regime with intra-court 
differences 
Response of the 
firm 
Building 
efficiencies by using the same 
attorneys repeatedly 
Integrating strategic 
litigation in multi and 
single invention 
environments 
Exploiting the benefits of 
getting familiar with 
institutional characteristics 
 
When combining strategic management and patent litigation approaches, three main research 
areas melt together: the firm itself, the industrial context and the institutional context. The four 
research questions present themselves in consecutive empirical chapters, creating valuable 
insights to fill the knowledge gaps. The following sections briefly introduce them:  
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1.1.2 Research Question 1 (Empirical Chapter 1)  
Research Question 1: What is the influence of strategic patent litigation on costs and firm 
performance, looking at the two performance dimensions: firm sales and profitability. 
As evaluated in the introduction, knowledge on patent litigation outcomes is still scarce, 
especially when it comes to the effect of litigation strategies on firm performance. In order to 
address this gap and to investigate if strategic litigation is beneficial for firm performance, this 
study looks at three dimensions of patent litigation outcomes: administrative costs, firm sales, 
and therefore, overall profitability.  
The litigation phase is of particular importance due to its promising payoffs but also due to the 
many challenges which can decide about firm performance. Litigation outcomes are often 
unpredictable because the value of each patent and the risk of each litigation endeavour is 
unique (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). Hence, the enforcement of property rights is neither 
certain of success (Marco, 2005; Somaya, 2012) nor a very convenient approach (Rudy and 
Black, 2015). Difficulties can occur, for example, if the enforceability of the exclusionary 
protection granted by the court is uncertain (Ziedonis, 2004; James et al., 2013), or if the 
litigation process is particularly time consuming and disruptive (Shane and Somaya, 2007; Gans 
et al., 2008) which can have significant monetary implications. Therefore, firms have to 
strategically manage the risks of litigation by considering the potential benefits of maintaining 
or increasing sales as well as possible detriments due to high costs and uncertainty carefully. 
Recent research found that patent litigation can positively influence firm sales (Rudy and Black, 
2015). However, despite possible sales profits, the high costs involved in litigation and 
expensive long-term trials (Shane and Somaya, 2007; Lumineau and Oxley, 2012) can harm 
the overall benefits of increased sales. To determine the performance consequences of patent 
litigation, possible detrimental costs effects on firm profits should not be neglected.  
Throughout this dissertation, the cost aspect of strategic patent litigation is presented as a 
counterweight to the possible sales benefits of litigation. Thereby, although presented in the 
main results, the organisational cost of litigation should not be considered as a performance 
measurement. The influence of strategic litigation on organisational costs is illustrated to make 
the effect that strategic litigation can have on expenses more explicit. It is included as a narrative 
for explaining firm performance because of its importance when it comes to the strategic 
choices during litigation. For example, strategies during litigation can increase or diminish such 
cost significantly. Therefore, litigation specific influences on organisational costs can be the 
9 
 
missing piece to explain the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance. The 
focus on costs as well as performance outcomes is vital to fill the need for the recognition of 
patent litigation strategies as important protection mechanisms against imitation and means to 
extract financial value from innovations. Thereby, considering costs includes a valuable part of 
the cost-diminishing litigation strategies of companies. 
1.1.3 Research Question 2 (Empirical Chapter 2)  
Research Question 2: How does the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance 
vary according to the repeated use of the same legal personnel? 
When taking a closer look at strategic patent litigation, the influence of patent litigation 
strategies on performance is not uniform across firms. Thus, it must be considered how factors 
pertaining to the indigenously firm-specific context influence the relationship between 
litigation strategies and performance to understand why some firms are able to benefit from 
innovation while others are not. Liebeskind (1996) argued that the ability of a firm to effectively 
protect valuable assets from imitation distinguishes it from competitors. Furthermore, the 
unique organisation of a company can provide an important isolating mechanism (Rumelt, 
1984; Liebeskind, 1996). Some firms might be more able to protect their assets from imitation 
than others because of specific characteristics they possess. That means that similar assets 
possessed by different firms can still lead to different litigation outcomes. Firms have to 
strategically litigate to benefit from their patents in the given environment. Thereby, firms need 
a feasible and valuable patent litigation strategy that aligns with their litigation strengths and 
experiences.  
To find such strategies and perform such litigation, companies can build on knowledge deriving 
from their previous legal associations. Therefore, knowledge from transaction cost economics 
(TCE) on firm-supplier relationships is integrated. More precise, attorneys that are employed 
on a regular basis accumulate firm-specific knowledge which they can leverage in future cases. 
Thereby, the concept of firm specificity of performance from Huckman and Pisano (2008) is 
incorporated. The endogenously accumulated expertise built by repeated firm-attorney 
relationships can be an important factor for performance outcomes when litigating. Specifically, 
this chapter investigates, if the repeated use of the same legal personnel influences the effect of 
strategic patent protection on firm performance.  
Litigation strategies and cases are not built in a vacuum; they are dynamic and contextually 
embedded within the context of the firm. For many litigation cases, success comes down to the 
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ability of the lawyer to build a case. Thereby, legal representation and the execution of litigation 
is unique for each company. Therefore, this research question examines how the repeated use 
of the same legal personnel influence the patent litigation strategy – performance relationship.  
1.1.4 Research Question 3 (Empirical Chapter 3) 
Research Question 3: How does the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance 
vary according to the industrial environment?  
It is well established in the patent literature that the effectiveness of patents and patent strategies 
is dependent on the industrial environment (Mansfield et al., 1981; Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et 
al., 2000; Somaya, 2012; Somaya et al., 2012). Surprisingly, although scholarship on patent 
litigation outcomes almost always incorporates industry measures (Shane and Somaya, 2007; 
Agarwal et al., 2009; Rudy and Black, 2015), knowledge about the utilisation and outcomes of 
strategic patent litigation across industries is scarce. Patent and litigation literature only 
fragmentarily concentrated on certain industries, the adoption of different patent strategies 
within them and the sales implications of litigation (Reitzig, 2004b; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Rudy 
and Black, 2015). Even less is known about how factors pertaining to the industry context 
influence the relationship between litigation and performance. Even though Rudy and Black 
(2015) found that the likelihood of initiation of patent infringement suit or a declaratory 
judgement suit can be dependent on the industry, it is still not clear how patent litigation 
enhances or diminishes the magnitude of firm sales and costs dependent on the characteristics 
of the industry. This dissertation focuses on multi invention and single invention-industries, 
which each comprise several industries that are distinguished by the fragmentation of patent 
ownership and technologies as main characteristics. Hence, the present study addresses this gap 
and investigates how inter-industry differences, influence the patent litigation - firm 
performance relationship. The question is, if the exogenously given industry context plays a 
significant role in determining the effectiveness of strategic litigation and its impact on costs 
and potential benefits. Answering this question offers theory development opportunities on how 
firms can maximise their value capture from patent protection (Cohen et al., 2000; Reitzig and 
Wagner, 2010; James et al., 2013). 
In conclusion, although it was touched upon the value of litigation in various industries (see: 
(James et al., 2013)), it’s outcome concerning strategic endeavours tailored to industry 
characteristics could open up a new route for theoretical explanations of why some firms can 
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outperform their competitors. Thereby, this chapter follows a research call of a multi-year study 
of patent litigation in multiple industries by Rudy and Black (2015). 
1.1.5 Research Question 4 (Empirical Chapter 4) 
Research Question 4: How does the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance 
vary according to the court specific experience of firms? 
When trying to unravel the influence of strategic litigation on performance, it is not enough to 
focus on firms and their industrial environment. There is a need to address the formal 
institutional context of a firm. In the case of the legal institutions, companies need to respond 
to the institutionally given environment and find a comprehensive strategy that takes the court 
of law into account. Institutional targeting has played a major role in patent litigation for 
decades and became more and more important due to the increasing emphasis on speed and 
hope for more certainty during the litigation proceedings. Hence, this chapter investigates which 
role court targeting of firms plays when it comes to the influence of patent litigation on firm 
performance.  
Whereas this study considers the industrial environment as exogenously given, the courts at 
which litigation lawsuits are filed are a mix between a given institution and a strategic choice. 
Indeed, all plaintiffs have to resort to traditional and existing courts (which means that 
institutions and industry regulations apply for all firms in the context) within the United States 
to litigate their patents. However, they are granted a certain degree of autonomy in choosing 
the jurisdiction where they want to litigate. In practice, the choice of location of the court might 
determine the outcome of the strategic litigation proceedings of the plaintiff in terms of benefits 
and the financial aspects of litigation. Previous literature has predominantly focused on 
determinants of tribunal targeting and the possible advantages for the suit itself (Somaya and 
McDaniel, 2012). However, the outcome of institutional targeting and its potential influence on 
firm-level performance received less attention. 
Linking that to the theoretical question of how patent litigation affects firm performance, one 
must consider the firm's competencies to handle the jurisdictional environment to conclude how 
the choice of venue for litigation is influencing litigation success as well as how a firm can 





1.2 Synopsis of the Research Questions, Design and Method 
The influence of strategic patent litigation on performance is highlighted from four different 
angles that build upon each other. Beginning from the underlying investigation of the influence 
of strategic litigation on sales and profitability in general, the focus will be set on firm-specific 
knowledge, certain industries and finally, local institutions. All four research questions are 
dedicated to the relationship of patent litigation and performance as well as costs, yet, all four 
serve their specific purpose of creating a holistic picture that describes patent litigation as a 
means to create and maintain value by fostering inimitability of assets. Therefore, the design of 
this study is meant to provide four intertwined perspectives that are, yet essential in effecting 
the patent litigation – performance relationship.  
In sum, the four research questions built a holistic framework of strategic patent litigation, 








The research design in this dissertation is characterised by a deductive research approach to 
achieve the discovery of generalisable causal relations. Thereby, expected relationships are 
deduced from theory and tested by numerous observations. To provide coherence with regards 
to the different parts of the study, an overarching quantitative method was used to collect and 
analyse the data. Thereby, each chapter entails a quantitative empirical investigation based on 
the same sample of firms to ensure the coherence of the new findings. This is supposed to 
support the comparability of the different contingencies to provide a generalisable contribution 


















Data for this study was collected using litigation data provided by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office and matching it with financial firm data from Thomson One Banker. Similar 
approaches were utilised in previous research (for example, see Somaya and McDaniel, 2012). 
By combining data on strategic patent litigation and firm performance, a novel dataset was 
created, that enriches scholarship on patent litigation. The timeframe of the dissertation data 
spans over 16 years, from 2000 to 2015, which brings exceptional data richness to the field in 
terms of consistency and data availability.  
1.3 Dissertation Structure 
The thesis is composed of a theoretical foundation relevant to the remainder of the dissertation, 
an initial review of the literature and research design and methodology that explains the data 
collection process, followed by four chapters, each addressing one of the four research 
questions, and a closing section, discussing the outcomes of the four chapters and the combined 
contribution of the dissertation. 
2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
This section begins by defining the fundamental concepts of strategic patent litigation and firm 
performance. First, it discusses the theoretical framework by establishing the importance of the 
RBV and inimitability to appropriate value from strategic patent enforcement. Second, it 
highlights innovation and intellectual property. Third, the section presents the main logic of 
patents, patent strategies, patent litigation and strategic patent litigation. These sections also 
give a brief overview of the recent history of patent research. Fourth, the chapter provides a 
literature review that incorporates past research on multiple topics concerned with determinants 
and outcomes of patent enforcement.  
3. Research Design and Methodology  
The overall research design and methodology section begins by discussing positivism as the 
underlying philosophical approach of the dissertation. It will then go on to present the 
justification for the chosen quantitative research design. Afterwards, it explains the data 
collection and the extensive data cleaning and matching endeavours that produced the final 
dataset. The chapter is closing with a short section on research ethics and its utilisation in this 




4.-7. Empirical Chapters on the four Research Questions  
The first empirical chapter of this dissertation examines the influence of strategic patent 
litigation on firm costs, sales and profitability. In the second empirical chapter investigates how 
the repeated legal representation by the same lawyers for the same firm can influence 
performance outcomes and costs. The third empirical chapter elaborates on how firms that 
operate in different industries but employ similar patent litigation strategies, experience 
different outcomes on costs, sales and profitability. The fourth empirical chapter focuses on 
institutional targeting and, how repeated litigation in the same courts influences the 
performance outcomes of patent litigation. 
8. Integrated Discussion and Conclusion 
The integrated discussion and conclusion shows the main outcomes from the four chapters by 
presenting the integrative framework Table 1, this time highlighting how the results from the 
four chapters filled the proposed research gaps. Then, the discussion of the academical and 
practical contributions and implications is conducted. Thereby the focus is on the contributions 
of this dissertation to reflect on the purpose and implications of the completed work. A thorough 
discussion of the limitations and future research opportunities follows before closing with a 
forward-directed conclusion of the doctoral project. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, sections 2.1 The Resource-Based Views’ Postulate of Inimitability and 2.2 
Appropriability from Innovation establish the foundational theoretical contribution of this 
dissertation. Sections 2.3 Definition of Key Constructs to 2.4 Previous Research in the Field of 
Patent Litigation discuss the various components of strategic patent litigation necessary to build 
the foundation of the theoretical framework. Thereby, these chapters not only explain the 
underlying constructs but they also present definitions and key concepts in the literature and 
critically examine them to understand the importance of patent litigation for the postulate of 
RBV’s inimitability of assets. The section 2.4 Previous Research in the Field of Patent 
Litigation discusses what we already know from previous work in the field necessary to 
understand the theoretical contribution and the contribution that can be made to the field by the 
integrative framework from Table 1. 
2.1 The Resource-Based Views’ Postulate of Inimitability  
In the underlying integrative framework for this dissertation (Table 1) the question of the 
influence of strategic patent litigation on performance arises. Although knowledge in the area 
is growing, the influence of patent litigation strategies on firm performance in the context of 
the RBV is not yet sufficiently understood. The following chapter explains how the RBV’s 
notion of inimitability of assets builds the necessary link between strategic patent litigation and 
firm performance.  
Achieving a competitive advantage requires that the firm is capable of employing a strategy 
which allows it to capture value from its assets, whereby the values of this strategy are not and 
cannot be duplicated by competitors (Barney, 1991). Thereby, assets are often described as 
particular types of resources that are owned by an organisation and influence value generation 
(Barney, 1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece et al., 1997). Firm-specific assets can be 
tangible (for example, equipment, plants and monetary) or intangible (for example, internal 
technological knowledge, information processes, employees) in nature (Wernerfelt, 1984; Amit 
and Schoemaker, 1993). According to the RBV, a unique asset position possessed by the firm 
which is isolated against competitors is vital to achieving above-normal profitability 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Teece et al., 1997). Therefore, the RBV postulates inimitability of assets as 
a driver of sustained competitive advantage. This is because successful barriers to imitation can 
lead to above normal profits (Barney, 1991). With the beginning of this century, inimitability 
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was predicted to be one of the most important research opportunities emerging from the RBV 
(Barney, 2001; De Carolis, 2003). 
To explain how strategic litigation, rather than patenting, is a means, and sometimes a premise, 
to achieve inimitability of assets, the roots and evolution of the resource-based research stream 
have to be discussed:  
The RBV is widely established and utilised in strategic management research (Teece et al., 
1997). However, until it emerged, the competitive forces approach from Michael Porter (1980; 
1981) was predominant. It represented the stance that a firm’s industrial environment, rather 
than firm-specific characteristics, is impacting its competitive advantage. It assumed that 
resources and strategies within industries are mobile (Porter, 1981). Which led to the 
presumption that a heterogeneous asset position is short-lived because assets were thought to 
be easily traded enabling firms to implement similar strategies (Barney, 1991).  
The RBV offered a new, firm-focused perspective. It provided a contrast to the assumptions 
predominant at the time by postulating long-lasting asset heterogeneity due to asset immobility 
between firms (Barney, 1991). RBV was pioneering due to its consideration of inter-firm 
variations as the source of competitive advantage. Hence, it challenged the assumption that 
firms gain sustained competitive advantage by strategically leveraging resources to respond to 
environmental opportunities in resource-homogenous industries. The RBV introduced two key 
assumptions: resource must be unevenly distributed between firms as well as immobile to allow 
firms to achieve above normal rents (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Many concepts of assets 
and performance emerged with the RBV which motivated Peteraf (1993) to provide a clarifying 
model and further developed the underlying assumptions of Barneys’ RBV. According to the 
author, a resource-based view requires four underlying economic assumptions. Those are 
heterogeneity (superior resources lead to monopoly rents), ex-ante limits to competition 
(initially limited competition for a superior asset position to keep the costs of sustaining that 
position low), imperfect mobility (necessary to bound the rents to the firm) and ex-post limits 
to competition (which sustain those rents by preserving heterogeneity). Those must be given to 
ensure a sustained competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1993).  
Barney (1991), in his definition of RBV, elaborated on the specific characteristics of a resource. 
Whereby, even if a resource is valuable, rare and non-substitutable competitive firms could 
simply imitate this same resource. Therefore, a resource must also be inimitable to be the 
potential source of sustained competitive advantage. Furthermore, inimitability is a vital 
attribute of resources because imitation influences the rareness and value of the resource 
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(Polidoro and Toh, 2011). According to Barney (1991), inimitability can derive from firm-
specific historical conditions (such as the time and place of a firms business), causal ambiguity 
(i.e. that the link between the resource and sustained competitive advantage is not sufficiently 
understood by the firm and competitors) or socially complex resources (for example 
interpersonal relationships or reputation). (Matheja, 2017, Understanding your discipline 
assignment, pp.2-3). However, a central argument of this dissertation is that inimitability does 
not solely emerge from one of those three traditional understandings. The consideration of 
patent litigation as a protection mechanism against resource imitation adds to the RBV 
assumption that a superior asset must be inimitable, valuable, rare and non-substitutable to 
enable the firm to employ a strategy to reach sustained competitive advantage. This thesis 
proposes that firm-specific abilities with respects to patent litigation against infringers is the 
missing link in our understanding of the RBV and barriers against imitation that lead to superior 
firm performance. This is based on the two arguments that many resources are not inherently 
inimitable, and patents constitute imperfect isolating mechanisms.  
Traditionally, in Barney's approach, inimitability is presented as a key feature of the resource 
itself, which needs to be given to achieve sustained competitive rents (Barney, 1991; Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993). However, in today's business environment and considering the 
technological advancement that companies are dealing with, inimitability based on historical 
conditions, causal ambiguity or socially complex resources is rare. Hence, a lot of attention in 
the strategic management literature has been dedicated to the protection of IP against imitation 
(Sherry and Teece, 2004; Reitzig and Puranam, 2009; James et al., 2013). Despite referring to 
inimitability as an inherent characteristic of a resource itself, assets that are not inimitable every 
so often can be protected by patents, as isolating mechanisms, to fabricate inimitability. It is 
well-established knowledge in the field of strategic management that IP rights, such as patents, 
are isolating mechanisms1 that can provide barriers to imitation (Rumelt, 1984; Somaya, 2012; 
James et al., 2013) and recent research did value the possible positive relationship between 
isolating mechanisms and firm performance in the context of the RBV (Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993; Teece et al., 1997). However, the present study complements the RBV by arguing that 
an effective imitation barrier to create or maintain value requires that firms actively enforce and 
protect their patents. Especially because patent enforcement, particularly litigation against 
infringers, can counteract the imperfect isolation posed by patents because of two reasons: 
 
1 Isolating mechanisms can be categorised in formal (e.g., patents, trademarks) and informal (e.g., secrecy) property rights, first 
mover advantages (e.g., lead time), complementary assets (e.g., market capabilities) and information asymmetries (e.g., specific 
product knowledge) (Rumelt, 1984, 1987; Lawson et al., 2012; James et al., 2013) 
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First, literature postulates that a patent does not grant affirmative rights (Ziedonis, 2004). While 
it constitutes a possibility to protect IP by precluding others from using, manufacturing or 
selling a protected innovation, it grants no usage right per se (Marco, 2005; Somaya et al., 
2012), but only an option to go to court (Marco, 2005). Consequently, a firm’s strategy to 
protect against the infringement of an IP right is vital to secure its value (Chen et al., 2016). 
This indicates that especially the enforcement of a patent in court is likely to determine the 
overall rent generation from it. Therefore, the success of patent protection is not only dependent 
on a firm’s ability to acquire patents but also on its take-up on its rights to enforce those patents 
in court to protect them from infringement. Such enforcement can be accomplished by the use 
or threatened use of litigation. During the litigation process, courts can be involved to legally 
exclude competitors from using the invention, to compensate the patentee with royalties 
(Somaya, 2012) or to challenge the validity of patents from competitors (Marco, 2005). 
Therefore, patent litigation expands the boundaries of and secures the protection offered by 
patents. 
Second, filing a patent is a double-edged sword because it gives a firm the option to protect its 
resources while disclosing details on how these resources can be built. Patents disclose valuable 
information publicly, facilitating substitution and imitation (Langinier, 2005; Somaya et al., 
2011). Hence, the patent is offering useful knowledge on how to imitate the IP it protects. Past 
research even found that imitability based on patent citations has a negative influence on 
performance (De Carolis, 2003). This suggests that patents alone are insufficient isolating 
mechanisms and do not suffice in building inimitability of assets. While modern businesses 
found a way to try to isolate from imitation (even if their resources themselves can be copied) 
by using patents, they also have to protect against the usage of knowledge exposed by the same 
patents. This is mostly done by the use or threatened use of litigation. Hence, whereas patents 
constitute a hurdle to imitation, litigation is inhibiting it. Thereby, patent enforcement is a 
strategic weapon to ensure inimitability of assets, even for those resources that can be easily 
imitated otherwise. 
These arguments support that skilful enforcement of patents by using litigation can be the 
missing link that ensures a sufficient barrier to imitation and value creation. Liebeskind (1996) 
argued, that some firms, in comparison to their competitors, have superior knowledge-
protection skills that prevent imitation. Hence, it should not be ignored that firms have to 
actively make sure that their assets cannot be copied by competitors. If this option is not 
strategically used, IP is simply disclosed, which may explain why some firms are better in 
securing inimitability and competitive advantage. Patent litigation allows imitation protection 
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constituted by the ability of the firm to create legal barriers to imitation, which makes the asset 
in question not inimitable from a technological perspective nor inimitable because of historical 
conditions, causal ambiguity or socially complex resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) 
but from an economic and legal perspective. A perspective of superior knowledge protection 
skills proposed by (Liebeskind, 1996), that makes firms more capable to deter imitation. 
Consequently, strategic litigation must be considered as a vital part of securing inimitability. 
Therefore, the RBV literature should be extended with regards to the role of the firm in litigation 
while trying to secure inimitability of assets and economic rents.  
Strategy research shows that the organisation of protection by a firm can cater as a crucial factor 
in establishing isolating mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984). To profit from their innovations, firms 
need strategies to respond to the market and their given appropriability regimes (Pisano, 2006). 
In other words, sustained competitiveness may not only stem from patents but also from the 
ability of the firm to effectively protect its patents from imitation in its given context. This 
ability builds on the congruence between internal possibilities and strategies and the outside 
environment. However, this is not an easy task. Until now, it is not fully understood why some 
companies succeed in providing sufficient legal barriers by the use or threatened use of 
litigation to defend their assets and others do not. The question remains in which contexts firms 
can protect their patents to reach or maintain a superior performance position. Consequently, 
researching patent litigation with regards to a firm’s internal and external contingencies might 
be central to answer the question of why some firms are more capable protectors than others. 
Hence, the acknowledgement of a firm’s contingencies of efficient patent enforcement adds to 
our understanding of value creation from strategic litigation of patents. 
The beginning of this paragraph stated, that achieving competitive advantage requires a firm to 
employ a strategy that allows it to capture value from its assets, by establishing inimitability 
(Barney, 1991). Afterwards, the aspects of inimitability and patent litigation were discussed 
thoroughly, whereby the latter enforces IP rights. However, the aspect of strategic patent 
litigation employment to capture value from assets needs an additional discourse. By building 
on the RBV and this demand of inimitability as the main driver of sustained competitive 
advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993), the momentousness of strategic 
patent litigation for firm-specific value creation is discussed in the next paragraph. The 
important aspect of this theoretical extension is appropriability. By understanding the concept 
of appropriability, it can be further and fully explained how and why patent litigation fits RBV.  
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2.2 Appropriation from Innovation  
In the previous chapter, it was explained how the RBV’s notion of inimitability of assets builds 
the necessary link between patent litigation and competitive advantage. In the present chapter, 
a firm’s value appropriation abilities add to this link by integrating firm-specific abilities to 
strategically respond to certain contingencies with patent enforcement. 
Appropriability refers to the degree to which a firm captures the value created when it 
introduces an innovation (Teece et al., 1997; Ceccagnoli, 2009). Thereby, IP protection 
mechanisms, such as functioning legal systems of protection and the type of innovation 
constitute so-called appropriability mechanisms or regimes (Teece, 1986; Cohen et al., 2000; 
Pisano, 2006). An efficient imitation barrier that increases the chances for profit is determined 
by a strong appropriability regime, which can be exogenously given (for example, IP rights 
regimes) (Cohen et al., 2000) or endogenously created (by competence or capabilities) (De 
Carolis, 2003). Hence, appropriability also refers to the extent to which firms can limit other 
firms from imitating their innovations by leveraging inter-firm differences (Ceccagnoli, 2009). 
This is in line with Teece (1986), showing that the appropriability regime is given (for example, 
as the nature of the technology and the power of the legal environment) but profiting from 
innovations needs to be mastered by aligning the appropriability regime with the firm's 
litigation capabilities or assets. According to the author the strategy needs to be fitted to the 
appropriability regime and the tighter the regime, the more complementary specialised assets 
(for example, litigation (strategies)) need to be in place to profit from innovation. Pisano (2006) 
elaborates on Teece’s logic that companies need to choose a complementary asset position fitted 
to the appropriability regime that surrounds them. Thereby, he suggests, that firms can even 
change the appropriability regime by drafting IP rights strategies that allow them to 
endogenously appropriate returns from their innovations. As an example of such strategies, the 
author names open source2 or disclosure in genomics. However, even in less drastic examples, 
to profit from their innovations, firms need strategies to respond to the market and their given 
appropriability regimes.  
 
2 For example, the car maker “Tesla” is operating in a niche market with firms manufacturing gasoline cars as its biggest 
competitor. Tesla’s CEO decided to announce that they will not sue infringers to keep the market growing. However, patents 
are still filed and maintained. This strategic patent (and preparing for patent enforcement) behaviour is a means to shape the 




Traditionally formal (e.g. patents, trademarks) and informal (e.g. secrecy) property rights, 
(Rumelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1987; James et al., 2013) are oftentimes referred to as isolating 
mechanisms that can determine the quality of appropriation. However, past research stresses 
that, in addition to the mere possession of patents, firms can strategically leverage the 
proficiency of them as an imitation barrier (Teece et al., 1997; Pisano, 2006; Somaya, 2012). It 
was argued before, that patents are offering insufficient guard against infringement. In practice, 
they need to be enforced to protect valuable IP. Thus, patents are oftentimes considered to 
provide imperfect appropriability (Teece, 1986). Therefore, the value and appropriability from 
patents are not only exogenously given, they must be endogenously pursued by firms. Which 
presupposes that the firm has special skills, such as “to integrate, build and reconfigure internal 
and external competences to address [..] environments.” (Teece et al., 1997, p.516). Here, they 
are defined as the abilities of an organisation to respond to external contingencies by building 
internal competencies. 
Translated to the patent litigation context, this could mean that firm-specific factors, for 
instance, strategies in patent litigation and legal efficiencies built by repeated experience with 
the same attorneys or courts, can enhance the appropriability from IP. In other words, sustained 
competitiveness may not only stem from patents but, in addition to the suggestions of the RBV, 
also stem from the ability of the firm to effectively protect its assets from imitation in 
congruence with its internal possibilities and strategies to address its outside environment. 
Particularly, researching strategic litigation with regards to a firm’s internal capabilities to 
respond to external environments, as a way to protect patents from imitation, might be central 
to answer the question of why some firms are more capable protectors than others.  
Appropriation from patent litigation 
In the context of litigation, both traditional streams of the above-mentioned appropriability 
discussion are important. Firms use strategic litigation to respond to tight or loose 
appropriability regimes whereby the outcomes of these strategies might vary according to the 
differences in those appropriability regimes, for example, in different industries. Hence, during 
patent litigation, firms can either benefit or suffer from exogenously given appropriability 
regimes. Respectively, the appropriability regime being equal, some firms might be able to 
employ strategic litigation to appropriate value from their inventions better than other firms, 
due to firm-specific efficiencies build from past experiences. Firms then can employ their 
specific knowledge to create value while responding to a certain type of exogenously given 
appropriability regime, for example, through experience with legal parameters of litigation.  
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Previous literature is supporting this argument, providing compelling research that a firm’s 
capabilities can determine positive performance outcomes compared to competitors (Teece, 
1986; Rumelt, 1987; Liebeskind, 1996; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo 
and Winter, 2002; De Carolis, 2003; Reitzig and Puranam, 2009). Therefore, this dissertation 
argues, that an efficient imitation barrier that increases the chances for profit is dependent on a 
certain appropriability regime and the firm-specific efficiencies in strategic patent litigation. 
Thereby, the firm-specific efficiencies are considered closely, to argue that they are a means 
for appropriation of value, rather than its creation. Reitzig and Puranam (2009) suggested this 
novel approach and concentrated on value capture and protection from imitation to secure IP. 
Whereas the authors suggest this on the patent level, this dissertation argues that firm-specific 
abilities with regards to patent litigation are an important addition to understand value 
appropriability from patent rights by guarding or establishing inimitability. Consequently, this 
proposes, that a firm’s value appropriation from an invention is not only affected by exogenous 
appropriability regimes (Cohen et al., 2000), or patent protection (De Carolis, 2003; Reitzig 
and Puranam, 2009) but also, or more so, by strategic litigation and the involved competences 
of the firm in different contexts. 
This focus is important to fill the need for the recognition of strategic patent litigation as a vital 
contributor to financial performance. Furthermore, firms can build specific efficiencies tailored 
to strategic litigation that supports them benefitting from their patents in different 
contingencies. Hence, different levels of risks, costs and potential benefits of litigation can be 
achieved by firm-specific abilities and knowledge of building, implementing and organising 
patent litigation tailored to the specific context.  
Taking this into account, the present research paper suggests that some firms 1. build firm-
specific legal experience, which is not transferrable to other organisations, 2. have the ability 
to choose the right strategy for the given industry context, 3. better employ court targeting 
practices. Consequently, these firm-specific abilities influence the outcome of patent litigation 
in terms of performance. This contributes to existing knowledge on the RBV’s notion of 
inimitability by considering imitation barriers determined by exogenous appropriability 




2.3 Definition of Key Constructs  
Throughout this dissertation, reappearing key constructs are discussed which refer to different 
fundamental concepts of the research framework. This is necessary to address the main concepts 
underlying strategic patent litigation as presented in the main framework Table 1. The following 
Table 3 gives an overview of the key constructs, which are established and critically discussed 
in the following sections.  
 
Table 3 Definition of Key Constructs 
Chapter and 
Construct 





The introduction of a product which is new to consumers or 






“Intellectual property is a category of intangible rights 
protecting commercially valuable products of the human 
intellect. The category comprises primarily trademark, 
copyright, and patent rights [..].” 
(2.3.3) Patents USPTO, 2020 
“A patent for an invention is the grant of a property right to 
the inventor.” In the United States, “The right conferred by 
the patent grant is, in the language of the statute and of the 
grant itself: “the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling” the invention in the United 





“[..] the decision to file a lawsuit and, following that, either 
to resolve [their] differences in pretrial settlement 




Rudy and Black, 2015 
Proactive Proprietary Patent Litigation Strategy or 
Proactive Defensive Patent Litigation Strategy. 
(2.3.4) Strategic 
patent litigation 
Rudy and Black, 2015 





Financial performance. In particular: firm sales and firm 




2.3.1 Innovation  
There is no “one size fits all” guide to successful innovation as it comes in all forms and sizes. 
According to Schumpeter (1942), the father of innovation research, innovation can be a new 
process, the initiation of a new market, new sources of material necessary for development, 
changes in the industrial organisation itself or incremental or radical innovation of a technology, 
product or service. From Rothwell and Gardiner (1985), we know that the process of innovation 
is lengthy. Starting from an idea which leads to the invention as such. Once the invention is 
commercialised, we speak of it as an innovation, and the cycle continues by incremental 
changes of that innovation. To be successful in the market and ahead of the competition, firms 
need to innovate. In the 1980s, Freeman et al. (1982), already wrote “not to innovate is to die” 
and with today’s global, fast-paced economies, it is more necessary than ever. However, not all 
firms benefit equally from innovation.  
One might say that, in a perfect world, a firm’s value creation is integrated into market progress 
based on collective, open innovation. In today’s economy, on the contrary, firm value creation 
is rooted in individual innovation protected by IP rights, often patents. This shows again that 
firms need to innovate and protect their innovations because otherwise, they might risk losing 
essential profits. The conundrum is that the same argument does not hold when thinking about 
the ideal open market, free of patents and IP. Without IP protection, markets might be more 
efficient, and innovation might increase, however, firms also lose one of their most important 
competitive advantages. Hence, patents are still vital in today’s business environment, but it is 
important to note that appropriability from innovation and value-creating moves far beyond 
patents (Somaya et al., 2012). We do not know the realities of a market without patents, but one 
thing is certain: either “all” companies protect their innovations, or “none” do. Leaving little 
room for an in-between solution3. Put differently, firms need to protect their IP to capture rents 
from their innovation and also to foster new innovation. Thereby, research agrees that patents 
are a key tool to achieve both (Kitch, 1977; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; Cohen et al., 2000; 
Rudy and Black, 2015). Whereby they might be more powerful to achieve the first. 
Back to today’s market, where without IP rights, fast, low-cost imitation is inevitable 
(Mansfield et al., 1981; Cockburn et al., 2002; DiMasi et al., 2003; Adams and Brantner, 2010; 
Liu and La Croix, 2015), hence firms are often discouraged to continue innovating without 
them. This is because the innovation always remains the same; the only thing that changes is 
 
3 There are firms trying to establish an “open source” approach, not litigating against infringers, for example, Tesla.  
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which company is creating value from it. Sherry and Teece (2004) present one crucial point: 
innovation and value from that innovation are different concepts, where the innovation itself is 
independent (however related) to the intellectual property rights for that given innovation. 
Innovation, especially creating value from innovation by successful commercialisation, is a 
challenging goal that many companies do not achieve. Lacking the needed competencies for 
commercialisation may deter the firm from returns and enable other firms, customers or other 
players in the industry to profit instead. Those competitors often possess complementary assets 
that make it easier for them to profit from innovation through imitation as opposed to the 
originator of the IP (Teece, 1986). Therefore, argued based on Teece (1986), one crucial part 
of successful market positioning and commercialisation is the protection against competitors 
by fostering unique skills within an industry or within the firm. However, there is no “one size 
fits all” approach to innovation and also no formula that promises perfect IP protection skills.  
In sum, the innovation itself is a fragile construct, and its value is bound to its intellectual 
property rights. These are supported or even created by firm-specific capabilities in the market.  
2.3.2 Intellectual Property and Forms of Intellectual Property 
Protection  
Intellectual property is an intangible asset often associated with innovation and it is most 
precious to the company if it is protected from imitation (Barney, 1991). IP rights such as 
patents, copyrights, trademarks (Teece et al., 1997; Sherry and Teece, 2004) and industrial 
designs can be filed for by a company to protect IP. However, firms can also capture value from 
intellectual property by relying on secrecy, lead time or complementary assets (Levin et al., 
1987; Cohen et al., 2000; James et al., 2013). All of the above protection mechanisms can be 
isolating mechanisms against imitation. However, the focus on patents as a form of IP 
protection in the present research has three different reasons.  
First, other than copyrights, trademarks or industrial designs, patents offer tangible IP rights 
that can be accumulated and enforced by law. Whereby, other isolating mechanisms, for 
example, secrecy can be used to prevent the imitation of IP and to diminish the “observability” 
of knowledge (Liebeskind, 1996) they are often subject to “leakage” problems. Patents hereby 
have the advantage, that they can protect valuable innovations that have high-value capture 
potential by law, even though they are often publicly disclosing vital information (Somaya et 




Second, patents offer detailed precise protection, especially for technological innovation which 
can be protected by the strong appropriability regime in the United States of America. Secrecy 
or lead time is oftentimes more important in environments with weak appropriability where 
patent rights are fragile, unenforceable or are used complementarily (Beukel and Zhao, 2018). 
In such environments, patents are not less important, their purpose, however, can switch from 
value creation to other strategic means, for example, to the protection of other patents (Lanjouw 
and Schankerman, 2001; Beukel and Zhao, 2018) or to building patent portfolios to counter 
litigation risks (Ziedonis, 2004; Beukel and Zhao, 2018). Different products, processes and 
technologies need different imitation barriers (Teece et al., 1997). Here, the scope, longevity, 
protection ability and feasibility of each IP right is inherent to the industry and the present patent 
laws in it (Liu and La Croix, 2015). Hence, research significance of patents predominantly 
stems from both, them being tacit IP rights that can be accumulated and their importance on the 
market (Arora, 1997; Beukel and Zhao, 2018), especially in strong appropriability regimes such 
as the manufacturing industries in the United States of America (Somaya, 2012; James et al., 
2013; Beukel and Zhao, 2018). 
Third, the inherent imperfections of patents can be ironed out by patent litigation. Contrary to 
uncertain protection by secrecy or lead time, this offers another level of protection (Somaya, 
2012). Thereby, patents are not only capable of protecting IP, patent litigation also enables a 
firm to take infringers economically accountable (Reitzig et al., 2007; Rudy and Black, 2015). 
Albeit no isolating mechanism is inherently perfect, the well-developed patent protection 
system grants three layers of certainty: legal right, litigation possibility and financial leverage. 
Other protection mechanisms, for example, secrecy, do neither constitute a formal right nor do 
they grant possible institutionally based leverage in case of imitation. 
In addition to the above-mentioned arguments, the focus on patents in this dissertation (rather 
than similar forms of isolating mechanisms, such as trademarks and copyrights) is based on 
their widespread heavy use in multiple industries, the thoroughly available data of patent 
enforcement and the predominant focus on patent litigation in the strategic and innovation 
literature (Somaya, 2003; Agarwal et al., 2009; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010; Polidoro and Toh, 




To protect innovation and generate profits from its commercialization, firms often resort to 
patents. Even though their usefulness is contested by many scholars, business experts and 
managers, patents still constitute one of the most important protection mechanisms.  
Sherry and Teece (2004) have acknowledged the value of patents in several stages during their 
lifetime. Patents are granted for an innovation that is (a) different from prior art and (b) 
patentable. Thereby the mere patent application for an innovation increases its value. A new 
technological process can be protected if it is officially registered at the patent office of a state. 
The patent office can allocate patents to protect inventions for a specific period and geographic 
area. If a patent is granted by the Patent Office, the value increases even more because it allows 
the patent holder to exclude others from using the innovative ideas. Then, if a patent is infringed 
or its validity and scope have been confirmed in a court of law, its economic value reaches a 
peak (Sherry and Teece, 2004). Hence, patents are highly valuable, even if they do not secure 
profit generation per se (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2003).  
However, while companies heavily invest in filing patents and maintaining them, which both 
costs fees (James et al., 2013), patenting can also have pitfalls. Even if the fees are disregarded, 
getting a patent granted comes with its unique challenges. Patent rights could be denied, could 
be too narrow or broad in scope or could be granted too late, disrupting, inter alia, licensing 
efforts (Gans et al., 2008). Additionally, they cannot be renewed after they expired (Sandner 
and Block, 2011). Arguably the main weakness of patents as an isolating mechanism is the need 
to disclose valuable information and knowledge when applying for the patent itself (Gans et al., 
2008) Furthermore, even during the life span of a granted patent, it is vulnerable to invalidity 
and infringement suits, which, if successful, diminish the patent value entirely. However, if 
such suits are not successful, for example, because of non-infringement scope reallocations, the 
value of patents can even increase further (Sherry and Teece, 2004). Thus, despite its pitfalls, a 
patent is required for strategic patent litigation and, nevertheless, necessary to increase or secure 
the economic value of the IP it is covering. 
The very essence of a patent is an exclusionary right (Ziedonis, 2004), which can be translated 
into economic terms as an “option to go to court” (Marco, 2005, p. 325). This means that the 
patent owner only has the right to preclude others from using, manufacturing or selling a 
product or service that uses the patented invention, which is to be differentiated from a mere 
affirmative, usage right (Ziedonis, 2004). However, this means, it is on the firm to act and 
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strategically protect the patent rights against competitors. Consequently, the value of the patent 
comes down to the enforcement, the legal protection of it, which is often fruitless (Cohen et al., 
2000).  
It needs to be mentioned that litigation is not the only way to capture value from a patent. Patent 
applications can also send a signal to competitors. Those signalling strategies are used to 
disseminate knowledge, signal a willingness to protect information or even guide the direction 
of innovation within an industry (Kultti et al., 2006; Kultti et al., 2007; James et al., 2013). One 
example for the latter is the automotive company, Tesla. Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, 
announced in 2012 that the company will not actively pursue litigation against infringers. With 
this strategy, the carmaker wants to increase innovation within the industry. Such strategies can 
work, but they are also very risky. Especially because research found that imitability negatively 
influences profitability (De Carolis, 2003). Another strategy would be the opposite, using the 
distraction technique to trick competitors into investing in patented innovations that are only 
patented by the firm to distract from other important technology but are otherwise not valuable 
(Langinier, 2005; Somaya, 2012). 
It was already discussed that patents are often key for value creation from innovation, however, 
as with any other IP right protection incentives, there is the need for congruence between the 
patent itself and the patent strategy of the firm. Somaya (2012), state that companies need to 
confer the sense of usefulness to the customer. Visible patent strategies can be helpful, for 
example, if a company uses its patents to communicate value to customers or potential allies. 
Thereby, patents and patent strategies can be used as signals to increase the likelihood of 
alliances, licenses, financing or commercialization agreements with established firms or start-
ups (Arora, 1995; Oxley, 1999; Gans et al., 2002; Mann and Sager, 2007; Gans et al., 2008; 
Haeussler et al., 2009; Somaya, 2012).  
Patents are isolating mechanism that can protect assets from imitation. However, the underlying 
problematic about patents, and often isolating mechanism as such, is that their value cannot be 
directly determined (Schankerman, 1998). Hence, the value and costs of patents are context 
related. Previous studies explained the differences in costs and benefits of a patent-based value 
capture strategy with contextual factors such as competition intensity or the local IP regime as 
well as firm-specific capabilities such as R&D investment, innovation, knowledge or the 
patenting process management skills (James et al., 2013). This dissertation furthermore argues 
that patent value is dependent on the protective ability of the firm.  
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Moreover, a variety of studies established that patents are often not the only or main isolating 
mechanism employed by firms and that patent intensity is heavily industry-dependent 
(Mansfield et al., 1981; Levin et al., 1987; Schankerman, 1998; Cohen et al., 2000). However, 
those conclusions need to be treated with caution. Whereas Schankerman (1998) and Mazzoleni 
and Nelson (1998) are representing the traditional stance that patents are more effective and are 
used more often in some industries, like the pharmaceutical industry, Ziedonis (2004) is 
opposing this view by proposing that firm in fragmented markets, like the electronics industry, 
need to build large patent portfolios as well to protect against competitors.  
2.3.3.1 Patent Strategies  
Patents are an important means to protect intellectual property. From an organisational 
perspective, they also ensure a competitive advantage on the market (Granstrand, 2000; Rudy 
& Black, 2015). A vast majority of past research concentrated on incentives to patent 
inventions, for example, the protection against competitors or license royalties (for an overview, 
see: Ruby & Black, 2015). Others concentrated on the strategic management of patents (for an 
overview, see: Somaya, 2012), by integrating literature from economics, law and management 
(Somaya, 2003; Lumineau and Oxley, 2012; Somaya, 2012). 
Patent strategies constitute the possible direction of a company’s future actions to protect its 
intellectual property. A firm’s patent strategy can be defined as the determination of the 
strategic utilisation of patents to achieve objectives and a competitive position. Thereby, the 
focus is set on the comprehensive part that patents play within a firm (Somaya, 2012). Patent 
strategies constitute the possible direction of a company’s future actions to protect its 
intellectual property assets. Recent literature indicated that the generic strategic use of patents 
for this purpose can be distinguished by proprietary or defensive usage of patents (Somaya, 
2003; Somaya, 2012; Rudy and Black, 2015). Somaya (2012), defined a third option as 
leveraging patent strategy.  
2.3.3.2 Proprietary Patent Strategies 
A patent provides the patentee with the ability to enforce the exclusion of competitors that want 
to take advantage of the invention protected by the patent. Thereby, the role of a patent is to 
ensure proprietary rights. By following a proprietary patent strategy, firms try to defend their 
inventions from imitation by securing enforcement right (i.e. patents) for them. Those, patent 
rights are then actively protected as a key competitive advantage. Therefore, firms are less likely 
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to engage in license agreements to keep sole commercialization rights and are more prone to 
actively track potential patent infringers (Teece, 1986; Rudy and Black, 2015). 
A proprietary patent strategy aims to establish a competitive position on the market. Several 
additional advantages of patents can elucidate the benefits that firms may experience by 
following a proprietary strategy. For example, patents can not only be used to block competitors 
from copying a particular invention, but firms can also avoid detrimental consequences, for 
example, injunctive relief during patent litigations with the accumulation of patents (Somaya, 
2012). Moreover, proprietary strategies can be implemented to use patents as a protection 
mechanism to prevent the imitation of inventions (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; Rudy and Black, 
2015). They are furthermore utilised to impede market entry for competitors (Clarkson and Toh, 
2010; Rudy and Black, 2015). In conclusion, a proprietary patent strategy can be the means to 
ensure the protection of certain technologies and exclusivity of their commercialization rights.  
2.3.3.3 Defensive Patent Strategies  
Defensive patent strategies can be employed to safeguard the firm against patents that are 
possessed by other firms. Thereby, the firm has the objective to ensure its rights to use and 
commercialise inventions without interfering others property rights (Somaya, 2012). Put 
differently, the firm wants to avoid to be in a “competitive disadvantage” (Rudy and Black, 
2015). For example, a firm could make efforts to accumulate a variety of patents that might be 
valuable to defend against competitive patents in the future. By following a defensive patent 
strategy, firms can minimise that threat of being restricted from using specific inventions that 
are protected by external patents. Therefore, those strategies typically comprise protective 
measures against the limitation of usage rights of technology, due to other companies’ patents. 
Those protective measures can be leveraged by large patent portfolios or patent pools (which 
are formed through cross-licensing between companies) that also provide firms with the 
possibility to profit from future inventions (Somaya, 2012; Rudy and Black, 2015). Defensive 
patent strategies can be employed either ex-post or ex-ante and are often described by scholars 
in terms of “(defensive) blocking and preemption”, “(defensive) thickets”, “portfolio patenting” 
and other terms (Somaya, 2012). 
If patents are used in such a defensive role, it often happens that mutual hold-up situations occur 
(Somaya, 2003). For example, two companies holding complementary patent rights could 
threaten each other by expressing their readiness to sue. Eventually, both parties can agree upon 
a beneficial solution. In sum, a defensive patent strategy reflects the incentives of firms to 
protect be protected from the accusations of infringement of competitive patent rights.  
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2.3.3.4 Leveraging Patent Strategies  
Somaya (2012) presented a third generic patent strategy, the leveraging strategy. This strategy 
is predominantly aimed at maximising profits by bargaining compensations based on patent 
rights. The author indicates that leveraging patent strategies might be a good alternative if 
proprietary or defensive patent strategies are not necessary or feasible. This could be the case, 
for example, if the patent protects an invention that is not particularly important to the core 
business of the firm or if it might be possible to circumvent, “invent around” the patent. A 
leveraging patent strategy might, nevertheless, be valuable because patents can also be used to 
generate rents, for example, if the patent holder grants usage rights in exchange for a royalty 
(i.e. licensing). That is possible because of the special feature of patents that allows the patentee 
the exclusion of others from using the patented invention. The leveraging patent strategy 
clarifies the notion that flawless patent protection of every technology of a firm is often 
unnecessary as long as the central core technologies are thoroughly protected, and the protecting 
patents are hard to circumvent. Firms that exclusively deploy the leveraging strategy (mostly 
without even generating products on their own) are called patent sharks or trolls. In patent 
litigation, leveraging patent strategies can be powerful, especially because of reputation 
building or the opportunity to deter competitors with preliminary injunctions (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2012).  
 
As shown in the sections above, patent strategies can be distinguished when it comes to their 
key characteristics. Moreover, the areas of application for different strategies can vary. Patent 
strategies can be aimed at one patent strategy domain or several domains at the same time. 
Somaya (2012) identified three comprehensive patent strategy domains: patent rights, licensing 
and enforcement. The Author indicated in his earlier work that the three domains entail nested 
choices. This means that some choices (for example, to licence a patent) are only possible if 
prior choices allow them (for example, owning the patent before).  
In detail, patent rights refer to actions that have to do with the possession and development of 
patents and patent portfolios. Licensing comprises the decisions of the scope of sharing of 
patent rights (for example, alliances, open source). The enforcement domain is of particular 
interest because the following paragraphs are aimed at patent strategy outcomes, especially 
patent litigation strategy outcomes. According to Somaya (2012), the enforcement domain 
involves the strategic (or threat of) use of litigation against infringers. The next paragraph will 
emphasise this domain and show more extensive approaches to this patent strategy domain. 
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2.3.4 Patent Enforcement and Litigation Strategies 
As argued in the previous paragraphs, to commercialise their innovations and gain profit, firms 
can protect their IP rights by enforcement. Therefore, it is not surprising the popularity of patent 
litigation is increasing. Figure 2 shows the total number of infringement cases for all firms from 
the dataset used in this dissertation for each year between 2000 and 2015. The trend is clear, 
strategic patent litigation became more popular since the early twenty-first century with a rise 
in total numbers from approximately 1050 in 2000 to 1800 in 2015.4  
Figure 2 Number of Infringement Suits per Year 
 
One important premise of patent litigation lawsuits is that it is a local endeavour dependent on 
the jurisdiction and only binding in such (Beukel and Zhao, 2018). However, litigation 
strategies are not just exogenously determined. Indeed, they are also chosen and endogenously 
manufactured by the management of the firm itself responding to the given external 
environment. That means, the value of patents is determined by the power of the patent holder 
to prove them valid and infringed in a court of law. If this endeavour is successful, patent 
litigation can lead to damage payments which are paid by the infringer to compensate for the 
patent holders loss and often lead to injunctions for the infringer to inhibit the further 
commercialization of the invention in question (Shapiro, 2010). It is striking that the number of 
patent litigation cases and the amount of damages awarded is increasing continuously (Shapiro, 
2010). Even if many cases are ultimately settled out of court, filing an infringement case is one 
 
4 The slight drop in 2015 was expected as it was the last year for which the USPTO provided litigation data, increasing the 
chances of incompleteness of the data. 
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of the most important means to ensure IP right protection. With increasing popularity and 
benefits of patent litigation, the question might not be to patent or allow competitors to patent 
(James et al., 2013). It is now important to ask: whether to litigate or “allow” competitors to 
litigate?  
Litigation lawsuits can be patent infringement suits (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; 
Agarwal et al., 2009; Polidoro and Toh, 2011; Rudy and Black, 2015) and declaratory 
judgement suits (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Rudy and Black, 2015). Firms that engage 
as the plaintiff in patent infringement suits follow a proactive proprietary patent litigation 
strategy (PPPL) (Rudy and Black, 2015). This implies that the firm is actively seeking and filing 
lawsuits against patent infringers. Firms that engage as the plaintiff in declaratory judgement 
lawsuits follow a proactive defensive patent litigation strategy (PDPL)(Rudy and Black, 2015). 
This implies that the firm, the potential infringer, is suing the patent owner to attain a patent 
invalidation, non-infringement or non-enforceability verdict usually to prevent restrictions of 
operations.  
Litigation research has predominantly concentrated on offensive, proprietary strategy (Agarwal 
et al., 2009; Polidoro and Toh, 2011; Rudy and Black, 2015; Chen et al., 2016). However, some 
authors looked at proactive, defensive patent litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Chen 
et al., 2015). Rudy and Black (2015) studied both strategies and defined proprietary litigation 
as characterised by the plaintiff in a patent infringement suit being the patent owner, suing a 
potential infringer, whereas, defensive litigation is characterised by the plaintiff in a declaratory 
judgement suit being the potential infringer, suing the patent owner. During litigation, both 
actions are manifested strategies that are expressed in the type of litigation suit that is pursued 
by the plaintiff. In addition to both proactive strategies, Rudy and Black (2015) also mention 
both reactive strategies. In reactive strategies, proprietary or defensive litigation is when the 
firm is the defendant in either of the two suit types. However, it can be debated if reactive 
participation in litigation can be strategic as both reactive litigation types require a plaintiff to 
start proceedings. Therefore, the focus of this dissertation is on proactive patent litigation.  
2.3.4.1 Patent Infringement Suits  
In a patent litigation, the patent owner initiates a lawsuit against a potential infringer (Polidoro 
and Toh, 2011). Thus, the patent owner is the plaintiff and the potential infringer is the 
defendant (Ziedonis, 2004; Rudy and Black, 2015). This type of litigation action is, for 
example, characterised by the patentees’ incentive to detain imitation, obtain an injunction 
against the infringer or monetary damages. Thereby the patentee often proactively seeks to find 
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imitators to enforce patent rights (Polidoro and Toh, 2011) and exclude competitors from using 
the patented technology (Agarwal et al., 2009; Polidoro and Toh, 2011). The patent holder is 
responsible for monitoring the market for potential infringement activities. Therefore, the 
plaintiff in a patent infringement suit is pursuing a proactive proprietary patent litigation 
strategy (Rudy and Black, 2015) against an infringer firm which is either aware of its 
infringement activity or not (Shapiro, 2010).  
In enforcement, proprietary patent strategies often lead to litigation in court as a settlement is 
less likely (Somaya, 2003; Rudy and Black, 2015). To litigate actively in court against an 
infringer can have other motives as well, for example, litigation can be an important strategy to 
protect other patents. Companies can use patent litigation for signalling effects (Agarwal et al., 
2009), thereby, litigating an existing patent in court could deter competitors from infringing on 
related patents of the same company. Then, litigation would not only protect one patent but 
others as well. In conclusion, a proprietary patent strategy can be the means to ensure the 
protection of certain patented technology and exclusivity of its commercialization rights.  
2.3.4.2 Declaratory Judgement Suits  
Declaratory judgement suits are not as frequent as infringement suits (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; Rudy and Black, 2015). A declaratory judgement suit is characterised by 
the potential infringer suing a patent owner. The potential infringer is the plaintiff (patent owner 
is the defendant) in declaratory judgement suits. The aim of a declaratory judgement suit could, 
inter alia, be to defend against potential infringement accusations, to prevent restrictions of 
operations or to seek monetary relief. Defensive patent litigation allows firms to defend against 
having a competitive disadvantage. Thereby, the firm proactively tries to obtain the legal right 
to use a specific invention by defending against the potential property rights (and enforcement 
of such) protected by the patents of others. Therefore, the plaintiff in a declaratory judgement 
suit is pursuing a proactive defensive patent litigation strategy (Rudy and Black, 2015).  
There are two forms of declaratory judgement suits identified in the literature: patent 
invalidation suits and countersuits (Marco, 2005; Rudy and Black, 2015). A patent invalidation 
suit aims to declare the disputed patent invalid or to restrict the scope of it. Patent invalidation 
suits can be either initiated by a firm pre-emptively to challenge the validity of a competitor’s 
patent in court or as a defensive action after an infringement suit has been filed against the firm 
by a patent owner (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). The aim of countersuits is that the 
plaintiff of such either attempts to defend against being excluded from using an invention that 
is protected by competitor’s patents or initiates a countersuit in the attempt of mutual hold-up. 
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The defensive action is conducted by a firm enforcing its own patents in court as a response to 
the infringement suit of another firm. By doing so, firms signal their willingness to enforce their 
patents in court which might lead to private settlement of the IP disputes because each firm 
deters the other from being able to make use of their patented inventions. Therefore, mutual 
hold-up can be used to access a competitor’s technology (Somaya, 2003). 
2.3.4.3 Differences in Patent Litigation Strategies 
There are several important distinctions between the two patent litigation strategies because of 
which proactive proprietary patent litigation (strategic patent litigation in the following) is the 
main focus of this dissertation.  
First, being a plaintiff in an infringement lawsuit is predominantly a means to ultimately 
increase performance outcomes by the exclusion of certain competitors and, thus, its 
performance outcomes might be more pronounced and can be more precisely interpreted. 
Especially because being the plaintiff in a proprietary patent litigation lawsuit is a strategic 
choice that can be prepared and evaluated. Being a plaintiff in a declaratory judgement lawsuit, 
however, is oftentimes a means to countersue, where the plaintiff has fewer strategic choices 
about the initiation of the lawsuit. Comparing firms that are strategically prepared to litigate 
probably gives more interpretable findings than comparing them with firms that are probably 
urged to litigate based on defence.  
Second, successful patent infringement suits exclude competitors from using and 
commercialising a patented invention which may increase the patent owner’s sales. If during 
the litigation phase the patent in dispute is found valid and infringed, there is a great possibility 
that the judge will place an injunction ordering the infringing firm to stop commercialising its 
product (Shapiro, 2010; Rudy and Black, 2015). Successful declaratory judgement suits 
override the exclusionary rights of the patent owner, allowing the plaintiff to commercialise the 
patented invention, which arguably could allow the plaintiff to generate sales (Rudy and Black, 
2015). Nevertheless, after successful patent invalidations suits, the plaintiff must not 
automatically gain the right to exclude the patent owner from commercialising the product 
using the patented invention. Therefore, as opposed to infringement suits, patent invalidation 
suits can give rise to external effects. Whereas solely the patent owner benefits from possible 
positive outcomes of infringement suits, many firms in a specific industry can benefit from the 
invalidation of a patent due to one firm’s successful invalidation suit. If the patent is no longer 
valid property rights cannot be enforced and the innovation is free to use. This implies that 
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defensive patent litigation rather prevents firms from having a competitive disadvantage than 
increasing their competitive advantage (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). 
Third, another important effect derived from strategic patent infringement deterrence is the 
signalling of the willingness to actively protect patents, to show toughness in infringement cases 
and to pursue high royalties in order to gain a competitive advantage in a key market (Somaya, 
2003; Rudy and Black, 2015). When firms are actively pursuing infringers, other firms might 
be deterred from using or commercialising the litigated patent and performance outcomes might 
be more visible. In declaratory judgement suits, firms signal back the willingness to also enforce 
their patents in court, which might lead to private settlement of the IP dispute because each firm 
can deter the other from being able to make use of their patented inventions. Therefore, mutual 
hold-up can be used to access a competitor’s technology (Somaya, 2003) which is less 
straightforward in its testable performance outcomes.  
Fourth, proprietary patent litigation involves costs when it comes to monitoring infringement 
actions of competitors the costs involved in managing and controlling the proactive proprietary 
patent litigation process and the administrative costs involved. Thereby, the costs are closely 
tied to the enforcement process. Whereby proactive defensive litigation costs are concentrated 
at the patent level. Defensive patent litigation also involves substantial costs, especially building 
a patent portfolio that provides a barrier to imitation and infringement suits (James et al. 2013). 
Firms have to spend substantial amounts of money and other costly resources on the patenting 
process involving R&D and legal costs (Somaya et al. 2007). Although it is not in the scope of 
this dissertation, the costs involved in infringement suits are assessed to be more closely tied to 
the litigation process than other organisational proceedings, thus, the findings are most likely 
more accurate when focusing on proactive proprietary patent litigation.  
Fifth, in strategic patent litigation cases, lawsuit are filed more frequently than in declaratory 
judgement matters. Previous scholarship acknowledged the majority of patent litigation cases 
by finding only fifteen percent of their data involving declaratory judgement proceedings 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). The same effect can be found in the dataset used for this 
dissertation where only a small proportion of the cases were filed as declaratory judgement 
suits. Hence, a comparison would be driven by the imbalance of sample sizes. 
A thorough, comparable and generalisable analysis is therefore only given when focusing on 
proactive proprietary patent litigation activities of companies. This is in line with previous 
research (Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001; Agarwal et al., 2009; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010; Polidoro 
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and Toh, 2011; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Beukel and Zhao, 2018) and practice, where the 
majority of filed cases are patent infringement lawsuits (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). 
2.4 Previous Research in the Field of Patent Litigation  
Patent litigation is a relatively new field of research. Nevertheless, previous scholarship can be 
found with regards to its determinants and outcomes as well as related topics. However, the 
research areas and theoretical approaches are rather dispersed, subsuming different angles to 
grasp the economic value of patent enforcement strategies.  
Somaya (2012), categorised patent enforcement and litigation as one of the three big patent 
strategy research domains, besides acquiring and maintaining patent rights and licensing. 
Authors in the patent litigation literature concentrated, inter alia, on research concerning patent 
litigation strategies (Rudy & Black, 2015), strategic determinants concerning patent litigation 
or settlement (Meurer, 1989; Somaya, 2003; Choi and Gerlach, 2015), characteristics of patents 
involved in litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001), or patent litigation of cumulative 
innovations (Llobet, 2003).  
A few studies concentrated on outcomes of patent litigation (Shane and Somaya, 2007; Agarwal 
et al., 2009; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010; Rudy and Black, 2015). However, from these studies, 
only Rudy and Black (2015) looked at firm-specific economic performance consequences 
deriving from patent litigation. Hence, this dominant research gap was identifiable from the 
literature and presented a unique area for contribution. While the reasons, why companies do 
involve in litigation, have been researched before, the financial outcomes for firms are less 
clear. Especially the influence of strategic patent litigation on sales and profitability as well as 
costs has not been consolidated, up to my current knowledge, in published research, yet. In 
addition, only very few authors concentrated on contingencies that influence the litigation - 
performance relationship.  
Somaya et al. (2007) looked at in-house legal expertise and found, that it predicts a firm 
patenting performance. However, the authors did not focus on other, financial, outcomes of 
legal expertise nor legal expertise of patent litigation. While there exists some non-strategic 
work on attorneys in patent litigation and how to manage in-house and external personnel for 
cost reduction (Foster, 1986), it seems that there is no study up to date that addresses the role 
of attorneys for performance outcomes in patent litigation.  
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Rudy and Black (2015) looked at industrial contingencies of the strategic litigation process that 
influence performance outcomes but did only focus on the two more dominant industries in 
litigation research, the pharmaceutical and semiconductor industry. Furthermore, they only look 
at market share outcomes and, hence, the trade-off between costs and sales is overlooked.  
Somaya and McDaniel (2012) and very recently Beukel and Zhao (2018) were concerned with 
the institutional targeting techniques of organisations. Whereby the former author team has 
looked at the determinants of tribunal targeting, the latter focused on determinants of targeting 
in a specific country, none of both has paid attention to the outcomes of forum shopping. Paik 
and Zhu (2016), although focusing on strategic institutional targeting in different 
appropriability regimes, are not looking at litigating firms, but those affected by it. Addressing 
this gap of the outcomes of repeated institutional targeting in patent litigation will advance 
knowledge in this research area significantly by filling our understanding of why some firms 
perform better in patent litigation than others.  
Whereas previous literature has somewhat begun to explore strategic patent litigation 
empirically, one main missing factor is the theoretical implication it has. Polidoro and Toh 
(2011) contributed to RBV by comparing its implications of inimitability and non-
substitutability and find that firms actions incorporate a trade-off of when to deter imitation. 
Reitzig and Wagner (2010) contributed to the knowledge-based view of the firm to find 
knowledge complementarities between patent filing and patent litigation. However, the 
theoretical focus of scholarship of strategic patent litigation is scarce. Hence, we do not know 
from previous research that litigation is adding to the RBV’s notion of inimitability as an 
important value appropriation mechanism for firms. Furthermore, it is unclear how some firms 
are more competent in implementing patent litigation than others.  
Building on RBV thinking, this dissertation further develops the thesis that strategic patent 
litigation strategy outcomes are influenced by firm, industry and institutional contingencies that 
some firms are more efficiently utilising for patent protection.  
The remaining interesting findings from previous scholars in the patent enforcement domain 
are consolidated and presented in a comprehensive table (Table 4). The more comprehensive 
set of research concerning the determinants and outcomes of patent litigation is discussed in the 
following two chapters. These insights will further clarify why the present dissertation finds 
answers to four research gaps that can be identified from the literature while contributing to the 
resource-based view of the firm. It is important to note, that the table exclusively addresses 
studies that investigate the patent litigation context.  
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Table 4 Previous Research on Patent Litigation 
Purpose of the study Context Key findings Theory Patent domain Litigation 
(strategy) 
Author (year), title and journal 
 
Determinants of Patent Litigation 
Investigating settlement 
outcomes resulting from 
patent strategies. Or:  
why firms are willing to 
continue fighting patent suits 





Support for strategic stake 
(citations) explanations in non-
settlement of patent suits. No 
clear empirical support for the 


















Judgement Suits  
Somaya (2003) 
 
Strategic Determinants of 
Decisions not to settle Patent 
Litigation 
 
Strategic Management Journal  
 
 
Determinants of patent suits 
and heterogeneity in litigation 
risk  
 






Litigation risk increased for 
patents owned by 
individuals and firms with small 
patent portfolios. Firms with large 
portfolios are less likely to 











Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) 
 
Characteristics of Patent 
Litigation: A Window on 
Competition 
 
RAND Journal of Economics 
Determinants of patent value, 
litigation rate and 










The value of a patent is a function 
of the enforceability of IP rights, 
technology and the degree of 
uncertainty over IP rights. 







The option value of patent 
litigation: Theory and evidence 
 
















U.S. Suits  
Increased substitution threat 
results in decreased deterring of 
imitation the earlier the 
development stage and novelty 
and the lesser the commercial 
value of the innovation. 




Polidoro and Toh (2011) 
 
Letting rivals come close or 
warding them off? The effects of 
substitution threat on imitation 
Academy of Management  
How do asymmetric 
information, competitive 
rivalry (of top management 
teams) and market positions 
influence a firms reaction to 
patent litigation? 




All three affect a firm’s reactive 
patent litigation strategies. 
Managerial capabilities regarding 
legal astuteness in patent 









Chen et al. (2015) 
 
Information- and rivalry-based 
perspectives on reactive patent 
litigation strategy 
What influence will legal and 
cognitive distances have on 
MNE conflict resolution 
strategy choice in 
international business IP 
disputes? 
U.S. Suits  Legal distance is positively 
associated with the likelihood of 
an MNE choosing 
Negotiation (instead of litigation).  
Cognitive distance increases 
reliance on litigation and at the 
same time weakens the effect of 













not specified)  
Fainshmidt et al. (2014) 
 
Legal Distance, Cognitive 
Distance, and Conflict Resolution 
in 
International Business Intellectual 
Property Disputes 
 





Outcomes of Patent Litigation 
Knowledge 
complementarities between 
outsourcing upstream (patent 
filings) and downstream 
(patent litigation) activities  
Industry controlled 




applicants who filed 
at least 100 patent 
applications at the 
EPO  
Increasing (decreasing) 
performance in conducting patent 
litigation the less (more) related 
patent filings are sourced out. 
 
Loss of relevant technological 








Infringement Suits  
Reitzig and Wagner (2010) 
 
The hidden costs of outsourcing: 
evidence from patent data 
 
Strategic Management Journal 










Qualitative and quantitative 
evidence that patent litigation 
harms university licensing 
activity (to the private sector) 
 because it reduces time and 
resources available for marketing 





 Shane and Somaya (2007) 
 
The effects of patent litigation on 
university licensing efforts 
 
Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 
Outcomes of patent 
enforcement 
 





U.S. Suits (taking 
state differences into 
account) 
Litigiousness reduces spillovers 
anticipated from departures of 
Human Capital, particularly when 
the hiring organizations are 
entrepreneurial ventures. 







Agarwal et al. (2009) 
 
Reputation for toughness in patent 
enforcement: implications for 
knowledge spillovers via inventor 
mobility 
 













motivates type of patent 
litigation strategy 
 




U.S. Suits  
Firms in the pharmaceutical 
industry are more likely to follow 
a PPPL strategy. Firms in the 
semiconductor industry are more 
likely to engage in a PDPL 
strategy.  
Firms in the semiconductor 
industry with PDPL strategy 





















Rudy and Black (2015) 
 
Attack or Defend? The Role of 
Institutional Context on Patent 
Litigation Strategies 
 
Journal of Management 
Examination of the economic 
role of preliminary 
injunctions in legal disputes 
U.S. Suits  Injunction requests allow 
plaintiffs to go beyond the 
avoidance of “irreparable harm” 
to extract even greater profit by 
raising the costs of legal disputes. 
Litigation benefits stronger firms 
and is damaging to capital-
constrained rivals.  
Game theory  Leveraging 
Strategy  
Proactive 
Infringement Suits  
Lanjouw and Lerner (2001) 
 
Tilting the Table? The use of 
preliminary injunctions 
 




Attorneys and Institutions in Patent Litigation 
Understanding organizational 




tribunals) for nonmarket 
actions 
U.S. Courts Differences in expertise and 
procedural flexibility that 
typically accompany tribunal 
specialization.  
Developed theory about targeting 
decisions suggests two main 
drivers of tribunal targeting: 















Infringement Suits  
Somaya and McDaniel (2012) 
 
Tribunal Specialization and 
Institutional Targeting in 
Patent Enforcement 
 
Organization Science  
How do multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) choose 
where to litigate? 
 
U.S. Industries  
 
Country differences 
(For exmaple., foreign 
MNEs filing more 
than litigating) 
MNEs prefer to litigate in 
countries with substantial track 
records to send 
strong signals to competitors. 
Especially if operating in highly 
concentrated industries and for 
radical innovations, which require 









Infringement Suits  
Beukel and Zhao (2018) 
 
IP litigation is local, but those 
who litigate are global 
 
Journal of International Business 
Policy  
Institution seeking behaviour 
in patent wars 
Smartphone Industry 
in 20 countries 
incuding the U.S. 
Targeting of weak institutions if 
not directly involved in litigation 
to take advantage of arbitrage 
opportunities. 
  Firms not directly 
involved in Patent 
Litigation but 
affected by it 
Paik and Zhu (2016) 
 
The Impact of Patent Wars on 
Firm Strategy: Evidence 







2.4.1 Determinants of Patent Litigation in the Literature 
Several studies looked at the determinants of litigation. Many of the firm-specific measures in 
patent protection research concentrate on firm characteristics that are important before litigating 
patents, for example, R&D intensity (Somaya et al., 2007; James et al., 2013; Rudy and Black, 
2015), patenting capabilities such as internal patent filing competence (Reitzig and Wagner, 
2010; James et al., 2013) or superior firm resources (Agarwal et al., 2009). Especially in the 
field of economics, researchers concentrated on patent litigation determinants (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; Marco, 2005; Choi and Gerlach, 2015). Previous scholarship focused on 
determinants of patent enforcement and settlement (Meurer, 1989; Lerner, 1995; Somaya, 
2003; Choi and Gerlach, 2015) and characteristics of patents involved in litigation (Lanjouw 
and Schankerman, 2001). Choi and Gerlach (2015) provided evidence that patent pools could 
also influence litigation incentives and even protect weak patents from being litigated in court. 
Polidoro and Toh (2011) found that increased substitution threat decreases deterring of 
imitation. Concerning the probability of patent litigation, Meurer (1989), proposed that the 
private information about the validity of a patent or the cost allocation of litigation could 
influence the settlement of patent litigations. Nevertheless, the findings reflect the rather 
disparate character of this research domain and cannot be easily structured.  
One important work in the research area comes from Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001), who 
found several key determinants of patent litigation. The authors showed that litigation is more 
likely to occur if the patentees’ patent is infringed or if the involved parties possessed different 
expectations regarding the litigation outcome. Patent litigation is increased for patents that 
provide a valuable base (for example, often cited, many claims and forward citations per claim) 
for subsequent patents. When pursuing an aggressive protection strategy, litigation was more 
likely if the company sought reputation benefits. Lastly, the authors found that litigation is 
determined by the strategic stakes of a firm. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) argue that 
litigation is less likely if the costs of trial exceed the expected costs of settlement. Therefore, a 
company might not initiate a patent litigation suit because of the incentive to defend its own 
patent but to strengthen its reputation or bargaining power in the future. This is especially 
interesting because a firm that follows this strategy should elaborate carefully on the trade-off 
between the costs of patent litigation and the potential performance outcomes but also theory 




Somaya (2003) extended this litigation research by looking at the strategic determinants that 
affect patent suit settlement decisions. Thereby the author complemented existing studies 
concerning firm valuation, predatory behaviour and suit filing decisions. The article indicated 
several existing determinants of non-settlement (for example, irrational behaviour, reputational 
reasons, takeout competitors in key markets, extract royalties) and settlement (forced to 
compromise to access complementary patents, bargaining surplus and therefore shared 
litigation costs) of patent litigations. Nevertheless, the article did not address the underlying 
processes behind the strategic perspective as well as the performance implications of patent 
strategies that are pursued by firms.  
As shown above, authors in the patent litigation literature concentrated, inter alia, on research 
concerning strategic protection or defensive decisions of patent litigation (Somaya, 2003), 
strategic determinants concerning patent litigation or settlement (Meurer, 1989; Somaya, 2003; 
Choi and Gerlach, 2015), characteristics of patents involved in litigation (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001), patent litigation of cumulative innovations (Llobet, 2003), or costs of 
patent litigation (Bebchuk, 1984). From this paragraph, we could see that a significant amount 
of research was done on determinants of patent litigation, however, when it comes to factors 
that influence the effect of patent litigation strategies on performance, the present study profits 
from an angle that highlights the actions and characteristics of firms that are relevant during 
strategic litigation. 
It is well established in the literature that litigation itself is often the last resort to settle patent 
disputes and comes with many challenges. Research found that the enforcement of property 
rights through litigation is neither certain of success (Marco, 2005; Somaya, 2012) nor a very 
convenient approach (Rudy and Black, 2015). Before initiating an expensive trial process, firms 
often settle IP disputes in private negotiations, usually after they filed a lawsuit (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2003). Moreover, many times the patent holder may try to reach 
a license agreement with a competitor to receive royalty payments (Meurer, 1989). After filing 
a lawsuit, is most commonly recognised that companies either negotiate in private to settle 
disputes or go to trial (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2003). Although the 
determinants of patent litigation were addressed thoroughly, less attention has been given to 
potential performance outcomes of patent litigation. By looking at strategic patent litigation as 
well as its influence on costs, sales and profitability, it is possible to further refine knowledge 
on the benefits or detriments of patent enforcement. By incorporating knowledge on the 
determinants of patent litigation, one can extract valuable insights and an outlook for new 




2.4.2 Outcomes of Patent Litigation in the Literature 
Other than the direct performance outcome of proactive proprietary patent litigation 
investigated by Rudy and Black (2015) mentioned before (see: 2.4), litigation can have other 
outcomes that can affect the firm. Beukel and Zhao (2018), argue that settlement, injunction or 
litigation up to the final stages are a strategic choice of the suing company, thereby, each step 
does have implications for the firm as such. Litigation could, inter alia, be used to increase to 
worth of an existing patent or patent portfolio. Not surprisingly, as Sherry and Teece (2004) 
found that a valid and infringed patent is worth much more than a patent that has never been 
challenged in court. Therefore, IP litigation can redefine the existing boundaries or worth of 
patents (Teece, 2000; Linden and Somaya, 2003; Beukel and Zhao, 2018).  
Shapiro (2012) showed that especially the power of injunctions (i.e. if an injunction is granted 
a court will stop the infringing party to commercialise the disputed technology) can be used as 
an important bargaining chip in IP disputes because it can put extreme pressure on the opposing 
party into agreeing to a settlement to be able to continue with the commercialisation of the 
disputed technology. Thus, litigation and the threat of injunction might increase the 
performance outcomes of the plaintiff.  
Besides the advantages of the bargaining position, IP litigation can affect the reputation of a 
company. Agarwal (2009) found that litigiousness can reduce knowledge spillovers that occur 
if, for example, employees are unsatisfied with the protection of their IP output. The authors 
argue that patent litigation is a strategic means for companies to build a reputation for toughness 
and prevent other companies from benefitting from their human capital or R&D efforts. Somaya 
(2012) indicated that firms also might seek the “tailoring of technology standards” in their 
favour with strategic patent litigation. Other scholarship concentrated on more alternative 
outcomes of patent litigation and complements the eclectic stream of research. It was found that 
patent litigation leads to increases in executive turnover (Aharony et al., 2015), has negative 
effects on licensing in Universities (Shane and Somaya, 2007) and that increased performance 
in litigating can cause diminished outsourcing in related patent filings (Reitzig and Wagner, 
2010). 
This paragraph gives room to assume that even though not every IP dispute ends in litigation 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2003) and not every litigation case ends with a 
verdict (Somaya, 2003; Beukel and Zhao, 2018) it is nevertheless a powerful move to file a 




3 Research Design and Methodology 
Chapter 3 presents the research design and methodological approach of this dissertation. A 
special focus is set on the extensive data collection efforts in order to create a unique patent 
litigation and firm performance dataset, unprecedented in patent litigation research.  
3.1  Philosophical Approach  
The quantitative research methodology of this thesis is based on a positivist philosophical 
orientation5. The following paragraph elaborates on the approaches of Thomas Kuhn (1962) 
and Karl Popper (1959; 1963) who shaped the underlying philosophical discourse on 
positivism. When discussing the philosophical approach of this thesis and its underlying 
philosophical assumptions, it is important to look at four different, but related, building blocks: 
paradigms including ontology and epistemology, as well as methodology. These blocks are the 
foundation of the positivist philosophical view of this study. The next paragraph discusses how 
paradigms, ontology and epistemology, according to Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper influenced 
the present research.  
All three words originate from the ancient Greek language. According to the Merriam Webster 
Dictionary, they translate to paradigm meaning “pattern”, ontology meaning “study of being” 
and epistemology meaning “logical discourse of knowledge”. A paradigm is an unquestioned 
general assumption about theory or methodology based on common agreements among a 
research community (Kuhn, 1962). It can be seen as a model assumption based on theories to 
capture reality and to define how reality is perceived. Paradigms are characterised by 
ontological and epistemological arrangements that conclude methodological suggestions 
(Guba, 1990). Ontology is defined as the specific nature of the reality or nature of truth. 
Epistemology defines the relationship between the researcher and the reality or the relationship 
between the researcher and the nature of the scientific explanation.  
According to Kuhn (1962), a scientific community agrees on a paradigm and sticks to its 
practices and definitions. Thereby, the ultimate goal is to apply this paradigm to a vast set of 
 
5 Parts of this chapter rest on: Matheja, Valerie (2016), Nature and Philosophy of Social Science Research. What justification 
can be given for quantitative research methodology? A discussion with reference to the competing perspectives of Karl Popper 





instances. Kuhn (1962) presents an important point: scientists, are not easily convinced to let 
go of their hypotheses just because they were falsified. Positivist ontology, stresses the 
existence of an external social world, which is not existent in the mind but outside of it (Carson 
et al., 2001). In Kuhn’s interpretation, the reality has to be conformed to the researcher’s 
paradigm. In positivist epistemology, the researcher is independent of the reality. Although 
positivist research is most certainly also prone to bias from the researcher’s emotions or 
decisions as Kuhn suggested. One important take away is that a researcher is never truly 
independent from the paradigm. Nevertheless, the philosophical logic of positivism is 
predominantly driving the present research design, which is discussed hereafter. The 
researchers’ perspectives or beliefs should be rather independent of the single objective reality 
(Popper, 1959; Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). However, it should be acknowledged that, indeed, 
although independency of the researcher is the goal in this thesis, Kuhn (1962) made a valid 
point that somehow, even if not intended, the paradigm (especially practice of sticking to a 
paradigm despite falsification) also influences the research outcome.  
To reflect how Poppers (1959) understanding of falsification and positivism influences this 
thesis, this chapter first elaborates on his work about the three worlds. Popper (1979; 2012) 
defines three worlds that profess reality and how reality is shaped. World 1 includes inanimate 
and animate things that belong to the material world meaning, they are physical. It is assumed 
that, ontologically, they comprise an objective physical reality that is epistemologically 
independent of the researcher if it is not the researcher himself who is studied. World 2 
comprises the experiences of living beings, which can mean it is a reality that ontologically and 
epistemologically resides in the mind of the researcher. World 3 combines World 1 and World 
2 as it combines “objective products of the human mind” (Popper, 2012, p.8) that are both 
physical and products of the mind, for example, books. It can be seen as that ontologically there 
is a real world, but epistemologically this real world can only be assessed through the subjective 
mind (critical realism).  
With the focus on World 1 and its ontology, the present thesis tries to find the one true reality, 
more so, a generalisation of it. From the epistemology viewpoint, Popper (1959) departs 
significantly from logical positivism by arguing for a deductive approach. In logical positivism, 
propositions are regarded as meaningless if they are not yet tested and verified (Outhwaite, 
1987). Karl Popper (1959) was an advocate for not differentiating between meaningful and 
meaningless statements, which gives the first indication that inductive empirical methods would 
be unsuitable in the context of quantitative positivist research that is built from theory. Popper 




though both might be important, observing and inducing knowledge from it is ultimately not 
sufficient to embody science in Poppers (1963) eyes. For positivists that follow Popper, it is 
sheer impossible to gather enough observations to exclude the possibility of exceptions to a 
proposed scenario. There might always be the one outlier observation that does not verify (or 
falsify) the underlying theory, leading to false conclusions (Popper, 1959; Benton and Craib, 
2010; Ritchie et al., 2013). Thereby, Popper (1959) mainly criticises the idea of logical 
positivism, where a statement can only be science and meaningful if it is ultimately verified or 
falsified. According to him, scientific knowledge can be created from reality with observations, 
generalisation and abstraction. Thereby, rationality, mathematics and logic are important for 
deduction to generalise independently from any context and independently from the researcher 
to find the one single objective reality determined by existing theories.  
With regards to World 2, Strategic literature has discussed the ontological positioning of 
strategy. In his quest to unravel knowledge creation in management science, Tsoukas discussed 
different approaches to tackle strategy philosophically and concluded that “types of knowledge 
are [..] social constructs which fight for acceptance within particular institutional settings” 
(Tsoukas, 1994, p.777). Based on this statement, patent litigation strategy employment can be 
viewed as context dependent. However, from a strategic management perspective, patent 
litigation and strategies are designed to respond to an external, independent reality while still 
constructed internally and dependent on the designer. In the present thesis, strategic patent 
litigation is therefore not regarded as only driven by the environment and institutional setting. 
It is rather that the internal ability to form strategies acknowledges the existence of the external 
reality. A strategy is objectively viewed and realised whereby it responds to an external reality. 
Thereby, the researcher tries to generate patterns that can be similar across different contexts. 
Put differently, the environment is acknowledged when planning strategies, and thus, also 
influencing how researchers research such strategies. Building a bridge to Popper, strategy and 
litigation and all its documents belong to the inanimate and animate world and form a reality 
independently from the researcher. Therefore, the strategic decisions result in tacit data points 
that can be analysed and generalised. Protecting IP with patent litigation is undoubtedly only 
makes sense in an environment where litigation in court is possible. If, for example, a company 
wants to protect its IP in a country with a weak institutional system, this company will have 
major difficulties to enforce their IP rights through litigation. Based on this ontological stetting, 
epistemologically, research on strategising should not be context-dependent, however, research 




positivist researchers themselves should, however, always be independently assessing the topic 
of research.  
World 3 brings the subject of research and the researcher together, Popper (1959) presented 
ideas that advocate a deductive philosophical approach instead and refused the need for ultimate 
empirical verification but accepts observation as a tool. Following this approach, the scientist 
deduces hypotheses from theory and tests them. In positivism, predominantly maths and logic 
are used to allocate meaning, embracing the possibility that single statements or observations 
refute the general theory. Popper hereby wants to open the possibility to differentiate between 
single statements and universal statements. Whereby single statements cannot prove the truth 
(universal statements), they can falsify it (Popper, 1959; Popper, 1963). Poppers work is 
grounding positivist research by proposing empirical work that is aimed to derive statements 
from theories that are testable to show that they are “not yet false or false” (Popper, 1959; 
Phillips, 1987) rather than continuing an unachievable search for the truth. This view is still 
vital for contemporary research as it is now common to form null Hypotheses that can be 
rejected or not rejected (but not be true) by data testing (Ritchie et al., 2013) but cannot be 
considered as true or false. Therefore, the last theory not yet falsified is not true it is just not yet 
false. One major discussed issue of Popper’s falsification approach is that if a theory is falsified, 
it might lead to the inaccurate rejection of that theory. The debate is centred on common 
knowledge at a given time. From a revolutionary perspective, paradigms shift towards 
paradigms that avoid previous falsifications (Chalmers, 1978; Phillips, 1987). Kuhn opposes 
Popper as he critiqued that observation is theory-laden because it is not independent (objective) 
of the subjective view of the observer and his embeddedness within a paradigm (Kuhn, 1962; 
Bogen, 2014). Popper (1963) was aware of such influences, however, he refused to not bring 
this subjectiveness in conjunction with a decline of the scientific status of the new theories. 
However, incorporating Kuhn’s criticism from above, especially when generalising, there are 
minor “falsifications” from outlier observations that do not establish a theory as false when 
sticking to a paradigm that allows exceptions to the rule.  
In sum, this thesis concentrates on researching the influence of patent litigation on firm 
performance through logic and statistics to find a generalisable pattern in different contexts of 
the firm. Ontological, this thesis assumes that there is an objective physical reality of strategic 
actions and processes which are epistemologically independently from the researcher. Being 
aware of paradigm influences it is the goal to interpret objectively if falsification of theory must 
be derived. The goal is achieved by delivering a quantitative research design with panel data 




3.2 Quantitative Research Design 
In line with Karl Popper's positivist approach, the present research uses deduction and strives 
for the identification of generalisable, explanatory causal relations.  
The deductive research approach is defined by testing theoretical statements (hypotheses built 
on theory) in an empirical, statistical manner with gathered data. The necessary variables to 
conduct this study and to test the proposed conceptual model were identified from the literature. 
If hypotheses are based on theoretical assumptions and are tested separately using empirical 
evidence, it implies a deductive research approach (Saunders et al., 2009; De Vaus, 2011). The 
deductive part of this study makes it possible to analyse if the predicted relationships (among a 
firm’s patent litigation strategy, performance and the moderation effects) derived from existing 
theory, are supported by the empirical findings.  
Quantitative research is defined by using statistics to investigate a model with data in a 
mathematical manner. Quantitative methods are generally appropriate to investigate many 
different firm characteristics in a variety of industries based on extensive data. Hence, research 
can be conducted on a large scale (Saunders et al., 2009). Therefore, the quantitative approach 
in this study facilitates finding differences between industries and firms and helps to generalise 
findings on the influence of litigation on performance.  
Even if sometimes contested (see: Priem and Butler, 2001), the RBV of the firm is a mature, 
well-known theory in strategic management and international business (Peng, 2001) literature. 
The use of such a well-established theoretical view alongside a deductive research approach is 
in congruence with the choice of quantitative data collection, which is also largely applicable 
when testing variable relationships (Edmondson and McManus, 2007; Saunders et al., 2009; 
De Vaus, 2011). The emphasis of the quantitative part of the study is on theory testing, where 
the assumptions of the RBV are examined and knowledge is complemented in the context of 
patent litigation strategies (in order to create or maintain inimitability) and its implications for 
competitive advantage. 
Existing theories, as well as data, are vital to test causal relationships, whereby high sample 
sizes increase the possibility of finding exceptions to universal statements. Thereby positivist 
findings are broadly applicable for the whole research population (Wilson, 2010). The study is 
explanatory of nature, which means that a deeper understanding of a subject is created by testing 
a model. While descriptive research is limited to identifying and describing the relevant 




insight and reasons by also developing and testing the causal explanations. By using 
explanatory research one can verify the proposed direct positive influence of patent litigation 
strategies on firm profitability with expected moderation effects of the industry as well as the 
firm-specific contingencies. Therefore, to explain the effect of patent litigation strategies on 
firm performance, the study draws from strategic management, patent and patent litigation 
literature as well as the RBV to develop, refine and expand existing knowledge of the outcomes 
of patent litigation in court. In line with this, the research questions of the study are aimed to 
find generalisations on the causal effects of patent litigation strategies on performance. Hence, 
the investigation of the causal effects of litigation strategies, industry factors, firm factors and 
performance is the main aim of the study.  
3.3 Sample and Data Collection 
To find data that provides credible and reliable findings, I identified a three-step approach. I 
followed these three steps to ensure that the data obtained was, on the one hand, focused enough 
to fit the research project and, on the other hand, widely applicable to litigation research projects 
that might follow in the past. First, I determined which sample and data criteria was important 
to answer the hypotheses. Second, I selected a valid data source that provided the sought-after 
data. Third, I identified the specific variables and downloaded the data. Figure 3 illustrates the 
sample and data collection process.  
Figure 3 The Sample and Data Collection Process 
 
3.3.1 Step 1: Determining the Sample and Data Criteria 
The U.S. is the principal country to conduct patent litigation research (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; Somaya et al., 2007; Rudy and Black, 2015). This is not surprising because 
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the United States patent law enforcement system and IP protection regime is very robust 
compared to other countries due to the strong appropriability regime and available records 
(James et al., 2013). The United States of America is not only a beneficial setting for patent 
litigation research because of their consistent quality of available litigation data. It is also 
important to consider that the U.S. patent system is rooted in a stable institutional infrastructure. 
Companies need to make sure that they can rely on laws and a strong local enforcement system 
to harvest the fruits of litigation (Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). Furthermore, 
the U.S. is home to innovative, strong and big markets and has a history of patenting and 
litigation. Litigation is dependent on jurisdictions with the above characteristics as it is vital to 
protect IP in markets that matter for the economic wellbeing of the firm. Not to forget, that 
litigation outcomes are only binding in the country of litigation (Beukel and Zhao, 2018). Thus, 
the United States’ litigation environment provides opportunities for meaningful research. After 
all, as most litigation research is conducted in U.S. markets, concentrating on the same context 
enhances the comparability of litigation research to make findings as valuable as possible.  
Comprehensive information on court cases (including distinctions between plaintiffs and 
defendants) was needed. Hence, the data should include U.S. companies that engaged in 
proprietary or defensive patent litigation in a timeframe of 16 years, from 2000-2015. 
Timeframes were adopted in the literature before (Somaya et al., 2007; Rudy and Black, 2015), 
however, while previous research concentrated on much shorter timeframes, a 16-year approach 
is more promising and necessary to receive the sought results. This is the case because litigation 
and the realisation of its outcomes can take up a substantial amount of time. Litigation data 
from after 1999 is often more complete than earlier data (Marco, 2005), which is important to 
obtain accurate results that reflect reality. Furthermore, obtaining data starting after the turn of 
the millennium adds to the topicality and relevance of patent litigation research.  
Database data can overcome some problems associated with the collection of individual 
primary data. In the present research, this has two positive effects. First, secondary data helps 
to keep (cost and) time investments manageable (Cowton, 1998). Second, secondary data 
diminishes the risks and uncertainties related to primary data collection (Cowton, 1998). 
Potential data analysis delays due to insufficient responses, access problems, sample 
discrepancies or response bias can be diminished, and the prospects of the study can be met in 
the given timeframe. Hence, the necessary time investment for the whole study becomes more 
manageable. Unfortunately, secondary data comes with the detriment that the data is assembled 
by another party and nearly no control can be exercised over the sample and collection 




nature of the data and how it has been assembled (Cowton, 1998). The present research is only 
possible by conducting a high-scope quantitative analysis based on financial and litigation data 
that is often difficult to obtain and unmanageable to collect separately for each entity.  
The data sample criteria  
In the process of conducting this research, I considered several research questions. It was a 
priority to make sure that the data was not narrowing down the possible research opportunities 
and interests. Thus, the downloading criteria for potentially necessary data were kept as broad 
as possible to allow further research proceedings. However, it was necessary to define some 
constraints for the downloading process to balance time commitment and data richness. I 
determined the following necessary criteria for the data to test the proposed hypotheses:  
• Publicly traded and private firms 
• Active and inactive firms  
• Country code: USA 
• The period from 2000 – 2015 
• Manufacturing firms (SIC codes 20-39) 
3.3.2 Step 2: The Selection of the Databases 
Finding a suitable database was grounded on the two main necessities: access and content. To 
find the best possible fit, I evaluated the available options according to these two criteria. Recent 
research concentrated on a comprehensive list of data sources. The most frequently used 
database for financial data was “Compustat”. For litigation data, many researchers consulted: 
Lex Machina, RPX (Rational Patent Exchange), LexisNexis and Westlaw, (for detailed 
descriptions see: (Marco et al., 2017). The main source of many of these litigation databases is 
Public Access to Court Electronic Records, or short, PACER. By using these mentioned 
databases, PACER is used indirectly by the majority of litigation scholars. Court records in the 
form of docket records are purchasable on PACER for a case-by-case fee. LexisNexis and 
Westlaw additionally source from other paper documents, however, this addition is most 
comprehensive for cases before the 2000s (Marco et al., 2017). All the above-mentioned 
databases were excluded from being possible data sources because they did not provide 
accessible litigation data from 2000-2015. Furthermore, access to them was not provided (by 
the University of Leeds, LUBS or CIBUL) or access to them was only available for purchase. 




Meanwhile, the financial data for the research project was downloaded from Thomson One 
Banker (TOB), a database to which access is provided by the University of Leeds. The database 
provides up-to date financial information from private and public companies starting from 
1982. Thomson One Banker was suitable to cover all needed financial information. Meanwhile, 
a reliable source for litigation data was still absent. However, it was clear that PACER data was 
the main interest of the content focus. 
In March 2017, the United States Patent and Trademark Office released an economic working 
paper calling for research on patent litigation, inter alia, the impact of patent litigation on a 
firms’ financial situation. They conclude that a better insight into the effects of patent litigation 
is needed but restricted by limited information sources on court proceedings and involved 
parties and access problems for researchers. The authors state that: “At this time, however, there 
is no reliable, comprehensive, free and publicly accessible source of patent litigation data. 
Researchers must rely on proprietary data that are typically costly and often do not provide 
formats that make it easy to integrate other data elements and sources” (Marco et al., 2017; 
p.5). The report, “Patent Litigation Data from US District Court Electronic Records (1963-
2015)”, accompanied the Patent Litigation Docket Reports Data (PLDRD), in the following 
titled as Patent Litigation Dataset (PLD) or USPTO Dataset. This database is a free-to-access 
litigation database created in the attempt to provide comprehensive litigation data for 
advancements in research. The PLD was created by the Office of the Chief Economist at 
USPTO by downloading PACER data (based on docket reports from 94 US district court cases6) 
and RECAP (a plug-in for PACER users with free access to pre-purchased case data) data in 
March 2016, and it was provided to the public on the 29.12.2016. This makes the PLD to one 
of the most recently provided comprehensive databases and covers court records from 1963 to 
2015 with a total of 74,623 unique cases. The report claims that the PLD has “near complete 
coverage of patent litigation cases post -1999” (p.20). However, collecting patent litigation 
data sourced from the PLD is a so far unprecedented endeavour for patent litigation research. 
The introductory phase of this database comes with benefits but also presented some drawbacks 
that I needed to overcome after downloading the data. Those problems will be discussed after 
describing how the data was obtained.  
 
 
6 Additionally, the metadata for these cases is provided by the PLD which includes, inter alia, case identifier, parties involved, 




3.3.3 Step 3: Identifying and Obtaining the Variables 
The proposed hypotheses are tested based on data from the Thomson One Banker financial 
database and the patent litigation database of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO). The sample consists of public and private U.S. companies operating in the 
manufacturing industries (Sic codes 2011-3999) that conducted proprietary and/or defensive 
patent litigation in U.S. district courts.  
As mentioned in the last section, secondary data comes with the detriment that the data is 
assembled by another party and nearly no control can be exercised over the sample and 
collection possibilities. However, the databases used are not pre-managed or influenced by a 
certain effort to clean or present the data in a certain way. Both databases only provide access 
to raw, unfiltered data in the condition of as it was obtained. Therefore, some control over the 
sample and collection process was given, as inter alia, the sample, the country setting, the 
industries and the timeframe could be chosen independently. Hence, the data was suitable to be 
downloaded for the research project.  
Obtaining Thomson One Banker data 
The TOB financial data was downloaded according to the following criteria. I selected U.S. 
companies (country code: USA) in the manufacturing industries (SIC codes 20-39), both active 
and inactive from 2000-2015, publicly traded and private firms (variable: Private Entity 
Indicator) that had more than one employee, for download via the company screener. This last 
criterion was necessary to contain the high number of results. Companies that had less than one 
employee or did not report the number of employees were only downloaded if they reported 
sales at least once between 2000-2015 this was necessary to narrow down the amount of data 
to a reliable set of companies that provide financial information. Furthermore, I excluded 
approximately 1800 listings with exclusively missing data for every variable in every year from 
2000-2015. I identified the variables for download by looking into common variables used in 
previous litigation research as well as by choosing additional variables needed to answer the 
research questions or possible research questions in the future. In total, I downloaded 53 
variables using the company screener from TOB, each variable for the period of 16 years from 
2000-2015 and each for firms in 19 different industries. TOB does not allow the download of 
more than 5000 observations in one download, therefore, I repeated the procedure manually 





Obtaining PLD data 
I downloaded the PLD on the USPTO website7 in “.csv” and “.dta” format. At the download 
stage, the database is divided into five different files with different content: attorneys 
(containing unique information about attorneys and their cases), cases (containing unique 
information about litigation cases), documents (containing additional written documents for 
some cases), names (containing firm names for unique cases) and pacer-cases (containing 
additional pacer-cases). All the databases resulted in a dataset of 74,629 unique court cases that 
indicate patents as the nature of suit (code 830). 
3.4 Data Cleaning and Matching 
After downloading the data from the two datasets, I needed to clean and match the two datasets. 
Figure 4 depicts this process and the next section explains the procedure. 
Figure 4 The Cleaning and Matching Process 
 
3.4.1 Transforming and Cleaning TOB data 
I downloaded the Thomson One data containing data for all firms in all industries available on 
the database for each variable individually to excel documents. I matched the files into one 
excel file containing 19 sheets for the 19 industries, each sheet containing all of the downloaded 
variables (in rows, matched with excel macros) including all firms with missing data as well. I 
merged the variables for each company. If a company had missing data (because it was not 
available in the database and therefore not in the variable document) I left the field blank. If 
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into a panel data format. During the research for this thesis, new, different variables proved to 
be interesting. I downloaded these variables additionally from TOB. I then brought them 
together with the original variables which required several reshaping, merging and cleaning 
attempts in excel and Stata. TOB is not consistent within itself, which poses some challenges 
for the researcher. For example, the same company is sometimes spelt differently for some 
entries so that merging is impeded. Furthermore, some observations were contradictory or 
displayed differently in TOB. This had to do with how TOB is sourcing their data. I treated 
such inconsistencies by token-based cleaning or manual identified cleaning. I additionally, 
contacted TOB to create awareness of the problem. The support team ensured that they would 
work on a solution with their troubleshooting team in the next couple of years. These 
inconsistencies, however, did not pose any problems for the research other than being time-
consuming.  
I prepared the complete dataset for matching with the PLD. The cleaning involved reshaping 
several variables, for example, the year of birth for each company which was transformed from 
a two- to a four-digit indicator. Then, I created a cleaning plan to be executed accurately for 
each dataset, TOB and PLD. I followed the recommendations by Thoma et al. (2010) to create 
the cleaning plan, which is described in the next paragraphs. This ensured that both datasets are 
cleaned simultaneously to provide company names that are as equal as possible to increase the 
accuracy of matching.  
3.4.2 Transforming and Cleaning the PLD 
The PLD is a valuable source of patent litigation data. However, compared to more established 
and often very expensive data providers, its content needed pre-assessment, transformation and 
cleaning. First, in the assessment stage, it was important to filter out the needed variables as 
well as their unique identification. This identification was necessary to merge the five PLD files 
by matching identical content. Second, I screened the variables in the dataset for missing, false 
or unnecessary data8. This is necessary because the database was neither cleaned nor 
standardised and entails many flaws from false numbering to typing errors and unstandardised 
text and abbreviations. Preparing the data for research in that way required thorough manual 
and automated attempts. From the perspective of the Chief Economists’ office is this 
 
8 PACER data is not always complete. Hence, the PLD comes with missing or faulty data for each variable. A summary of the 
missing data can be found in the “Patent Litigation Data from US District Court Electronic Records (1963-2015)” report. 




preparation of research datasets from the PLD a “valuable contribution to future research and 
understanding.”  
To create a valuable research dataset, I needed to minimise the amount of processed data. 
Therefore, I neglected the data files “attorneys” and “documents” at the initial stage. I conflated 
the files “cases” (containing case information from US district courts) “names” (containing 
plaintiff and defendant names for most cases) and “pacer_cases” (containing otherwise missing 
start and end dates for specific cases) by identifying common unique variables for 1:m (cases 
and names) and 1:1 (cases and dates) matching9.  
The case numbers of 197 cases were equal. Case numbers are solely unique within the same 
district court. Hence, I distinguished between cases from different district courts with a and b, 
resulting in 74,826 unique case numbers. Other than expected, it was indicated in the Patent 
Litigation Data from US District Court Electronic Records (1963-2015) report, that the 
case_row_id, party_row_count and case_row_count variables are not a unique common 
identifier between the three files. Therefore, the files needed to be matched using case numbers 
and district court information. To do that, I renamed the pacer cases case_numbers. They used 
four-digit years (for example, 1998) instead of the normal two-digit year case_names (for 
example, 98). Furthermore, the pacer cases did not indicate the judge initials at the end of the 
case name, however, to have a unique match I created a new case number from the combination 
of the case number and the court location initials to avoid mismatching. To create this case 
number, I had to standardise the court location initials in the cases and pacer cases file. I also 
conducted the above-mentioned a and b distinction manually for the pacer cases. Afterwards, I 
matched the new pacer case numbers with the case file document. Only 226 cases from the 
pacer_cases file could not be matched; this is because those cases did not exist in the USPTO 
file (cases and names). If a case was not available in USPTO, I added it as a new case to the 
merged file. Furthermore, I manually cleaned inconsistencies in the case numbers.  
A large number of cases were missing the filing date information because it was already missing 
in the docket report source (Marco et al., 2017), it was useful to be able to complement this data 
by using the PACER metadata. After successfully matching the PACER-cases, I compared the 
start-and end-dates from the original USPTO cases sheet and the PACER-cases sheet. Dates in 
the PACER-case sheet for date_closed were in American date format (MM/DD/YYYY) while 
any other dates indicated in the PACER-cases sheet and the USPTO sheet were in the UK date 
 





format (DD/MM/YYYY). I changed the date closed dates in the pacer_cases file to the UK 
format. Then, I compared the two start_date rows and the two end_date rows with each other 
and took the date from the PACER-cases if the date was missing (or the other way around). 
This also applied to many variables, for example, party names or case names which could be 
complemented by using the information from all three data files. 
To be able to match the names file, I converted the data to long format, allocating multiple rows 
per case for the cases within the “case” file. The problem was that in the “names” file, each case 
had several rows because it indicates plaintiff and defendant as well as other roles in separate 
rows. In the cases file, however, each case was allocated to one row. When bringing the two 
sheets together, multiple rows were the best way to capture the plaintiff and defendant 
distinction based on firm names. The main goal of matching the litigation data with the financial 
data from Thomson One Banker needed firm-year based data on litigation. Thus, I transformed 
the cases file by multiplying the information for each case by the number of parties involved in 
the case. Thereby, when matching the names and cases file, each company was represented in 
rows according to the cases they were involved with in court (i.e. name-party_type-case 
combinations).  
The party_type column indicated multiple additional roles other than plaintiff or defendant10. 
Those additional party types are not standardised in the original database, thus, entailed many 
typing mistakes and different written forms of the same form of party type. To keep useful 
information, I standardised the party types to proceed with the matching of the cases and names 
files. I distinguished the involved entities into the original defendant (listed as the defendant) 
and the original plaintiff (listed as the plaintiff). The other columns are indicating several other 
party types, for example, 3rd party defendant and consolidated plaintiff, which I named 
additional defendant or additional plaintiff. If the original party_type was missing, I looked at 
an indication of counterclaim defendants or plaintiffs. Counterclaim defendants are usually also 
the plaintiff in the same case and vice versa. I cleaned missing defendants and plaintiffs 
accordingly from the counterclaim defendant/plaintiff column. I excluded all duplicate firms 
 
10 ADR provider, amicus, appellant, appellee, arbitrator, appellant settlement officer, bankrupt party, claimant, conservator, 
consol, 3rd Pty dft, consol claimant, consol counter claimant, consol defendant/plaintiff, counter claimant, counter defendant, 
inventor dft, inventor pla, master commissioner, material witness, MDL notice, mediator (ADR panel), mediator (mandatory 
program), miscellaneous, movant, neutral, nominal defendant, non-party, notice, notice only, notice party, objector, other, other 
party, party, party of interest, petitioner, plaintiff – consolidated, plaintiff – defaulted, plaintiff, counter defendant, proposed, 
provider, real party in interest defendant/plaintiff, receiver, relator, respondent, selection required, special master, technical 





that were also listed as the original defendant or original plaintiff to avoid double counts. I also 
excluded party types that were not relevant for testing the hypotheses. 
After merging the three data files, I replaced missing start dates with the first of January of the 
year indicated by the case number. Case numbers indicate the courthouse with the first digit, 
and the next two-digit reveal the year the case was filed, then the type of the case is indicated 
(in patent cases “cv” for civil) followed by a number that indicates the succession of cases filed 
with the court in the given year. Some case numbers conclude with the initials of the judge or 
magistrate judge the case was assigned to.  
I initiated the first coarse round of cleaning to exclude cases that were unusable for further 
research, for example, cases that could not be assigned to a specific entity, for example, “a 
company”, “all defendants”, “an individual” or other paraphrases. 
I then transformed the dataset into case-level data. The data was already in case-oriented form, 
however, the different party_types and party_names were differentiated by rows rather than 
columns. Therefore, the cases had several rows, depending on the parties involved. Thus, the 
newly created columns were party type based. If a “party name” was missing, the names were 
sometimes indicated by the “case name” column because it lists the first name as the plaintiff 
and the second name as the defendant, which is consistent with all other cases in the database. 
Before this transformation, I deleted duplicates, if several columns for one single case had the 
same party type and party name, for example, the same company was listed as the defendant in 
multiple rows. After the case level transformation, every case represented one row. One 
problem that arose is that the plaintiff and defendant roles were not hierarchical in the original 
dataset. Hence, it was not possible to identify an intrinsically order among all defendants (or 
plaintiffs). Therefore, I handled multiple defendants or plaintiffs as equals, receiving a row on 
their own.  
I only kept cases for further analysis if the case-causes were concerning patent litigation. I 
cleaned the variable case_cause and distinguished between infringement suits or declaratory 
judgement cases. I excluded a few cases that did not concern these matters or were unclear to 
identify. Lastly, I neglected cases that ended before 2000. After this point, the database 
contained 52.577 cases. 
I transformed the cases into firm-case unique combinations, duplicating the case as often as it 
involved plaintiffs and defendants and giving each firm case combination a new column 




an additional defendant. Then, I transformed the data to panel data format from 2000 to 2015, 
creating the variable “case in year” indicating if the case took place in the given year with “0” 
or “1”.  
The next step was cleaning the database by standardising firm names and creating date 
variables. I simultaneously carried out the cleaning for both datasets. However, the USPTO 
dataset contained unique terminology that was cleaned first. For example, the dataset contained 
firm names that ended with “a division of”, “a city/state corporation”, “a subsidiary of” or “dba” 
“d/b/a” and “also known as”. I excluded the cases with unknown party names, for example, if 
instead of the name the case displayed “company”, “corporation”, “citizen”, “party”, “plaintiff”, 
“multiple plaintiffs”, “known as”, “terminated”, “doe”, “individual doing business”, “a 
business” or any type of numbers, dates, missing names or similar content. Then, I removed 
city or state additions, for example, “a Delaware corporation”, “Delaware”. However, I did not 
clean companies that were displayed as “company name of Delaware” as this terminology is 
common to distinguish between different firm entities and, thus, firms in the TOB dataset would 
have ended up with the same name.  
3.4.3 Simultaneous Cleaning of PLD and TOB 
The next step was cleaning punctuation in both the USPTO and TOB dataset. Inter alia, I used 
punctuation cleaning to standardise all common punctuation marks, for example, the 
exclamation mark, but also including all different types of brackets, slashes, quotations marks, 
mathematical signs, at-sign or abbreviations (for example comm., aka, fka, incop., int’l, pty, 
.com). Then, I harmonised company forms. This included, inter alia, to change common 
company forms to one specific abbreviation. For example, I changed “limited liability 
company”, “limited liability companies”, “limited liability corporation”, “limited liability co”, 
“ltd liability co”, “ l c” and different forms of spelling mistakes to “llc”. I did this for all 
company types, including but not limited to company additions ending with plc, lp, corp, inc, 
ltd, gmbh, ag, kg, holding, group, company, america, usa, service, system, associates, brands, 
technologies, enterprise, laboratories, pharmaceuticals, and industries. I conducted no cleaning 
without checking the results manually and revising if problems occurred.  
I used the trim function to make lower case transformations. Furthermore, the dataset contained 
a lot of missing and additional blanks. I cleaned additional blanks with a function and missing 
blanks manually by identifying the cases in which they appeared, inter alia, before pty, lp, inc, 




3.4.4 Internal Harmonisation of the USPTO Dataset 
The consolidation of the USPTO database was the next step after the initial cleaning phase. The 
data was supposed to be matched internally to reach harmonisation of the data, meaning firm 
names should be uniform and not duplicated throughout the cases. Duplicates can appear due 
to spelling differences (see also: (Reitzig and Wagner, 2010)), but also, if a case was, for 
example, registered multiple times because of venue changes (Agarwal et al., 2009). Thus, I 
needed to assign all cases to one firm, which I identified by harmonisation. For example, the 
cases of “Apple inc.” and “Apple incorporated” needed to be combined without duplication of 
each case and with consideration of already duplicated cases. I evaluated different approaches 
to reach the best possible internal harmonisation. First, I considered the fuzzy name matching 
command matchit according to token-based similarity issues.  
Matchit with token-based similarities can identify the most common grams within a dataset. 
However, one major problem during the USPTO und TOB dataset merging was the difference 
in headquarter-subsidiary reporting. Because of this problem, the token-based similarity 
approach was not suitable for internal harmonisation as it would not distinguish between 
different firm entities. For example, “Ranbaxi inc” is a private subsidiary of “Ranbaxi 
pharmaceuticals inc”, which is Canadian and therefore not listed in the TOB database. “Ranbaxi 
inc”, however, is in the database. To perform internal harmonisation, it needed to be clear if 
different company forms are consolidated in the TOB dataset or not. Furthermore, token matchit 
did not provide sufficient success rates.  
I decided to conduct the internal harmonisation by using fuzzy name matching on USPTO firm 
names and TOB firm names (from full datasets). By incorporating TOB, I did the internal 
harmonisation of USPTO simultaneously with the matching of the databases. I merged the 
datasets and then conducted fuzzy name matching on merged firms with unmerged USPTO 
firms and unmerged firms with unmerged USPTO firms. I ran the fuzzy matching several times 
up to .86 similarity scores. Thereby, I checked the observations manually, looking for false 
matches or false mismatches. If I identified patterns of common causes, I corrected them and 
repeated matchit. This step involved that several times up to 5000 firms needed to be checked 
manually. The followed sequence was 1. merge 2. match 3. cleaning wrong matches manually 
4. assign newly identified matches to the original firm name.  
I split the USPTO dataset between public and private firms and consolidated public firms with 




matching. Furthermore, I only changed firm names if they were completely similar except 
spelling errors or missing company forms. For example, if one company name indicated “inc” 
and the other indicated “llc”, I did not consolidate them. However, I did consolidate them if one 
company indicated “co” and the other “corp”. For example, I matched public firms if companies 
that did not have a company form indicated or had a different form indicated, for example, 
“walt disney” was matched with similar firms, for example, “walt disney inc” or “walt disney 
corp” with “walt disney licensing inc”. I identified the main company form for companies with 
missing company forms in USPTO from Bloomberg. I manually checked all instances with 
Google and Bloomberg company screener, which required approximately 600 manually 
checked firms.  
Moreover, I consolidated companies when the entity in USPTO was more constrained than in 
TOB, for example, “gameloft se” (TOB) was matched with “gameloft us inc” (USPTO), being 
a subsidiary of the former, or “minnesota mining and manufacturing co inc” (TOB) was 
matched with “minnesota mining and manufacturing inc”. Thereby, I also matched the most 
common abbreviations, inter alia, “3m”. In general, I identified companies that matched by 
typos, mixed up names, companies that were written together or had a blank in the name or 
companies with a missing company form, for example, “comcast cable international” and 
“comcast international cable” or “ben and jerrys inc” and “ben and jerrys” or “all sensors corp” 
and “allsensors corp inc”. This step accounts for subsidiaries of public firms. However, private 
firms were not consolidated in that case. I only consolidated private firms in case of spelling 
errors or company form abbreviation cases, for example, “co” and “corp”. This step takes the 
subsidiaries of public firms into account because TOB reports public firms in consolidated 
accounts, however, reports private firms unconsolidated. However, the consolidated 
subsidiaries cannot be identified. Hence, the matchit process is consolidating USPTO 
subsidiaries with the headquarter companies, however, this step is only meant to increase the 
resulting case-data slightly because USPTO itself is often including headquarter and 
subsidiaries as different parties within a case. That means that case-level matching with TOB 
is still accurate when matching headquarters cases to consolidated firms.  
I did not consolidate entities if there was reason to believe that they stem from different, 
unrelated industries, for example, “noah education holding ltd” (TOB) and “noah systems inc” 
(USPTO). Especially, when the “smaller”-seeming entity is listed in the TOB database, in this 
case, education holding instead of inc. The same applies to, for example, “chatsworth data 
solutions inc” (TOB) and “chatsworth inc” (USPTO) or “tradiran” (TOB) and “tradiran telecom 




technology corp” (TOB) with “geospace products co inc” (USPTO). The same applies to 
companies where the name indicated a difference, for example, “lawson products inc” (TOB) 
not with “lawson software inc” (USPTO) or “continental teves inc” (TOB) not with “continental 
teves ag” or “lump llc” (TOB) not with “lump inc” (USPTO). 
I repeated the matchit with grams and weights for the matchit command. The bigram (or 
trigram) similarity function and the weights function enhances the accuracy because the former 
accounts for differences between "Org" and "Organization" and the latter is useful to give more 
importance to the firm name than organisational form (Chaudhuri et al., 2003). 
After this step, I repeated the matching without the public and private distinction. Not cleaning 
different company forms again. This step resulted in approximately 12000 firms to manually 
screen, thereby, I considered the matchit results up to .8 similarity scores to expand the 
matching and get better results. The matching proceeded as follows:  
1. Merge all USPTO and all TOB firms. Fuzzynamematch unmerged-TOB firms with 
unmerged-USPTO firms.  
2. Merge all USPTO and all TOB firms. Fuzzynamematch merged-TOB and merged-
USPTO firms with unmerged-USPTO firms.  
Lastly, I calculated several time-indicating variables, inter alia, year-counts, day-counts and 
case-counts as well as attorney and court dates.  
• Count of cases per Year for each Party_type (total cases per year) 
• Count of cases per year for each company using one of the four strategies (for 
example, casesyearorigdef) 
• The calculated number of days of litigation for each company in every single year 
(first case level then cumulated by firm and Party_type)  
 
Then, I transformed the USPTO file into firm-year panel data from 2000-2015, to finally 
merged it with the TOB database. After merging the two datasets, I assigned a zero to missing 
case data, which is especially necessary for non-merged TOB firms, as it is assumed that these 





3.4.5 The Final Dataset 
The proposed hypotheses are tested based on data from the Thomson One Banker financial 
database and the patent litigation database of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO). The sample consists of public and private U.S. companies operating in the 
manufacturing industries (Sic codes 2011-3999) that conducted proprietary and/or defensive 
patent litigation in U.S. district courts.  
The matching from firm and subsidiary level data posed some difficulties, however, after a 
thorough investigation, it became clear, that TOB reported financial statements on a 
consolidated level for the headquarter and the subsidiaries. Simultaneously, although the case-
count of the USPTO case data is not consolidated, it is usually the case that headquarters were 
consolidated with its subsidiaries. After a thorough investigation, I found that for cases where 
this was not possible, for example, small headquarters with entirely different names, it is safe 
to assume that litigation cases for those exceptions carry little to no weight for the overall case-
count of the headquarter. 
The overall matching scores are considered high, even though many USPTO companies could 
not be matched. This is because only manufacturing firms are included in the TOB database, 
which excludes many companies with many cases that are listed in USPTO, for example, eBay. 
Furthermore, not all companies in USPTO are U.S. companies, hence, the dataset contains 
many companies that are outside the boundaries of the set sample. The final dataset comprises 
nearly half a million observations.  
 
3.5 Variables  
Previous studies used the logarithms based Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation (IHS) to 
normalise variables  (Burbidge et al., 1988; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a). Compared to log 
transformation, IHS is useful if values can get negative, for example, profitability (Burbidge et 
al., 1988). Hence, I IHS transformed all continuous dependent and control variables. Predictors 
are not IHS transformed to avoid log-log models and enhance interpretability. All non-




3.5.1 Dependent Variables 
3.5.1.1 Firm Costs 
To measure organisational costs of patent litigation I used General and Administrative (G&A) 
expenses per Employee. I divided these cost by the number of employees to avoid absolute cost 
measurement. Previous literature utilised G&A expenses to depict firm managerial costs, 
executive compensation and other administrative costs, inter alia, legal consulting (Hashai et 
al., 2015). Patent litigation lawsuits require the time of managers and comprise a variety of 
other costs, such as substantial legal fees (Chen et al., 2016). Therefore, G&A expenses are a 
suitable measure for firm costs in patent litigation.  
In the following, a more thorough discussion on the measurement of firm costs is provided.  
Highlighting the costs of patent litigation is common in litigation research. Indeed, many 
previous scholars in the field dedicated substantial thoughts to the importance of the financial 
parameters of litigation (Mansfield et al., 1981; Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
2001; Bessen and Meurer, 2008a; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010; Chen et al., 2016).  However, the 
measurement of the exact cost of litigation comes with unique challenges, as financial litigation 
data is not disclosed by companies. Hence, the goal of theory and measurement alignment was 
met by identifying a proxy that reflects litigation costs. In the following, I will elaborate on the 
two incorporated measures: general and administrative expenses and duration of patent 
litigation. First, I will discuss the characteristics of the two measurements. Second, I elaborate 
why I choose general and administrative expenses, rather than litigation duration, as 
measurement of litigation costs.  
The measure of general and administrative expenses can be used to measure the organisational 
costs of strategic patent litigation. The measurement reflects the indirect costs of a company 
which are not related to making a product or conducting services as well as interest. General 
and administrative expenses can therefore show the expenses of a company related to its 
strategic behaviour. Litigation requires the attention of executives and other employees (Shane 
and Somaya, 2007; Bessen and Meurer, 2008a; Aharony et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2016) which 
can reflect heavily in personnel salaries. Furthermore, the costs of outside legal counsel are an 
equally important expense that can determine the costs of strategic patent litigation (Lanjouw 
and Schankerman, 2001; Chen et al., 2016). Both constructs are incorporated in the general and 
administrative expenses variable. The measure combines personnel and legal counsel 




being another important expense that can increase litigation costs for organisations (Lanjouw 
and Schankerman, 2001). To avoid absolute cost measurement, general and administrative 
expenses can be normalized by the size of the firm.  
Duration of litigation lawsuits can be a significant factor in determining litigation costs. The 
average litigation length or duration of litigation cases can be measured on the time period a 
firm is litigating each year across its cases. Thereby, dividing the days per year of each case of 
a plaintiff in patent litigation by the total number of cases of a plaintiff firm in the given year 
shows the average duration of patent litigation. Little attention has been paid to the duration of 
lawsuits and its influence on litigation costs in previous literature. Cases can either settle within 
weeks, months or years and instinctively, legal costs are linked with the progression of time 
during a lawsuit (Bessen and Meurer, 2008). The longer a lawsuit lasts, the longer the personnel 
has to be compensated which can increase costs. However, Love and Yoon (2017), indicate that 
different cost occur at different stages of a lawsuit, separating costs of discovery and summary 
judgements (usually less costly) from trial costs. Hereby, the chances of a case going through 
trial increase with proceeded time of the case since filing. Hence, duration of litigation lawsuits 
can reflect the costs involved.  
However, this argument already shows that it can be misleading to measure the costs of 
litigation solely by the duration of a case. This is because cases are unique in their timeline and 
characterized by the merits of the disputed patent and the firm itself (Foster, 1986; Bessen and 
Meurer, 2008a; Love and Yoon, 2017). Ultimately, the costs of litigation are not dependent on 
duration alone. Differences between the duration of litigation lawsuits and costs of litigation 
lawsuits can be explained by the team size and experience of legal representatives and 
employees of the firm, the characteristics of the patent case, as well as the characteristics of the 
firm. In the next three sections, I will bring forward the three main characteristics that explain 
differences of duration and financial costs of patent litigation.  
Legal representation 
Regardless of the duration of a litigation case, it is necessary to dedicate employee and attorney 
time to a lawsuit. Hereby, inter alia, the size of the case determines the amount of personnel 
needed. Consequently, a case with a high number of dedicated personnel will be more expensive 
than a case with a small team assigned. Hence, the duration of the case cannot solely determine 
the costs of a lawsuit, as cases can be smaller and larger in size and the number of such dedicated 
personnel reflects in litigation costs (see Foster, 1986). Patent suits might carry varying 




explain why the costs of similar sized patent lawsuits with equal duration can vary. A firms 
staffing decision can lower the costs of a lawsuit, for example, if staff is reduced during slack 
periods that do not require considerate care (Foster, 1986). Furthermore, experienced firms can 
either facilitate proceedings or reduce their personnel hours needed for litigation (Lanjouw 
Schankerman, 2001), while case duration might be more rigid, due to court regulations and 
common waiting periods or slack times (Foster, 1986). Hence, costs can differ considerably 
between cases, especially if firms diverge in the ability to manage and control the costs of legal 
teams and employees working on the cases. The size of the litigation team as well as its 
experience (which can also reflect in salaries) can determine the general and administrative 
costs of a firm.  
Characteristics of the Patent Case 
Litigation lawsuits can differ in significantly in costs depending on the number of working 
hours needed. Some lawsuits might require staffing of expert witnesses or come with increased 
amounts of required documents (Love and Yoon, 2017). If, during discovery, it is necessary to 
produce a bulk of documents in a short time, more personnel is needed, increasing costs. 
Thereby, the duration of a lawsuit cannot account for such costs. Furthermore, especially 
valuable patents might be litigated with heightened scrutiny and might involve an increased 
allocation of resources. Hence, a key aspect of litigation costs is the “profile” of the lawsuit 
which is often determined by its stakes (Love and Yoon, 2017). Furthermore, costs can occur 
at varying stages of a lawsuit, sometimes earlier or later in the case. These costs can be 
dependent on the dispute itself or even regional differences. For example, some courts make 
faster decisions when it comes to transferring cases to different venues than others (Love and 
Yoon, 2017), making it difficult to compare case lengths and, hence, drawing conclusions on 
litigation costs. As an example, if two similar sized cases are compared, one is filed and settled 
within a year; the other is filed, transferred after eight months and then settled quickly within 
two months, both lasted equally long but the first might come with higher costs than the second 
lawsuit, simply because the second lawsuit involved a waiting period to transfer.   
Characteristics of the firm  
Litigation costs can also be dependent on the characteristics of a firm, as for example, firm size, 
industrial differences or location (Bessen and Meurer, 2008). As the sample for this dissertation 
consists of public and private firms of different sizes, industries and lawsuit locations, the 
organizational costs of litigation can deviate from litigation duration. Lanjouw and 




can be mainly attributed to the firms‘ knowledge of local courts and proximity issues (e.g. travel 
times, translation and expenses).  The Authors also show that firm size can determine litigation 
costs. The differences in the amount of external personnel needed can determine litigation costs 
and increase such for smaller firms (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Lanjouw and Lerner 
1996). Ultimately, these differences can be accounted for when looking at general and 
administrative expense. The costs of personnel might vary a lot between smaller and bigger 
companies because of the necessary reliance on outside counsel which is often more expensive 
than in-house legal teams. Bigger, more experienced firms might also be better equipped to 
reduce disruption and, therefore, reduce the costs during litigation. Therefore, I further 
relativized general and administrative costs by firm size. By doing that it can be seen if a 
company is accumulating extraordinarily high costs, for example, due to intense coordination 
with multiple lawyers or lawsuits. 
In conclusion, whereas the duration of litigation can be a useful variable in providing a first 
indication of the costs of strategic patent litigation, general and administrative expenses are 
needed to holistically measure the organisational costs of patent litigation. However, the full 
model does incorporate the average duration of litigation cases as a control variable. 
3.5.1.2 Firm Sales  
I measured Firm sales by Net Sales or Revenue per Employee, where the sales measure is 
divided by the number of employees of a firm to avoid absolute revenue measurement (Rudy 
and Black, 2015). Sales is an especially important measurement in the context of patent 
litigation. It does not only include increased market sales due to possible injunctions against 
infringers selling similar products, but it also sometimes contains penalty payments that are 
directly linked to patent infringement lawsuits. For example, the Apple Annual Data Report 
(2017) states: “During the first quarter of 2016, the Company received $548 million from 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. related to its patent infringement lawsuit, which was recorded 
as licensing net sales within services” (p.25). According to IFRS standards, those licensing 
payments are included on the income statement within Net Sales or Revenue, however, 
according to GAAP, they are only included if they possess stand-alone value. Thus, 
irregularities in reporting occur. However, by measuring net sales vital payments as outcomes 




3.5.1.3 Firm Profitability 
I measured profitability on Return on Sales (ROS) which is the operating profit margin, or net 
income (operating profit) before interest and tax divided by net sales. Past scholarship indicated 
that profitability is an appropriate indicator for firm performance and relied on several 
measurements of profitability to capture performance (De Carolis, 2003; Markman et al., 2004). 
ROS is a particularly important measure in this study as it accounts for sales as well as operative 
and administrative expenses. ROS allows the measurement of firm profitability and thereby 
considers the scale of a firm’s operations (Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a). 
3.5.2 Independent Variable  
3.5.2.1 Strategic Patent Litigation 
Up until now, litigation literature followed different approaches on how to measure strategic 
patent litigation endeavours (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Agarwal et al., 2009; Rudy and 
Black, 2015). Thereby, the underlying theoretical concept of strategic patent litigation as a main 
factor for firm performance was previously measured in only one study in the field, which 
operationalized the concept by counting the number of plaintiff actions initiated against 
infringers in a patent infringement lawsuit (Rudy and Black, 2015). However, simple count 
measures of plaintiff actions in infringement lawsuits do not consider, that the strategic 
litigation action is dependent on the unique IP portfolio of the firm. Therefore, a mere count 
measure (as operationalized by Rudy and Black, 2015) does not account for the size of a firm’s 
patent portfolio, and hence, does not account for the actual intensity of litigation that a firm puts 
forward. Therefore, I suggest normalising the count of a plaintiff’s infringement lawsuits by 
size.   
To align the measurement with the theoretical concept, it is necessary to look at the litigation 
action in the context of the firm. Firms with large patent portfolios have numerous options to 
file for infringement, simply because they hold multiple patents that may be infringed. At the 
same time, firms with more extensive patent portfolios are most likely more equipped to initiate 
infringement lawsuits because of, inter alia, experience or financial possibilities. By 
normalizing the measure, the strategic choice to litigate and hence, litigiousness, can be 
compared the different sizes of companies. Consequently, I look at the count of a firm’s 
litigation cases in the context of its patent portfolio. As the sample of firms in this dissertation 
differs considerably between firms with small and large IP portfolios, the measurement of the 




is used to relativize case count. Intangible assets is a close proxy for patent portfolio size, as it 
predominantly includes the size of the underlying patent stock of a firm. Previous research 
utilized this measure to capture both, current and accumulated intangibles of a firm (Griliches, 
1981; Chang et al., 2013; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016b). Therefore, strategic litigation is 
measured as the number of patent infringement suits of a plaintiff per year divided by its stock 
of intangibles per year. Thereby, litigation is expressed as a measure of intensity, rather than a 
count, as intangible assets built over time are increasing a company’s ability to frequent 
litigation. Because of this reasons and to further develop the usage of suitable litigation 
measures, I proceeded with the measure of litigation counts normalized by IP portfolio size. 
3.5.3 Control Variables 
I considered several control variables for inclusion in the study to control for external validity. 
Previous litigation literature controlled for Firm Age in years since the founding (Agarwal et 
al., 2009; Rudy and Black, 2015). This is necessary, because older firms could, inter alia, have 
a larger patent stock or stick to unique procedures which could lead to inertia that influences 
their litigation strategies (De Carolis, 2003; Balasubramanian and Lee, 2008; Rudy and Black, 
2015), hence, I incorporated the variable in the analysis and measured it on the count of years 
since the founding date, starting with one in the founding year.  
Firm size can be an important measure in depicting the performance of a firm. Thus, in line 
with previous patent and litigation studies, I controlled for the Size of the Firm (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Somaya et al., 2007; Rudy and Black, 2015), measured by the possession of 
assets as a scale and size measurement of a company (Markman et al., 2004).  
In line with previous literature, I included R&D Investment as a measure for the firm’s 
innovativeness to control for the effect of R&D expenditures on performance (De Carolis, 2003; 
Markman et al., 2004; Somaya et al., 2007; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Rudy and Black, 2015). Firms 
with higher R&D investments are expected to be able to be more innovative (De Carolis, 2003). 
R&D is measured on annual R&D investment rather than a cumulative measure over the years 
because showing a significant effect of multiple-year R&D investment on patenting is 
considered difficult due to intra-firm correlations and additional other effects (Somaya et al., 
2007). This logic is adapted for the litigation context, and it is expected that measuring same 
year R&D effects on profitability are as (or more) accurate. Similar to De Carolis (2003), I used 





I address the possible effects of the financial position of a firm by controlling for Organisational 
Slack, as done by previous studies (Rudy and Black, 2015). Organisational slack can alter a 
company’s patent litigation behaviour as patent litigation is very cost-intensive and often 
requires thorough asset utilisation for the company to have enough resources to fund innovation 
and litigation. I measure slack intensity by a firm’s total asset turnover, which measures the 
value of a company’s sales or revenues generated relative to the value of its assets. This measure 
indicates how efficient the company is in creating revenue per dollar of asset. 
Some lawsuits last longer than others and, therefore, the impact of a single case might vary 
when it comes to costs and revenues. Hence, I controlled for the average Litigation Duration 
measured on the time period a firm is litigating each year across its cases. I computed the 
measure by dividing the days per year of each case of a plaintiff in proactive patent litigation 
by the total number of proactive patent litigation cases of a plaintiff firm in that year. 
Finally, I included Year Dummies to incorporate time effects that might influence profitability. 
The dummy variable for the year 2000 was omitted due to multicollinearity because of inclusion 
of a Hackman analysis explained in the next section. 
3.6 Research Ethics  
Ethics is of widespread and multilayered importance for academic researchers and their work 
(Cowton, 1998; Kalleberg et al., 2006). Thereby, it comprises the academic conduct of the 
researcher as well as ethical research guidelines. The following sections examine both aspects 
and their importance for the present research closely.  
Ethical academic conduct is not a virtue but a necessity. Research ethics standards have to be 
followed by practising honesty, objectivity and openness in scientific discourse, whereby the 
ethical researcher follows the moral standards of society (Kalleberg et al., 2006). In addition, 
the ethical researcher is bound to scientific integrity to represent a high level of ethical standards 
within the academic community. The truth should always be followed while respecting the 
intellectual property of peers. More precisely, honest and ethical research as well as refraining 
from plagiarism are indispensable (Kalleberg et al., 2006).  
For this quantitative research dissertation, following ethical research guidelines for statistical 
practice and data management were equally important as ethical academic conduct mentioned 
above. Besides being ethical in one’s ethical principles and morals, ethical issues with the 




interpretable, and reproducible results” (American Statistical Association, 2018, p.2). Thus, the 
ethical use of databases and analysis needs to be considered.  
On the one hand, collecting data from available databases diminishes some of the more common 
ethical issues that have to do with the researchers own biases and the protection of personal 
data of respondents. This can be beneficial for the study as sometimes more time can be devoted 
to the research gaps and theoretical goals of the thesis as well as the preparation and analysis 
of the data to strengthen the link between theory and data, a common ethical issue (Hakim, 
1982; Cowton, 1998). 
On the other hand, collecting data from databases comes with its own ethical challenges due to 
non-involvement of the researcher in the composition of the database. This requires additional 
thoroughness of the researcher to familiarise with the structure, organisation, collection and 
accumulation of the data11.  
In general, the data analysis should follow statistical tests and reporting research findings should 
occur comprehensively, following ethical guidelines (Creswell, 2013). Such guidelines 
comprise those presented by the American Statistical Association (ASA) (2018) which were 
followed closely during the preparation of this dissertation. 
First, the ASA ethical guidelines promote, inter alia, an appropriate pairing of methods and 
hypotheses, while choosing appropriate data that is handled ethically. Most importantly, the 
structure and content of the database(s) used should not influence the research project and its 
theoretical direction (Cowton, 1998). However, the data has to be transformed or further 
prepared to be suitable for the research problem at hand (Cowton, 1998). Hence, the present 
dissertation provides, a very thorough explanation of the data collection and cleaning process 
and followed common research practice closely to ensure, that the methods used were suitable 
and reproducible. Furthermore, I refrained from additional cleaning procedures that could have 
improved the matching process but were difficult to reproduce. 
Second, the presentation of the data should follow in a non-misleading, unskewed or non-
manipulated style without limiting or holding back results to present more favourable findings 
(Kalleberg et al., 2006). This ensures, that it is not focused solely on data for the purpose to 
prove or refute one’s own hypotheses (Creswell, 2013). Furthermore, to allow informed peer 
 
11 During data collection of this dissertation, some of those difficulties were experienced. For example, a close communication 
with the support team from Thomson One Banker highlighted inconsistencies that derived from their use of secondary data 
providers. Furthermore, structural issues with the provided data led to Thomson One Banker setting up a special team to work 





review, findings should then be presented in such a way that the credibility of the study can be 
determined by the examiner(s) themselves (Neuman, 2014). Notwithstanding, the research 
should present sample, limitations or imputations of the data and clearly assess its implications. 
If any mistakes are detected, they should be immediately corrected (American Statistical 
Association, 2018). Furthermore, it needs to be ensured that data obtained from the database is 
not unethically disclosed or shared with third parties and handled in such a way that it is kept 
from misappropriation (Creswell, 2013) at all time.  
The ethical guidelines aim to promote accountability by informing those who rely on a 
statistical analysis of the standards they should expect, to ensure, that ethical research and 
academic integrity are practised. Hence, I closely followed the ethical guidelines illustrated 
above and the ethical requirements from the Leeds University Business School concerning 

















4 RQ 1: The Influence of Strategic Patent Litigation on Firm 
Performance 
This chapter investigates the relationships of strategic patent enforcement and two measures of 
firm performance as well as firm costs. Thereby, empirical chapter 1 establishes a link between 
inimitability of assets and strategic patent litigation which impacts firm costs, sales and 
profitability.  
4.1 Introduction 
There is a vast body of scholarly work that tries to understand the link between innovation, 
patenting and firm performance with respects to the resource-based view of the firm (Teece, 
1986; Barney, 1991; Cohen et al., 2000; De Carolis, 2003; Pisano, 2006; Rudy and Black, 
2015). However, when building on the RBVs premise of inimitability and its link to firm 
performance, the influence of strategic patent litigation has been widely neglected. The main 
question is if firms can capture value from their patents by strategically engaging in litigation? 
 In the past decade, litigation increased significantly (Leychkis, 2006; Bessen and Meurer, 
2008a) and companies, on average, tend to litigate more than previously. Thereby, one of the 
reasons for increases in patent litigation might be that companies try to capture profit from their 
innovations by protecting themselves from imitation. Previous work in the patent litigation field 
has looked at the influence of patent litigation on the outsourcing of related patent filings 
(Reitzig and Wagner, 2010), on university licensing activities (Shane and Somaya, 2007), 
knowledge spillovers from human capital (Agarwal et al., 2009) and the influence of patent 
litigation strategies on firm sales (Rudy and Black, 2015). Studies on patents as isolating 
mechanisms against imitability found conflicting results, postulating a positive effect 
(Markman et al., 2004) and a negative effect (De Carolis, 2003) of inimitability on performance. 
Whereas the relationship between patent-based inimitability and performance is more 
frequently researched in the past literature (De Carolis, 2003; Markman et al., 2004), 
scholarship on patent enforcement-based inimitability and performance is only seen in more 
recent work (Rudy and Black, 2015). However, also this recent work only scratched the surface 
of the litigation - performance relationship by not incorporating costs as well as measures of 
performance such as sales and profitability.  
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate strategic patent enforcement and its influence on 




to reach or maintain competitive advantage, firms use patent litigation to secure inimitability of 
assets. This inimitability is expected to pose a certain trade-off on the firm, between 
administrative costs of strategic litigation and benefits from a favourable market position. Even 
though this trade-off is often mentioned in previous literature (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
2001; Somaya, 2003) it has not yet been utilised in a study to investigate performance outcomes 
of strategic patent litigation. 
To dive deeper into this trade-off and the contribution that can be made, it is necessary to look 
at the litigating landscape. In practice, strategic litigation is not always successful in its 
protection against imitation because its costs can exceed the potential benefits significantly. 
Bessen and Meurer (2008a) show in their research that litigation can cost companies millions 
of dollars according to case length. Leychkis (2006) quotes a study from the American 
Intellectual Property Lawyers Association, which illustrates that patent litigation involves 
substantial investments, averaging at 2.000.000 USD for a single lawsuit. Bhagat et al. (1994) 
and Lerner (1995) argue in their research, that firms involved in litigation experience an average 
drop in their market-adjusted value of up to 3.1%, which translates to shareholder investment 
losses way past the 20-million-dollar mark (Chen et al., 2016). Not including the negative effect 
this loss can have on the future funding of business operations and innovations. Whereas all 
three authors include the remark that settlement can reduce those costs, companies are not 
expected to refrain from pursuing litigation proceedings in court.  
When firms have to take such costs into account, why do so many still engage in strategic 
litigation? Researchers concentrated on this questions and found that, in some industries, 
litigation also has a positive effect on firm sales (Rudy and Black, 2015) or that inimitability 
does positively influence a firm's profits (De Carolis, 2003). Furthermore, Shapiro (2010) 
argues, that the plaintiff in successful infringement suits, can be awarded damages to 
compensate for the loss of sales or the loss of royalties they could have had received from the 
infringer for a licensing agreement. Other studies concentrated on non-financial outcomes of 
patent litigation, such as inter alia, R&D effectiveness (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001) 
executive turnover (Aharony et al., 2015), knowledge spillovers (Agarwal et al., 2009) or its 
influence on licensing activities (Shane and Somaya, 2007).  
However, even when subsuming the previous literature on strategic patent litigation, there is 
still a research gap on the actual influence of strategic patent enforcement on performance, 
especially when taking the trade-off between costs and sales benefits into account. From a 




intellectual property. Nevertheless, the tripod of its performance implications has been 
overlooked. This chapter imposes a contribution to the patent litigation field by investigating 
the effect of strategic patent litigation on costs, sales and profitability. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, the link between strategic patent 
enforcement and potential implications for financial performance are discussed while refining 
theory on the resource-based view of the firm. Then, the three hypotheses on the influence of 
strategic patent litigation on costs, sales and profitability are developed. Lastly, data and 
methods are presented, and the results are discussed. The chapter closes with a discussion of 
the findings and a link to the integrative framework Table1 as well as the next chapter, which 
will refine knowledge on patent litigation and firm performance even further. 
4.2 Theoretical Background and Literature Review  
The link between strategic patenting and performance is widely researched in past scholarship 
(for example, see: (Ceccagnoli, 2009)). When it is assumed that a strong appropriability from 
patents, by the strategic use of patent protection, can lead to superior economic performance, 
litigation must be viewed as a powerful tool in order to generate rents from innovations. After 
all, according to the RBV successful barriers to imitation lead, to above normal overall profits 
(Barney, 1991). By deterring competitors from imitating innovation and appropriating 
commercial value from said imitation of intellectual property, firms can establish a competitive 
advantage in the form of profitability (De Carolis, 2003). Consequently, inimitability of assets 
was titled the most important postulate of the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 2001; 
De Carolis, 2003). Arguably because it concentrates inherently on the strategic aspect of 
resource protection, rather than the value and rareness of them. This chapter argues that 
protecting from imitation is also one of the main drivers of economic profit when engaging in 
strategic patent litigation. Thereby, it anticipates establishing a theoretical link between 
strategic patent enforcement and firm performance by using patent litigation as a guarding tool 
that can foster inimitability of assets.  
When engaging in strategic litigation, companies have to carefully consider the short term and 
long-term consequences of their actions. This often requires finding a trade-off between 
immediate benefits and future losses or vice versa (Polidoro and Toh, 2011). However, to date, 
there has been little agreement and even fewer findings of the influence of strategic patent 





On the one hand, scholars found that litigation can increase the worth of a patent and its 
economic value significantly (Sherry and Teece, 2004). Hence, and in line with the general 
argument of the importance of patent litigation as one of the inimitability premises of the 
resource-based view, especially “proven-valid-and-infringed” patents, that means patents that 
have been disputed in litigation have an extraordinary economic value (see (Sherry and Teece, 
2004)). Rudy and Black (2015) show that litigation strategies, in some industries, can positively 
influence performance outcomes in terms of market share. They found, for example, that being 
the plaintiff in a declaratory judgement lawsuit in the semiconductor industries can enhance 
firm performance compared to competitors not employing this strategy. However, this could 
not be proved for other litigation strategies, such as proprietary litigation. 
On the other hand, literature has indicated that the market value of firms involved in litigation 
on average decreases after the initiation of a patent suit (Lerner, 1995; Somaya, 2003). That is 
in part to be explained by the fact that the benefits of litigation can be harmed by the often 
substantial financial requirements of the IP right enforcement process (Lerner, 1995; Linden 
and Somaya, 2003; Lumineau and Oxley, 2012). This past argument illustrates the conundrum 
between economic benefits and detriments of litigation in the literature. At the bottom of the 
debate lies the dichotomy of strategic patent litigation decisions as a two-sided coin. Despite 
potential benefits of patent litigation, infringement is difficult to detect, and patent enforcement 
can be extremely costly, disruptive, time-consuming and unpredictable (Shane and Somaya, 
2007). In the following, it will be elaborated on the influence of strategic patent litigation on 
costs, sales and, therefore, profitability to contribute to the debate by incorporating two 
measures of performance while establishing a framework of mechanisms that are influencing 
them. 
Costs 
Despite possible sales increases of strategic patent litigation, there are substantial costs involved 
diminishing its positive influence on performance (Lerner, 1995; Shane and Somaya, 2007; 
Lumineau and Oxley, 2012). High sales and revenue generation due to successful patent 
litigation strategies need to compensate for the overall organisational costs involved. Litigation 
can cost millions of dollars (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001; Rudy & Black, 2015; Somaya, 
2003, 2012). Between 1984 and 2009, costs of litigation reached 385 billion dollars (Bessen et 
al., 2018) whereby firms in the smartphone industry alone spend 20 billion dollars in 2011 and 




litigation can involve up to twenty-five percent of a firms R&D expenditures (Llobet, 2003), 
which might have increased significantly in the past ten years. 
Legal proceedings and trial preparation are costly. Monitoring and detecting infringement as 
well as strategically drafting strategies for litigation involves substantial costs (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2012; James et al., 2013) but is necessary in order to be prepared 
for trial. Afterwards, expensive court proceedings involve direct costs such as legal fees and 
fees for suit filing (Lumineau and Oxley, 2012; Chen et al., 2016). Legal fees, although 
substantial to begin with, might be further increased by unexpected disruptions during the 
litigation process or particularly lengthy trials. Therefore, litigation is not always profitable due 
to costly trials (Somaya, 2003; Somaya, 2012) and other financial burdens. However, total 
litigation costs exceed legal fees (Bessen and Meurer, 2008b). Litigation is especially costly 
because the majority of costs stems from executives’ and attorneys’ salaries. The efforts and 
working hours of management, legal personnel and scientific or technological experts are 
indirect costs that have to be covered (Chen et al., 2016). Hence, top-management team and 
personnel involvement are a major cost factor of litigation (Somaya, 2003; Chen et al., 2015), 
as companies often hire expensive law firms or invest in in-house legal departments to guide 
their legal proceedings (Somaya et al., 2007). Thereby, the legal fees are increased even further.  
Sales 
Strategic litigation can be a means to extract returns and increase sales from patented 
innovations, whereby stronger patent protection was often found to lead to higher economic 
performance (Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Rudy and Black, 2015). With 
regards to patenting, previous literature found, that often-cited patents are positively related to 
increased sales (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002). Given that the utilisation of real options is a 
choice to protect the inimitability of assets, and therefore, competitive advantage, patent 
litigation might have a similar effect. To secure competitive advantage, firms can revert to 
strategic patent litigation. Hence, to understand sales as the measure of interest the hypotheses 
are built on the following four assumptions:  
First, patents often protect a technology which is part of one product (Markman et al., 2004) or 
multiple products. By litigation, an increase in sales can be realised for multiple products that 
contain the technology protected by the litigated patent (Markman et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
infringing products containing this technology can be excluded from the market.12 Due to the 
 
12 It is also possible that patents which do not protect a valuable technology per se, are litigated strategically to protect other 




costs of litigation, firms might litigate important patents that make up for a substantial part of 
their sales. This strategy was already proposed for the accumulation of patents (Somaya et al., 
2011) and scholarship agrees, that for many firms the main revenue generation derives from 
just few technologies within the patent portfolio (Lerner, 1995; Markman et al., 2004). Hence, 
the plaintiff firm might increase sales by strategic patent litigation because even if only a portion 
of revenue can be protected, this protection can be substantial13. Hence, because it is a strategic 
decision to proceed against infringement, it is assumed that firms predominantly strategically 
litigate important patents that make up for substantial shares of their total sales. 
Second, even in the early proceedings, the plaintiff can achieve an injunction, ordering the 
competitor to stop commercialising the product, which can positively affect sales (Shapiro, 
2010). Hence, it is assumed that firms are utilising this option and try to push injunctions 
whenever possible.  
Third, a verdict (or a trial) is not necessary to capture benefits from strategic litigation (Marco, 
2005). If firms settle out of court, they might still negotiate an outcome that is beneficial for 
firm sales. Thereby, it is assumed that companies act accordingly and try to negotiate in such a 
way that they reach a beneficial outcome which protects their sales income.  
Fourth, an incentive for firms to engage in strategic patent litigation can be monetary 
compensation in terms of royalties (Somaya, 2012) or licensing fees. Interestingly, while 
damages are booked as income and become more relevant when measuring profitability, the 
American accounting system (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles: GAAP) does leave 
the option to firms to book royalties and licensing fees as “net sales including royalties/ 
licensing net sales” or “licensing net sales within services” (see for example: Apple Annual 
Data Report, 2017) if they have stand-alone value. Consequently, even non-sales-related 
monetary compensation of strategic patent litigation will eventually be present at the income 
statement sheet and incorporated in the annual sales measure. Hence, it is assumed that firms 
follow GAAP and use this option.  
It is important to note, that there might be other benefits to litigation utilised by firms that can 
be linked to increased sales, for instance, companies can reduce knowledge spillovers by 
strategic litigation, keeping valuable employees from departing (Agarwal et al., 2009). 
However, other activities such as licensing could potentially be neglected with increasing 
 
13 However, if patents are infringed in multiple countries, it could also be the case, that firms are not able to increase their sales 




litigation pressures, decreasing sales (Shane and Somaya, 2007). Nevertheless, the high costs 
of strategic litigation could even out the positive effects presented in this paragraph.  
Profitability  
Especially in the context of patent litigation, it is important to focus on the marginal effects of 
firm revenue and costs to examine profitability as a measure of performance. Based on the facts 
that patent enforcement can increase sales and increase costs at the same time, the question 
arises, if it is, in general, profitable for companies or not? This central question can be pictured 
as a pair of scales, in one bowl sales, in the other costs. The heavier one decides about the profit 
implications. If there are more sales benefits than costs, then being the plaintiff in infringement 
suits will eventually be profitable. Are costs the bigger burden, outweighing sales, then being 
the plaintiff in infringement suits will not be profitable. Bessen and Meurer (2008b) discuss this 
trade-off in the context of innovation incentives. The authors argue (but do not test) that 
innovators have to balance the estimated costs of litigation with the estimated benefits and 
thereby determine an ex-post tax on their innovative effort. Eventually not litigating if the tax 
is too high. Hence, by investigating the trade-off between sales and costs, it can be determined 
if litigation is, in most cases, profitable or not.  
Arguably, firms that expect higher sales returns than costs after filing an infringement case also 
might be the only ones inclined to do so. However, although companies determine the benefits 
of litigation in advance, often expecting that increased sales will outweigh costs, litigation is 
not always profitable. This is because litigation includes, in most cases, a significant amount of 
risk. Despite strategic patent litigation being a decision, the risks that are involved and 
especially costs, result in uncertain performance outcomes. Somaya (2003) argued that strategic 
litigation can protect other valuable strategic stakes or secure access to the patent-“usage”-rights 
with mutual hold-up. Thus, litigation can be a tightrope walk trying to balance the protection 
of strategic stakes and patents while being exposed to numerous risks. The main risk being ruled 
against or receiving fewer royalties than expected. However, risks during litigation can be as 
profound as a loss of perspective during a lawsuit, a scratched ego, rivalry, avarice, or 
overconfidence, for example, in legal advice (Somaya, 2003). Risk can also derive from higher-
level concerns, such as the fear of loss of reputation, including the negative effects it can have 
on a business (Agarwal et al., 2009). Despite those risks, or because of them, firms follow 
through with litigation in court, and the question remains if strategic litigation is beneficial for 




Actively defending against infringement could influence profitability by strategically litigating 
patents to increase sales and weighing out the costs at the same time. However, it needs to be 
determined if the risks and costs involved in litigation contribute to an overall negative effect 
on firm performance, or if they are neutralised by the positive benefits of litigation. 
Incorporating the trade-off between benefits and costs ultimately highlights the three facets: 
sales, costs and therewith, profitability. Therefore, costs and monetary losses, as well as 
potential sales generation, have to be considered equally to investigate the effectiveness of 
patent litigation strategies in increasing overall post-patent litigation firm profitability. 
As described above, recent research is inconclusive about the influence of patent litigation 
strategies on firm performance. Thereby, profitability is the most important measure to picture 
financial sales generation efficiency while taking costs into account, hence, the ability of the 
firm to earn a profit.  
4.3 Hypotheses 
Engaging in a proprietary patent strategy is especially necessary for firms that want to bring 
their innovations to the market themselves instead of licensing it (Teece, 1986). Proactive 
strategic patent litigation is the key to secure competitive advantage as it is functioning as the 
intermediary step between the patent and the actual protection from intellectual property 
imitation. Thereby, patent litigation is aimed to discourage infringers from using patented 
technology and oftentimes to extract monetary reparation from them (Reitzig et al., 2007; Rudy 
and Black, 2015).  
The financial benefits of the patent holder can often exceed sheer compensation of losses, 
increasing performance outcomes (Rudy and Black, 2015). Nevertheless, litigation is costly, 
and often it is unclear if sales losses can be compensated with litigation. The following 
mechanisms will show how securing inimitability of assets with strategic patent litigation can 
lead to enhanced performance. Thereby, a special focus is placed on the influence of strategic 
patent litigation on sales, costs and profitability.  
Costs  
Firm sales only make up a fraction of a firm’s profit generation. Despite possible sales benefits 
due to successful employment of strategic patent litigation, there are substantial costs involved 




mainly arise in three areas: management time commitment, disruption of organisational 
processes and monitoring.  
First, research showed that litigation requires executive time which demands that resources are 
allocated towards management, and thus, can create substantial costs for litigation (Somaya, 
2003; Chen et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2016). Patent litigation can require multiple strategic 
decisions and time-intensive involvements of personnel to direct its course. Consequently, costs 
might increase because of the time commitment that has to be made by top-management and 
legal personnel.  
Second, litigation poses indirect financial burdens due to disruption that conditions 
inefficiencies and increased workloads, especially during initiation and discovery. At first, 
firms have to evaluate the scope of patent infringement violations and other firm’s patent rights. 
Then, during discovery, the plaintiff has to gather documents and evidence and has to handle 
public relations (Chen et al., 2015). Further losses can occur, for example, due to delays in court 
(Bebchuk, 1984; Lumineau and Oxley, 2012) that distract from other business activities. 
Strategic patent litigation can result in other business processes to be disrupted. For example, 
Shane and Somaya (2007), found that licensing activities were negatively affected when 
Universities litigated increasingly. Hence, disruption of organisational processes can increase 
expenditures due to patent litigation.  
Third, monitoring infringement actions of competitors involves substantial costs (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2012; James et al., 2013). However, not only the competitors 
have to be monitored. Litigation strategies and their execution have to be monitored and 
adjusted during the process. Furthermore, in order to avoid mistakes, firms have to invest in 
controlling transactions made by employees and transaction partners, such as lawyers (Foster 
1986). These expenses contribute significantly to the overall costs of litigation and, hence, 
litigation might increase administrative costs substantially.  
Besides, if the litigated patent makes up a significant portion of the firm’s revenues, unexpected 
failures in court can decrease the finances of a firm significantly beyond trial and executive 
costs (Markman et al., 2004). Hence, I hypothesise that:  







Strategic patent litigation can influence firm sales by two mechanisms: avoiding loss of revenue 
by excluding competition and increasing the value creation effect of patents and other effects, 
such as signalling, injunctions, settlement or licensing fees.  
In strategic patent litigation, the infringer can be excluded from commercialising the patented 
technologies so that the infringers can no longer offer its products for sale. Fewer choices of a 
specific product type on the market will eventually result in limited choices for consumers. This 
can ultimately benefit the sales position of the plaintiff party because customers will not be able 
to buy a competing product anymore (Rudy and Black, 2015) and have to resort to the patent 
holders product. Less competition due to patent protection also means that the patentee can 
achieve higher prices on the market, increasing sales with higher sales margins. For example, 
in the United States, the HIV drug PrEP is commercialised by Gilead for approximately 2000 
USD while it is sold for approximately 30 USD in Australia. This price difference is due to 
patent protection in the United States.  
Patent enforcement might also be used to block related technology from being patented or 
litigated by signalling enforcement rigour. This might, in turn, lead to increased sales as the 
signalling effect of toughness in patent litigation can discourage competitors from imitation or 
future litigation endeavours (Linden and Somaya, 2003; Rudy and Black, 2015). Thereby, even 
if a filed lawsuit is settled out of court, the signalling effect of toughness or validity is prevalent 
(Marco, 2005). Agarwal et al. (2009) found that litigiousness can also prevent skilful employees 
from resigning, potentially securing future sales on products involving their knowledge. Hence, 
the signalling effect can increase sales sustainably.  
Sales generation by strategic patent litigation is not only possible after a successful court 
proceeding. During the early stages of litigation, plaintiffs can try to achieve an injunctive relief 
against their infringers, urging them to stop with the commercialization and production of a 
product until patent rights are disputed (Bessen and Meurer, 2008a; Shapiro, 2010). Even 
though constrained to a certain timeframe, such an injunction will have the same effect on sales 
as proposed after successful patent litigation. 
Another factor that is supposed to increase the gains from patent litigation in the form of 
infringement suits for the plaintiff is that they are on the one hand, more frequent than patent 




benefitting other firms on the market (Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001). Hence the plaintiff will 
solely benefit from sales generated from excluding competitors.  
Lastly, settlement and licensing fees are an important aspect of why firm sales might be 
positively influenced by strategic patent litigation. When licensing fees have to be paid, the 
infringer usually pays a proportion of their revenues to the patentee for the usage right of the 
patented invention in their products. Licensing fees are often negotiated between the parties and 
serve the same purpose while being paid as a one-off or reoccurring payment of the negotiated 
amount. Royalties and licensing fees can be included in the income statement sheet and 
incorporated in the annual sales measure as “net sales including royalties and licensing net 
sales”, hence, they are counted as sales benefits for the firm.  
All the above arguments imply that firm sales increase if the firm utilises strategic patent 
litigation to protect their patents, hence:  
Hypothesis 2: Strategic patent litigation has a positive influence on firm sales. 
 
Profitability  
Strategic patent litigation can pose a barrier for imitation for potential infringers, deterring them 
from commercialising the patented technologies. Consequently, companies which employ 
litigation can protect their revenues and benefit from a competitive advantage. Furthermore, 
firms might be able to offer their products at higher prices. However, as elaborated in the 
previous paragraphs, the sole measurement of sales benefits neglects the possible detrimental 
effect of litigation costs. Hence, patent litigation strategies that are aimed to contemplate 
potential sales and costs might facilitate the litigation process and increase profitability in cases 
where the positive effect on firm sales is stronger than on firm costs. The ratio of sales and costs 
then decides about the overall profitability outcomes. Therefore, the effect of patent litigation 
strategies on profitability is expectedly dependent on the magnitude of sales and cost.  
Because strategic patent litigation is actively pursued by firms to protect or secure IP rights and 
competitive advantage, firms most likely carefully prepare and assess risks and outcomes of 
legal proceeding. Hence, companies might predominantly litigate in the case that they can 
increase their profitability from such proceedings. However, such assessments are imperfect, 
as firms often fail to strategically protect their patented technologies, for example, due to 




the bargaining power of a firm to positively influence benefits from negotiations during 
settlement.  
In line with the above-mentioned arguments concerning costs, sales and profitability of patent 
litigation, I hypothesise that:  
Hypothesis 3a: If increasing sales exceed increasing costs, strategic patent litigation has a 
positive influence on firm profitability.  
Hypothesis 3b: If increasing costs exceed increasing sales, strategic patent litigation has a 
negative influence on firm profitability.  
4.4 Data and Methods 
4.4.1 Sample 
The sample to test the Hypotheses contains active and inactive publicly traded and private U.S. 
companies. The data is unbalanced panel data ranging over 16 years, from 2000 to 2015. The 
sample concentrates on manufacturing firms (SIC codes 20 to 39), excluding firms with the Sic 
code 39, other manufacturing industries (see: Cohen et al., 2000). I used litigation data from the 
PLD provided by USPTO and merged it with financial data from the TOB dataset. The data 
contains filings reported to the PTO, which entails filed cases that settle and cases that go to 
trial (Marco, 2005). In line with Leeuw (1998), I excluded industries with less than 5 firm-year 
observations to ensure at least 5 individual-level observations in each hierarchy. The data used 
for the analysis then includes 726 firms that litigate at least once between 2000-2015 as a 
plaintiff in an infringement suit. When including the firms that do not litigate, the final sample 
for the analysis comprises 3,269 firms, from 278 industries and 21,745 observations, hence, 
approximately 22,2% firms in the dataset litigate. The observations further categorise to an 
average of 78.2 individual-level observations per industry and 6.7 observations per firm. 
 
In Figure 5 it can be seen that the average number of litigation lawsuits per firm and year ranges 
in the lower half of ten. There is a slight drop in the average number of litigation cases per firm 
in 2010 and 2011. While firms were litigating less before 2005 the average number of litigation 




Figure 5 Average Number of Litigation Lawsuits per Firm and Year 
  
4.5 Analysis 
This dissertation uses multilevel mixed model analysis (also called hierarchical or mixed linear 
modeling) (Ozkaya et al., 2013; Hair and Fávero, 2019; Peterson et al., 2020) to test the 
proposed hypotheses of each of the four chapters. In the field of IB, strategy and management, 
multilevel mixed model analysis was used previously to investigate firm performance on the 
firm and industry level (for an overview see: Hair and Favéro, 2019) . 
The multilevel aspect of the analysis is necessary as it structures the data into nested hierarchies, 
categorising the variables to capture complex relationships and dependencies across levels 
(Hofmann, 1997; Ozkaya et al., 2013). This means that the observations are considered 
according to hierarchies, meaning, the industry level as well as the company to which they 
belong. The first level is the industry, followed by the second level, the company itself. Thus, 
in order to capture the true effects of the predictor variables on the dependent variables, I 
specified the data in such hierarchies.  
The mixed effect aspect of this type of analysis is suitable because of the underlying panel 




over the years. Whereby the mixed implies that both, fixed and random effects are included 
(Hair and Fávero, 2019), which assures correct analysis of unbalanced datasets (Bamiatzi et al., 
2016). Furthermore, multilevel mixed model analysis in a panel data structured setting is a 
suitable method of analysis to prevent interference from causality issues. Theoretical support 
for multilevel mixed model analysis is given due to the nested structure of differences between 
industries and firms. The estimates of the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) reported in 
the results, provide further justification of the use of the multilevel mixed model analysis 
(Ozkaya et al., 2013).  
I analysed the hypotheses by using hierarchical regression, where successive models are built 
adding control variables first, followed by predictors and, lastly, moderation variables if 
applicable (see Chapters RQ2 – RQ4).  
Survival bias  
Patent litigation may contribute to a firm being deprived of its most vital core businesses, even 
to that point where firms are unable to survive or go bankrupt (Rudy and Black, 2015). In data 
analysis, this survival bias needs to be considered. As the data of the analysis range across many 
years, from 2000 to 2015, the possibility of firms exiting from the sample is high. Hence I added 
a two-step Heckman correction (Heckman, 1976), called Heckman Exit, to the analysis. 
In previous literature, Heckman correction is used as a method to deal with survival bias (Rudy 
and Black, 2015), to avoid bias in the sample (Greve, 1999). Hence, I calculated a dummy 
variable for exit from the data, indicating the first year a company disappeared from the dataset 
during 2001 and 2015 with 1, any other years with 0. I used the exit variable as the dependent 
variable in the following multilevel mixed probit model estimation. To estimate the likelihood 
of exit, I proceeded similar to Rudy and Black (2015), using independent variables that are 
predictors of firm survival (Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a). I included a count of the cases per 
year each company was listed as a defendant, as being sued increases the financial burden of a 
company and the risk of getting bankrupt. Furthermore, I added a one-year lag of firm size 
measured on the number of employees, as the size of the firm can be the reason why a firm can 
recover after litigation or influence the likelihood for the firm of being sued (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004). Moreover, I included a one-year lag of a firm’s total capital because the 
total investment in a company can be highly important for survival. Lastly, I incorporated a 
one-year lag of a company’s cash and equivalents to current assets which shows the long-term 
ratio between cash and liabilities, to include the effect of liquidity and well-being of a company 




1996). Following the probit model, I calculated the inverse mills ratio based on the previous 
estimates. I then integrated the resulting inverse mills ratio into the mixed methods model as a 
control variable named Heckman Exit.  
4.6  Descriptives 
In Table 5, the means, standard deviations and correlations are illustrated. 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: RQ1 
 
The correlation matrix shows acceptable values among the independent variables. However, 
the values of (-0.54) between Organisational Slack and R&D intensity as well as (0.45) between 
Firm Age and Firm Size indicate a stronger correlation. This was expected given that older 
firms tend to be bigger and R&D intensity can make a company more efficient in using its assets 
to generate sales and vice versa. To rule out multicollinearity issues, the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) for each variable were calculated using the “collin” command in Stata. The mean 
VIF showed 1.35, with ranging scores between 1.02 for Patent Litigation and 1.73 for R&D 
intensity. These VIFs are well below 10, which is the cut off value defined by Myers (1990). 
Even though this test suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue for this analysis, I performed 
a robustness check to rule out multicollinearity. As expected, excluding R&D intensity did not 








1 12.881 1.108 -0.05 ***
3 ROS
1 -0.238 4.095 -0.49 *** 0.59 ***
4 Firm Age
1 3.177 0.600 -0.17 *** 0.27 *** 0.37 ***
5 Firm Size
1 5.921 2.605 -0.30 *** 0.42 *** 0.60 *** 0.45 ***
6 R&D Intensity
1 2.533 2.070 0.52 *** -0.46 *** -0.64 *** -0.20 *** -0.31 ***
7 Organisational Slack
1 0.799 0.449 -0.30 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.12 *** -0.05 *** -0.54 ***
8 Litigation Duration
1 0.042 0.154 0.01 ** 0.08 *** 0.10 *** 0.07 *** 0.14 *** 0.03 *** -0.04 ***
9 Heckman Exit 0.315 0.232 -0.08 *** 0.13 *** 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.33 *** -0.04 *** 0.01 0.15 ***
10 Patent Litigation 0.001 0.022 0.07 *** 0.02 ** -0.02 *** 0.00 -0.02 *** 0.04 *** -0.02 ** 0.16 *** 0.00
Number of Observations=21.745 ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1




4.7  Results 
The results are presented in Table 6. All Prob>𝜒2 were significant at the 0.001 level. 
Table 6 Multilevel Mixed Method Analysis: RQ1 
 
Table 6 shows the results from the multilevel analysis. I ran three independent Models to 
illustrate the influence of strategic patent litigation on costs as well as the performance measures 
sales and profitability.  
Hypotheses 1 suggested that strategic patent litigation has a positive influence on firm costs. 
From the results, it can be seen that patent litigation has a positive and significant influence on 
firm costs (coefficient = 0.113, p< 0.05), showing that firms who actively engage in patent 
litigation experience higher organisational costs than other firms as every unit increase in 
litigation intensity influences costs by 11,6%. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  














Coef.       
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Firm Age
1 0.00 0.0001 0.008 0.008 0.168*** 0.167***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.054]
Firm Size
1 -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.884*** 0.884***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014]
R&D Intensity
1 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.858*** -0.858***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014]
Organisational Slack
1 0.00 -0.0001 0.670*** 0.670*** 1.796*** 1.796***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.048] [0.048]
Litigation Duration
1 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.038 0.033 0.077 0.045
[0.007] [0.007] [0.028] [0.028] [0.098] [0.099]
Heckman Exit 0.006 0.006 -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.154** -0.152**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.019] [0.019] [0.067] [0.067]
Independent Variable
Patent Litigation 0.113** 0.221 1.208**
[0.044] [0.170] [0.598]
Constant 0.238*** 0.238*** 11.609*** 11.608*** -6.059*** -6.062***
[0.017] [0.016] [0.082] [0.082] [0.219] [0.219]
Year Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
1
Variable is IHS-transformed. 
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms] ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 




Hypotheses 2 suggested that strategic patent litigation has a positive influence on firm sales. 
From the results, we can see that patent litigation has a positive but insignificant effect on firm 
sales (coefficient = 0.221, p> .1). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. The insignificant 
influence might be explained by effects that relativise the positive effect on sales, such as 
increased awareness of the consumer to carefully assess the purchase of products that are 
disputed by litigation. This is because future complementary investments or product 
maintenance might be insecure due to the possibility, that the invention will be withdrawn 
(Bessen and Meurer, 2008a). 
Hypothesis 3a suggested, if increasing sales exceed increasing costs, strategic patent litigation 
has a positive influence on firm profitability. It can be seen from the results that patent litigation 
has a positive and significant influence on firm performance (coefficient =1.208, p< 0.05). 
Hence, Hypothesis 3a is partly supported. However, sales are not significantly increased due to 
patent litigation, whereas costs are.  
Hypothesis 3b suggested that if increasing costs exceed increasing sales, strategic patent 
litigation has a negative influence on firm profitability. Although the influence of patent 
litigation is positive and significant on firm costs, a negative effect on ROS could not be 
determined. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is not supported. 
These results show that strategic patent litigation is increasing costs and profitability but that it 
is not significantly influencing sales. However, the overall positive effect on profitability gives 
room for suspecting that patent litigation might be beneficial for certain firms in specific 
circumstances, while it may be detrimental for others. To get a better picture of the actual effect 
of intensive litigation on performance, I refined the analysis by drawing predictive margins at 
different levels of patent litigation intensity. Therefore, I transformed the IHS values back to 
their original scale and calculated the predictive margins. The results show the effect of 
different levels of litigation intensity (ranging from 0 to 1.4, case counts divided by intangible 
assets) on performance.  
In Figure 6, the predictive margins show that the positive effect of litigation on sales increases 
the more a company is litigating in patent litigation. These results provide additional support 




Figure 6 Predictive Margins Sales per Employee: RQ1 
 
Figure 7 shows that with increasing litigation intensity, the predicted marginal effect on ROS 
becomes positive (between .6 and .8) and grows. Hence, firms that litigate more intensively 
experience a positive effect on ROS while a low litigation intensity negatively influences 
profitability.  
Figure 7 Predictive Margins ROS: RQ1 
 
This section investigated the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance, 
measured on sales and profitability. Set out as a baseline investigation to clarify the role of 
strategic patent litigation in firm performance and its abilities to protect firms from imitation. 
It was found that in general, litigation does have a positive effect on firm profitability. 




but rarely tested has been confirmed by the results: strategic patent litigation increases the 
expenses of a firm significantly. However, the multilevel analysis revealed that although patent 
litigation is costly, the sales benefits are less pronounced. Whereby strategic patent litigation 
still allows the firm to profit from intellectual property. 
4.7.1 Magnitude of the Effects 
The sample of this dissertation contains litigating and non-litigating firms. Furthermore, many 
firms do not litigate every year. As a result, Patent Litigation is highly skewed. Because the 
mean and the standard deviation do not adequately represent such distribution, I show the 
magnitude of the effects from the 90th-99.9th percentile to discuss how increasing patent 
litigation intensity affects firm sales and profitability when taking the sample distribution into 
account. This is necessary because the observable variation within the dependent variable 
actually occurs at the top 10% of the firms in the dataset.  As a unit increment in patent litigation 
intensity is rather difficult to grasp, I report the effect of the 90th,  99th-99.6th (in .2 increments) 
and the 99.9th percentile. In order to represent magnitudes of effects realistically, in calculating 
predicted margins I remained conservative and included the magnitudes at up to the 99.9th 
percentile of the independent variables. Including the maximum values or even the 99.99th 
percentiles sharply increases the predicted values in all cases. To account for the means of the 
random effects, in addition to the fixed effects means, I included them in the calculations. 
Keeping everything else equal with increased number of cases from the 90th to the 99.9th 
percentile the predicted sales per employee increase from 196,267.7 to 205,122.9, hence 
litigation intensity accounts for a variation in sales per employee of 8,855.2. Between the 90th 
and 99.9th percentile, the predicted ROS increases from -0.2415 to 0.0023 which translates to 
an increase of 0.24 percentage points. The results can be examined in Table 7. 
Table 7 Magnitude of the Effects RQ1 
 
Percentile Patent Litigation Value Predicted Sales per Employee Predicted ROS 
90.0 0 196,267.7 -0.2415 
99.0 0.0008 196,299.1 -0.2405 
99.2 0.0021 196,358.0 -0.2390 
99.4 0.0083 196,629.1 -0.2312 
99.6 0.1 200,647.5 -0.1187 





4.7.2 Additional Tests 
4.7.2.1 The Intraclass Correlation Coefficients 
I calculated the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) (Koch, 2006) for the three models. A 
high ICC suggests that the observations within a group are more similar than observations 
between different groups, as the means of the first level variables are predicted by the level two 
variables (Peterson et al., 2020). Thus, a multilevel mixed model is particularly beneficial in 
those cases. Examining the ICC helps to determine how much of the overall variation in the 
observations is stemming from the defined groups. The ICCs from the analysis was 0.05 at the 
industry level and 0.66 at the firm level for costs, 0.20 at the industry level and 0.82 at the firm 
level for sales and 0.12 at the industry level and 0.63 at the firm level for return on sales. This 
shows the correlation between two firms in the same industry and two observations from the 
same company in one industry. Hence, 5% of the variation in firm costs appears to stem from 
the industry and 85% of the variation is attributed to the firm itself. For sales, 20% of the 
variation in firm sales can be attributed to the industry and 82% of the variation in firm sales 
can be attributed to the company itself (including the industry). For profitability, 12% of the 
variation can be attributed to the industry and 63% to the firm.  
Interestingly, these results give room to believe that when assessing the outcome of litigation, 
it is necessary to examine firm-specific and industrial differences, especially when looking at 
the influence of patent litigation on sales and return on sales. This is because the ICC suggests 
a high similarity in values for firms within the same industry for firm sales. When looking at 
costs, however, unique firm characteristics might be more important than industrial differences, 
as the ICC suggests that firms within the same industry might still experience great differences 
in costs. This is in line with previous research on firm, industry and country effects that state 
that firm-specific variations and their influence on performance are more distinct (Rumelt, 
1991; Mauri and Michaels, 1998; Brush et al., 1999; Short et al., 2007; Bamiatzi et al., 2016), 
especially in manufacturing industries (McGahan and Porter, 1997). However, differences in 
measurement can reveal contrary results showing the relative importance of industry effects 
(McGahan and Porter, 1997), promoting industry differences as superior for core strategies (for 
example, technology or marketing) (Mauri and Michaels, 1998) and for firms which are neither 
leaders nor losers within an Industry (Hawawini et al., 2003). These controversies in the debate 




4.7.2.2 The Koyck Distributed Lag Model 
To determine the long-term influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance 
exceeding the year of case settlement, a Koyck distributed lag model (Koyck, 1954) was 
estimated for the sample. Litigious activities of a company may have longer term impacts on 
sales and profitability. As litigation cases differ in their scope, some cases might influence non-
immediate performance more significantly than others with an abating effect over time. 
Additionally, firms can build a reputation for toughness in litigation (Agarwal et al., 2009) 
which can persistently influence their operations and performance in the future. Not least 
because it curbs knowledge spillover effects. Hence, to calculate the persistence of the 
performance effects of patent litigation, I followed past literature (Palda, 1965; Mulchandani et 
al., 2019) and estimated a Koyck distributed lag model. It is a dynamic lag model that allows 
the limitation of infinite coefficients by specifying the decrease of coefficients with increase of 
lags.  
The Koyck distributed lag formula (Palda, 1965),  
(1) Yt = a + b0Xt + b0λ Xt-1 + b2λ2 Xt-2 +….+ bk λk Xt-k +ut,   
 
is transformed into: 
 
(2) Yt = (1 – λ) a+ b0Xt + λYt-1 + ut- λ ut-1 
 
where the estimation process involves incorporating the lagged dependent variable into the 
estimation model as an independent variable. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
(λ) represents the speed of adjustment of the lagged effects (Palda, 1965; Dekimpe and 
Hanssens, 2000). 
I calculated the effects using the method by Mulchandani et al. (2019), based on the formula: 
(3) b'k= b0 λk 
 
To show the prolonged effects of patent litigation explicitly, I calculated lagged effects 
following equation (3) for up to 5 years of lagged effects. In the ROS model, the lag effect 
declines from 1.93 in time k to 0.03 in time k-5, with λ=.43. For the sales model, the lag effect 





Although the effect of litigation on firm performance drops quickly in the first five years, there 
is a prolonged effect, stressing the importance of strategic patent litigation for firm 
performance. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the drop rate of the lag effects:  
Figure 8 Koyck Distributed Lags for ROS 
 










Table 8 and 9 show the calculations of the Koyck lagged effects. 
Table 8 Distributed Lag Effects of Patent Litigation on ROS 
 
 
Table 9 Distributed Lag Effects of Patent Litigation on Firm Sales 
 
4.7.2.3 Non-Linearity 
In order to explore non-linearity of the relationship between patent litigation and firm 
performance, I followed previous studies (Jones, 2003; Laursen and Salter, 2006) and tested for 
an inverted U-shape relationship. Inverted-U-shaped relationships are characterised by an  
initially increasing dependent variable (with increasing values of the independent variable) to 
reach a maximum from which it decreases again (Haans et al., 2016). Theoretically, it can be 
expected, that the performance effect of patent litigation might be increasing with the number 
of cases, as it takes thorough consideration for the firm to file an infringement suit which mostly 
may be directed at a rise in performance. As litigators often closely determine which cases they 
initiate, the signalling effect of a few well-placed lawsuits might be additionally positively 
influencing performance. Thereby, one patent litigation case can not only deter competitors 
from infringing a patent, it can also positively affect employees (Agarwal et al., 2009). 
However, if companies do not capitalize on these effects, continuing to litigate relentlessly, the 
positive influence of litigation on performance might wear off. As Somaya (2003) point out, 
this might be especially the case if irrational behaviour (e.g. subjective behaviour of executives) 







0 0.43^0 = 1 1.93 * 1 1.93 0.709 3.145 
1 0.43^1=0.43 1.93 * 0.43 0.83 0.305 1.352 
2 0.43^2=0.185 1.93 * 0.185 0.36 0.130 0.582 
3 0.43^3=0.079 1.93 * 0.079 0.15 0.055 0.248 
4 0.43^4=0.034 1.93 * 0.034 0.07 0.024 0.106 
5 0.43^5=0.015 1.93 * 0.015 0.03 0.010 0.047 
λ=.43 







0 0.30^0=1 0.34 * 1 0.34 0.0203 0.666 
1 0.30^1=0.30 0.34 * 0.30 0.10 0.0061 .1999 
2 0.30^2=0.09 0.34 * 0.09 0.03 0.0019 .0599 
3 0.30^3=0.027 0.34 * 0.027 0.01 0.0005 .0179 
4 0.30^4=0.008 0.34 * 0.008 0.003 0.00005 .0053 





is surfacing or unbeneficial legal advice is followed. However, it could also happen if the firm 
limits particular structural or legal capabilities to efficiently direct litigation endeavours or if 
litigating against several competitors did not lead to a beneficial outcome.  
To provide evidence for a U-shaped relationship, I regressed the dependent variable Y on the 
independent variable X and its square, following Haans et al. (2016):  
(1) Y = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1X + 𝛽2X2 
 
The results in Table 10  for the firm sales model show a significant and negative 𝛽2 indicating 
an inverted U-shaped relationship. The results for the ROS model show an insignificant effect 
of 𝛽2. 
Table 10 Results for Non-Linearity 
 
 










Coef.       
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Firm Age
1 0.008 0.008 0.168*** 0.167***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.054]
Firm Size
1 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.884*** 0.884***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014]
R&D Intensity
1 -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.858*** -0.858***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014]
Organisational Slack
1 0.670*** 0.670*** 1.796*** 1.796***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.048] [0.048]
Litigation Duration
1 0.038 0.022 0.077 0.062
[0.028] [0.029] [0.098] [0.100]
Heckman Exit -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.154** -0.152**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.067] [0.067]
Independent Variable
Patent Litigation 1.063*** -0.089
[0.412] [1.445]
Patent Litigation Squared -0.884** 1.374
[0.394] [1.394]
Constant 11.609*** 11.607*** -6.059*** -6.060***
[0.082] [0.082] [0.219] [0.219]
Year Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms] ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; 
*p<0.1. 
1





These findings support the logic that the influence of patent litigation on firm sales is increasing 
positively at first but continues to decrease with overly high levels of patent litigation. Hence, 
when it comes to litigation, a few strategically targeted cases might be worth more than suing 
multiple infringers in an array of lawsuits. Additionally, I found similar inverted U-shape 
effects for the influence of patent litigation on firm costs, providing a foundation for the 
rationale of economies of scale in patent litigation. However, a u-shaped relationship could not 
be found for the effect of patent litigation on ROS, the effect may be linear which explains the 
insignificant coefficients. One explanations for the non-linear relationship that can be found in 
sales but not ROS is that the rate of decline in firm sales is less steep than the rate of decline in 
costs. Hence, the trade-off between the potential sales and organisational costs of patent 
litigation results in a linear positive effect on profitability. 
4.7.2.4 The Role of Local Patent Litigation for Firm Performance  
Patent protection is local (Beukel and Zhao, 2018). A patent that is issued in the United States 
is only valid and defendable for the United States market. Hence, the possible realised sales and 
profits might occur mainly locally. However, previous litigation literature did not distinguish 
sales and profitability from U.S. sales and the profitability of U.S. operations (Rudy and Black, 
2015). Two main arguments can underline why this is not the case. First, scholars are confident, 
that U.S. based litigation is often influencing patent-litigation related profits outside the U.S. 
market (Bessen and Meurer, 2008a). As Beukel and Zhao (2018) show, companies try to litigate 
in a few, strong markets that signal to other countries. Hence, U.S. based litigation endeavours 
can decide on sales and profits that are globally realised.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the U.S. is a very strong and big market. This also 
explains the strong signalling effect U.S. based litigation can have on foreign markets. At firms 
often decide to litigate only in few countries (due to the costs involved) they tend to choose the 
market with the biggest purchasing power and promising signalling effect. Hence, for strategic 
patent litigation, domestic as well as foreign firm performance might both be determined on 
litigious activities of the firm in the United States. Whereby litigating in the U.S. by itself is an 
indicator that the U.S. is an important market for the firms in the sample. 
To nevertheless control for the importance of U.S. business in the total operations of the 
plaintiff, I added the control variable internationalization. The degree of internationalization of 
the company determines if it is conducting business more locally or internationally. Firms that 
are having their predominant business operations in the U.S. might be influenced by U.S. 




literature  (Grant, 1987; Tallman and Li, 1996; Kafouros et al., 2008; Denicolai et al., 2014) 
and used the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. The results can be examined in Table 11.  
Table 11 The Influence of Patent Litigation on Firm Performance Controlling for Internationalization 
 
The results from the main model were robust to including internationalization as a control 
variable. Based on the reasons outline above, it does not seem that there is a significant 
difference between domestic and foreign effects of patent litigation for the firms in the sample 
of this dissertation.  
I calculated the Akaike (AIC) (Akaikei, 1973) and Bayes (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) information 
criteria to assess if the model benefits from including the control variable internationalization. 
The AIC and BIC of the model for sales not including internationalization were (36825.23 and 
37024.91). These AIC values are only slightly bigger than the model including 
internationalization (36823.4 and 37031.07). This is supported by marginal information loss of 










Coef.       
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Firm Age
1 0.009 0.009 0.166*** 0.166***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.054]
Firm Size
1 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.881*** 0.881***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.015] [0.015]
R&D Intensity
1 -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.858*** -0.858***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014]
Organisational Slack
1 0.671*** 0.671*** 1.793*** 1.794***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.048] [0.048]
Litigation Duration
1 0.039 0.033 0.076 0.045
[0.028] [0.028] [0.098] [0.099]
Heckman Exit -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.154** -0.153**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.067] [0.067]
Internationalization -0.037** -0.037* 0.077 0.079
[0.019] [0.019] [0.064] [0.064]
Independent Variable
Patent Litigation 0.217 1.216**
[0.170] [0.598]
Constant 11.619*** 11.619*** -6.055*** -6.059***
[0.082] [0.082] [0.219] [0.219]
Year Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms]; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1





i = 1.83 < 2 if internationalization is not included, calculated from the formula of Burnham 
and Anderson (2004) i= AICi – AICmin, which allows the interpretation of AIC scales. The 
ROS shows a better fit for the model without internationalization (89506.65 and 89722.3), than 
with internationalization (89547.3    89754.96) and a delta difference of i = 40,65 > 2. Because 
the control variable of internationalization does not seem to add additional value to the model 
fit for the main performance variable ROS, I did not further integrate it in the main models. 
To test the influence of strategic patent litigation on U.S. firm performance only, I used the 
measures foreign sales and foreign operating income reported on the income statement of the 
sampled firms. I collected this variables from the Thomson One Banker database and estimated 
U.S. sales and U.S ROS by deducting the foreign measures from total sales and total operating 
income. However, especially for the measure of to foreign operating income, data availability 
issues diminished the sample size from the original analysis significantly with only 14.109 
observations (hence, 7.785 missing observations). When assuming the missing values of the 
foreign operating income to be 0, the resulting creation of U.S. ROS requires utilizing foreign 
sales which also has missing values for 2.076 observations. The results of the model without 
imputing the missing values for foreign sales shows a strongly positive and significant effect 
on U.S. ROS, however, when imputing the missing values, this effect is no longer visible. Yet, 
this is an indicator, that patent litigation influences local profitability significantly. As the 
difference between the results when modelling U.S. based profitability and the global measure, 
might be explained by the differences in sample size. The model might lose significance due to 
a reduced sample size and the simultaneous loss of degrees of freedom. The effect of patent 
litigation on U.S. sales shows positive but insignificant results as well as the main model.  
The role of patent litigation for local performance and global performance could be a valuable 
route for future research. Whereas research on the relationship of patents and patent litigation 
in the United States and firm performance mostly utilizes global based performance measures 
(see: De Carolis, 2003; Markman et al., 2004 and Rudy and Black 2015), recent scholarship on 
litigation shifted the focus on location (see: Beukel an Zhao, 2018) leaving room for further 






4.7.2.5 Market Concentration  
In more concentrated industries, the effects of patent litigation could be more pronounced, as 
less competition might increase the importance of stopping infringement of a key competitor. 
However, in industries that consist of a small numbers of key players without considerable 
competition, companies can often only sue against a few competitors, whereby the remaining 
market share (that can be captured by litigation) decreases with market concentration. 
Furthermore, market concentration could also account for the number and outcome of patent 
litigation cases filed in an industry. In addition, market concentration could influence the 
signalling effect because litigating in less concentrated markets against one or a few key 
competitors might deter other firms from infringing on the litigated patent (Agarwal, 2009). 
Hence, firms can hinder a cohort of competing firms from imitating their products without 
litigating multiple times. However, in less concentrated markets, these effects might not come 
to pass. Therefore, it might be necessary to control for market concentration in the main model 
to account for such effects.  
In order to test if adding a control variable for market concentration improves the final model, 
I followed previous research in the field (Beukel and Zhao, 2018) and calculated the Herfindahl 
Index (Herfindahl, 1950; Kelly, 1981). As a measure of market concentration, the Herfindahl 
Index is a sum of all squared market shares within an industry. Whereby a higher value of the 
Index (from 0-1) indicates a lower degree of competition in a market and, hence, hints to more 
monopolistic markets, and vice versa (Boyd, 1995). Controlling for market concentration, 
shows that market concentration does not influence the main results. The results can be viewed 




Table 12 The Influence of Patent Litigation on Firm Performance Controlling for Market Concentration 
 
I calculated the Akaike (AIC) (Akaikei, 1973) and Bayes (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) information 
criteria to assess if the model benefits from including the control variable market concentration. 
The AIC and BIC of the model for sales without market concentration are (36825,23 and 
37024,91). These values are higher than the model including market concentration (36815.04    
and 37022.71). This is supported by an information loss of i = 10.19 > 2 if the control is not 
included, calculated from the formula of Burnham and Anderson (2004) i= AICi – AICmin, 
which allows the interpretation of AIC scales. However, the ROS model does not benefit from 
including the measure of market concentration (89548.07 and 89755.73), showing a better fit 
of the model without controlling for market concentration with (89506.65 and 89722.3), having 
a delta difference of i = 41,42 > 2. Hence, because the main performance model ROS does 
not benefit from including market concentration as an additional control variable, I did not 
include it in the main analysis. 










Coef.       
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Firm Age
1 0.008 0.008 0.169*** 0.168***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.054]
Firm Size
1 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.886*** 0.886***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014]
R&D Intensity
1 -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.858*** -0.858***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014]
Organisational Slack
1 0.672*** 0.672*** 1.797*** 1.797***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.048] [0.048]
Litigation Duration
1 0.039 0.034 0.077 0.046
[0.028] [0.028] [0.098] [0.099]
Heckman Exit -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.152** -0.151**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.067] [0.067]
Market Concentration -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.117 -0.116
[0.041] [0.041] [0.136] [0.136]
Independent Variable
Patent Litigation 0.218 1.205**
[0.170] [0.598]
Constant 11.619*** 11.619*** -6.055*** -6.059***
[0.082] [0.082] [0.219] [0.219]
Year Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms] ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
1





4.7.2.6 Robustness Checks 
In order to claim validity of the findings. I performed several robustness checks14 throughout 
different stages of the analysis.  
First, a bigger standard deviation compared to the mean of a variable can be questionable 
regarding the power of outliers. Therefore, following previous studies (Chang et al., 2013; 
Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a), I performed the analysis without extreme values of Return on 
Sales. I cut off extreme ROS values at the -100% and 100% mark. The alteration reduced the 
sample size; however, the findings are robust to the changes. Furthermore, I tested Return on 
Assets (ROA) as an alternative measure of profitability as previous studies relied on ROA as a 
measure for profitability (De Carolis, 2003; Bamiatzi et al., 2016) and because it highlights the 
asset protection component of inimitability. The detected influence on ROA is similar to the 
effects shown in the original analysis on ROS with no change in significance, hence the change 
did not influence the results.  
Second, there exists an inherent bias in the sample of litigating and non-litigating firms which 
has to be considered when analysing the effect of litigation on performance. The firm itself 
makes an informed decision on whether it’s worth litigating. Consequently, litigating against a 
potential infringer is a choice, made based on several trade-off decisions. I considered the 
resulting selection effect that could alter the results based on choices made before litigation 
with another two-step Heckman correction, using a multilevel mixed probit model estimation, 
followed by the calculation of a second inverse mills ratio which I then included in the main 
mixed-methods model. I ran the probit model with several variables. First, the dependent 
variable constitutes a dummy variable indicating if a company was litigating as a plaintiff in 
the given year. Then, I included several predictors of litigation. First, assets (intangible and 
tangible) and total current assets, as the size of the firm, its intangible assets and its financial 
strength can influence the decision to litigate. As Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) found, 
litigation prosecution decisions are more likely for small patentees. Furthermore, I included if 
a firm was listed as a defendant in a given year. Companies that are sued in court often resort 
to counter suits to defend against allegations (Rudy and Black, 2015). Lastly, I calculated the 
cumulative litigation cases of each company in the time period to include experience with 
litigation cases in the analysis as more experienced firms might be more skilled in assessing the 
 
14 I tested the robustness checks presented in this chapter (and the outcomes remain similar) for the current and all consecutive 




need for litigation. Including the measure in the final model revealed similar results, 
demonstrating the robustness of the findings.  
I performed a likelihood ratio test to test the significance of the inverse mills ratio of litigation 
for the model. The test was not significant at the 0.1939 level. To further rule out, that including 
the variable does not improve model fit to justify overfitting (i.e. parsimony), I calculated the 
Akaike (AIC) (Akaikei, 1973) and Bayes (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) information criteria. The AIC 
and BIC of the model including the ratio (89546.8 and 89746.47) were only marginally better 
than without the ratio (89547.11 and 89754.77), concluding that both models are practically 
equivalent. This is supported by an information loss of i = 0.31 < 2 calculated from the 
formula of Burnham and Anderson (2004)i= AICi – AICmin, which allows the interpretation 
of AIC scales. Hence, to maintain simplicity, I excluded the inverse mills ratio from the model. 
Third, I considered the possibility of simultaneity. Here, the dependent variable, ROS might 
have a simultaneous effect on litigation intensity because companies experiencing high 
profitability from their operating businesses might be interested in protecting it, while at the 
same time, are considerably financially equipped to initiate litigation. Hence, I tested if ROS is 
influencing patent litigation. The influence was statistically insignificant and an issue with 
simultaneity is, thus, ruled out for this analysis. 
Fourth, following Cohen (2000), I additionally ran the analysis on the three-digit SIC code 
level, the two-digit SIC code level, an accumulated version of SIC-code levels (where all 
predominant SIC codes of a company were consolidated into the primary group of Industry) 
and the NAICS code level to counteract precision issues with four-digit Industry assignments.  
Sixth, the costs of a lawsuit are underlining the trade-off that companies have to make when 
initiating patent lawsuits and hence, are part of the mechanisms that determine the profitability 
of strategic patent litigation. To illustrate how litigation costs can influence firm performance, 
I estimated two additional models, using organisational costs as an explanatory variable. As 
expected, high litigation costs influence profitability negatively. This is in line with the 
narrative, that costly enforcement results in lower profitability for the plaintiff (Bessen and 









Table 13 Litigation Trade-Off 
 
4.8 Discussion and Conclusion 
By investigating the influence of patent litigation on firm costs and firm performance, it is now 
clear, that firms can use strategic litigation to appropriate value from their innovations by 
shielding their patent rights, from exploitation through imitative behaviour. The findings add to 
the existing knowledge of the RBV’s notion of inimitability by making it more responsive to 
firm-specific litigation abilities rather than pre-set resource characteristics. This was suggested 
by previous literature in the field (Liebeskind, 1996; Markman et al., 2004) but not yet tested 
in the context of RBV and patent litigation. The contribution is of particular value because the 
RBV notion of inimitability was long time thought to stem from asset characteristics (barney 
1991). However, especially for assets that are imitable by nature, or are made imitable through 
disclosure during patent protection, strategic patent litigation provides firms with the ability to 
guard their patents against imitation. Furthermore, this protection has positive implications for 
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Heckman Exit -0.152** -0.075
[0.067] [0.064]











Year Controls Incl. Incl.
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms] ; 







firm performance, especially profitability, allowing firms to capture value from strategic patent 
litigation. Hence by adding to the RBV, what Markman (2004) already similarly postulated for 
patents is now postulated for strategic patent litigation: it acts as surrogate of inimitability by 
building isolating mechanisms.  
The findings of this chapter are also interesting for practitioners as they illustrate that strategic 
patent litigation is an important tool to profit from innovation. Rather than focusing solely on 
patent acquisition and R&D, firms can create significant value from their IP when they skilfully 
protect it in court. Consequently, firms should focus on their litigation strategies and further 
develop their patent enforcement strengths, while carefully evaluating the costs of their 
endeavours. This is because suing against infringers will not always increase sales. The 
substantial effects on administrative costs must be considered to determine if the potential 
outcomes are capable of compensating for the investments of key-personnel time and risks of 
disruption.  
The present research, on the one hand, contributes to the RBV by establishing strategic litigation 
as a vital link between inimitability and performance and, on the other hand, gives room for 
further research on the appropriation of value from innovation. The positive effect of strategic 
patent litigation on profitability, while costs are increasing implies, that litigation is only 
profitable for some firms. This lays an important groundwork for further research on strategic 
patent litigation and how it can increase the profitability of the firm. Whereby other factors 
could influence profitability, for example, corporate reputation and the signalling effect 
deterring other firms from imitation (Agarwal et al., 2009), this study strengthens the idea that 
there must be litigation specific contextual factors that determine the outcomes of strategic 
patent litigation. This is also underlined by the results, indicating that litigation can be indeed 
very costly, while also improving profitability without a clear indicator that firms can register 
higher sales outcomes. This raises an important question about the mechanisms that make 
strategic patent litigation an important link between IP rights and competitive advantage of the 
firm. The abilities of the firm to do so might be bounded to certain contingencies which have 
to be considered. Although this poses some limitations on the findings, it gives a first indication 
of the influence of strategic patent litigation on performance in a generalisable fashion.  
Increased profitability without significant findings on the influence of strategic patent litigation 
on firm sales proposes three things: 1. strategic patent litigation influences firms sales only in 
some cases and not in others, 2. specific circumstances allow firms to save costs of litigation so 




outcomes that can reflect in increases profitability of firms as, for example, reputation or 
strategic litigation to protect other patents within the portfolio. Further research should 
elaborate on the contingencies that act as mechanisms which link strategic patent litigation and 
profitability. Also, the role of the firm and its strategies should not be neglected. De Carolis 
(2003) underlines the need for further research focused on how firms try to secure inimitability 
of assets. These knowledge gaps provide the opportunity for the next chapters to determine 
important contingencies that need to be integrated into patent litigation research. These 
contingencies will eventually highlight when and how firms can profit from patent enforcement. 
To move the debate forward, a better understanding of these contingencies and their influence 





















5 RQ 2: The Role of the Repeated Use of the Same 
Attorneys in Strategic Patent Litigation 
This section discusses why and how the present study intends to incorporate firm-specific 
factors that can influence the relationship between patent litigation and firm performance. In 
particular, empirical Chapter 2 illustrates the firm-specific factor by looking at the role of the 
repeated use of the same attorneys in strategic patent litigation. The chapter sheds light on the 
inter-firm differences with regards to repeated legal relationships and, hence, the strategy of 
rehiring that can shape a firm’s litigation success. 
5.1 Introduction 
Firms engage in strategic patent litigation to secure inimitability of assets and increased rents 
(see Chapter 1). Although this makes strategic patent litigation a powerful and widely utilised 
tool, it is unclear why some firms are better in enforcing their intellectual property to capture 
value from their innovations and secure economic rents than others? In a surge to answer this 
question, previous literature focused on patent-based value capture strategies from innovation 
and recognised, that firm-specific abilities can influence costs and benefits. It was suggested 
that strong appropriability competences can be determined endogenously by firms (Liebeskind, 
1996; Pisano, 2006) and increase the chance of profitability (De Carolis, 2003). Hence, firm-
specific efficiencies of strategic litigation might vary because of inter-firm differences in value 
capture endeavours.  
To capture rent from their innovations, firm resort to protection mechanisms shielding them 
from imitational behaviour of their competitors. Therefore, patent protection and firm 
performance are of prevalent interest within the broad research field of innovation. In order to 
establish the role of the firm in the relationship of patents and performance, scholars already 
recognised the importance of a firm’s size, its ability to manage R&D and the patenting process, 
(James et al., 2013) as well as its legal capabilities involved in corporate strategy and patent 
enforcement (Shanley and Peteraf, 2004; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Beukel and Zhao, 
2018). Few scholars also looked at the role of the top management teams (Somaya, 2003; Chen 
et al., 2015), as well as in-house and external attorneys (Lerner, 1995; Somaya et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, to detect infringement and enforce patents, scholarship recognised the necessity 
of patent law experience of legal teams and decision making in patent filing with regards to 




asymmetric information in top executive levels to explain strategic litigation decisions and 
stressed the role of legal astuteness in litigation (Chen et al., 2015). Other non-patent related 
research looked at learning by hiring (Song et al., 2003), the role of social and intellectual 
capital for competitive advantage (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) and learning and the creation 
of capabilities, whereby operating routines are viewed as competencies (Zollo and Winter, 
2002).  
However, the role of firm differences with regards to their ability to build on their reoccurring 
relationships with attorneys in strategic patent litigation is often ignored. Legal literature 
rightfully criticised economic scholarship (where litigation has been a topic of interest because 
of its game-theoretic facets) for ignoring the role of attorneys in litigation (Gilson and Mnookin, 
1994). Hence, although there is a growing interest in the role of strategic patent litigation as a 
main driver of firm performance and lawyers can be crucial for litigation (McGuire, 1995), the 
role of reoccurring relationships between the firm and attorneys, especially in patent litigation, 
has been neglected. 
The purpose of this chapter is to shift the focus on variations in a firm’s specific abilities to 
appropriate rents from their patents by building on knowledge creation from repeated 
experience with the same attorneys. Thereby, the repeated use of the same attorneys may 
influence the effect of strategic patent litigation on firm performance. Thereby, knowledge 
creation from repeated experience refers to the accumulation of information on the firm, its 
technologies and processes by the legal team, internal or external, that conduct strategic 
litigation. The repetition in relations, keeping the same attorneys repetitively on the case and 
other cases, might stem from the firm’s ability to manage its strategic litigation endeavour and 
transaction costs to answer to the trade-off between costs and benefits inherent to patent 
litigation. Moreover, repetition might build efficiencies from managing the firm’s internal and 
external resources that ultimately build a competitive position.  
This shift is contributing to our knowledge on strategic patent litigation as an endogenously 
built isolating mechanism for imitable assets by emphasising the role of the repeated use of the 
same attorneys (and the knowledge on the firm accumulated by the attorney) during patent 
enforcement. Furthermore, this offers a contribution to the firm-specific contingencies that 
influence the relationship of strategic litigation on costs, sales and profitability which can be 
reviewed in the integrative framework (Table 1).  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, it is built on the RBV to increase 




to inimitability of assets and competitive advantage. Second, three hypotheses are developed 
that take a closer look at the repeated use of the same legal personnel and its influence on the 
strategic litigation - performance relationship. Third, the sample and variables are provided, 
followed by the analysis and the discussion of the results. Lastly, the chapter closes with 
presenting the contribution and implications with a link to the integrative framework Table 1.  
5.2 Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
Building on competitive advantage and the RBV, technical expertise or superior assets alone 
do not determine performance. Asset protection and ex-post limits to imitability are important 
to achieve sustained competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1993). But, traditional isolating 
mechanisms, such as patents, require active protection to shield inventions from imitation. 
Firms must resort to legal mechanisms to protect their profits from imitation (Teece, 1986; De 
Carolis, 2003). In a similar vein, it is unlikely, that firm-specific competencies in the strategic 
patenting field, are always enough to achieve appropriability from inventions (Teece, 1986). 
To reach effective patent protection, previous scholarship postulated, that firms have to have 
special abilities that enable them to build the necessary legal protection (Cohen et al., 2000). 
Such abilities can be to keep repeated ties with good attorneys (Somaya et al., 2011) by 
employing them for multiple litigation cases. This is because reoccurring interactions between 
a company and skilful contractors can shape the competitive position of firms (Reitzig and 
Puranam, 2009). Hence, this chapter argues that some firms perform better in protecting their 
patents to appropriate value from their inventions than other firms, due to firm-specific 
efficiency building with legal means, such as representation by attorneys. 
To achieve a competitive advantage, prior research suggested capabilities in strategy, 
management, and the development of competence, especially with regards to human resources 
as well as fruitful dealership with external institutions (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; De Carolis, 
2003). Furthermore, Teece (1986) postulated, that especially capabilities of complementary 
nature, for example, co-specialisation, might be key to benefit from innovation. Liebeskind 
(1996) stated that the employment organisation of a company itself can be the source of such 
capabilities. When it comes to litigation research involving the resource-based view of the firm, 
knowledge of firm-specific legal assets is scarce. Rudy and Black (2015) suggested that further 
research on patent litigation strategies could investigate the effect of legal representation in the 
context of litigation. They argue that litigation capabilities could be measured by looking at the 




that in-house patent law expertise combined with R&D influences a firm’s patenting 
performance measured on granted patents. In their study, the authors looked at unique patenting 
knowledge of in-house patent attorneys and agents opposed to services of external patent law 
firms. Thereby, they managed to integrate complementary capabilities with the RBV further. 
Even the scarce information from those studies suggests that legal representation plays a central 
role in patent litigation and it becomes clear that relationships with legal personnel are a missing 
link between establishing inimitability of assets with litigation and performance.  
When initiating an infringement lawsuit, the performance outcomes can differ significantly 
among firms. To refine knowledge on firm-specific abilities in patent enforcement, this chapter 
argues that if firms are able to successfully define and employ litigation strategies as well as 
navigate litigation endeavours against competitors, the positive influence of strategic litigation 
on sales and profitability will increase, while costs can be controlled. Building on this suggests, 
that appropriability from patents depends on firm-level patent enforcement experience created 
by strategic transactions with legal employees as well as contractors.  
Not surprisingly, in a study on attorney experience in the Supreme Court from 1977 to 1982, 
McGuire (1995), found that experienced attorneys can contribute to but not guarantee 
successful litigation. Furthermore, Somaya (2003) pointed out, that insufficient advice by legal 
councils influences outcomes of litigation, and Somaya et al. (2007) showed that internal legal 
expertise influences patenting performance. Somaya et al. (2011) mention the importance of a 
firm to keep its skilled attorneys to increase patent litigation efficiency. And legal and political 
literature states that attorneys are likely to be repeated players in litigation and not seldom 
establish reputations (Gilson and Mnookin, 1994; McGuire, 1995). However, little is known 
from the literature on the role of attorneys in patent litigation.  
To understand why companies might prefer to repeatedly work with the same legal teams, it is 
necessary to look at the workload involved to gather firm related knowledge in patent litigation. 
Attorneys have to be educated on particular technological circumstances and must undergo 
intensive training on firm-specific procedures. Thereby, they not only learn how to coordinate 
within the firm, but they also familiarise with involved laws, competitors and technological 
matters unique to the firm and the industry of operation. Therefore, it is valuable for companies 
to hire the same attorneys repeatedly, to avoid the frequent need for education on such matters 
(Hricik, 2004). Hence, whereby pure legal expertise is indeed important for the outcome and 
often the success of patent litigation, firms might be able to increase the efficiency of patent 




Huckman and Pisano (2006) found, that firm-specific benefits can be derived from the 
contractor’s familiarity with the assets of a firm, for example, networks, structures or routines. 
Thereby, the value of such firm-specific experiences is not transferrable to other firms. Thus, 
superior performance is not solely attributed to experience, power or seniority of the contractors 
themselves. In light of these unique findings, it is striking, that the existent litigation research 
has not explored the influence of the repeated use of the same attorneys on firm performance in 
the context of strategic patent litigation, yet.  
When attorneys build engage in repeated transactions with the same firm, two main sources of 
experience building need to be distinguished: generic knowledge accumulation, hence, 
experience growth versus firm-specific knowledge accumulation in the form of asset 
specificity. The basic knowledge, to practise as an attorney is not firm-specific it is acquired 
through obtaining a law degree. Therefore, attorneys are relatively free in their choice of 
employment and might negotiate their salary or fees. However, whereby their experience and 
knowledge on the legal side are indeed transferrable, the gained experiences with the firm-
specific organisation, personal relations, technology, management and litigation history, are 
not. When in-house or external attorneys are transferring to another company, the previous 
employer and the attorney themselves can no longer build on attorney experience with firm-
specific litigation. The main argument here is that whereby skill and gained legal experience 
through working on litigation are transferrable, firm-specific specialised, complementary assets 
are not (and hence, performance is not fully transferrable).  
Hereby, the notion of firm-specific legal expertise is vital. This is because it can hardly be 
transferred to other companies. Williamson (1981), clearly distinguishes between transferrable 
and non-transferable skills. Repeated transactions of the same lawyers on the litigation cases of 
the same company build transferrable but also non-transferable skills. Whereby job experience 
solely increases skills through practice, the special knowledge of firm specificities is not. The 
more often an Attorney works on a case for a specific company, her or his knowledge become 
more specialised to the particular firm. Hence, when attorneys not only increase their 
knowledge on attorney related skills but also on, for example, internal practices of a firm when 
it comes to patenting and enforcement, the firm is repeatedly benefitting from it, creating value 
from reoccurring utilisation of the same lawyers in litigation cases. For example, with their 
(2006) study, Huckman and Pisano, built on RBV and TCE thoughts in the context of surgical 
freelancing, and found, that performance of surgeons at cardiac surgery at the hospital increased 
if they were rehired for multiple procedures by the same hospital but did not increase if surgeons 




dependent on the specific hospital-surgeon complementary assets, and not experience alone. 
Contrary to the belief that firm-contractor relationships are at odds with the RBV, especially 
the inherent opportunities to build specialised experiences (complimentary assets) with each 
other act as rent appropriability mechanism to benefit sustained competitive advantage 
ultimately. In the present case, those parties are represented by the litigating firm and an entity 
that is providing legal expertise while conducting strategic patent litigation. Independently of 
attorney skill-level, this implies that performance can not only improve through general 
knowledge accumulation and experience, it is also influenced by the employing firm. Therefore, 
with rehiring the same contractors, flexibility decreases, and co-dependency increases as 
performance becomes firm-specific, developed from familiarity with assets (Huckman and 
Pisano, 2006). 
Thus, when in-house or external attorneys are assigned to lawsuits of a certain firm over and 
over again, this allows the attorneys to build firm-specific experience. The firm then can 
capitalise on this same experience. This is because specialised knowledge through recurring 
transactions will benefit the firm as it diminishes transaction costs and risks over time 
(Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 1981) which makes the firm more reluctant to turn to other 
legal representatives. Furthermore, the parties can develop a bilateral dependency described by 
Williamson (1979; 1981), due to firm-attorney recurring relationships. For example, hiring the 
same attorney(s) will increase the fit between the attorney’(s) and the internal requirements of 
the firm. This, in turn, benefits the company as the transactions become more vertically 
integrated. Furthermore, it also benefits the attorney(s) as they are frequently hired by the same 
company and are able to build upon and create experience. Furthermore, the legal teams benefit 
from a stable assignment situation and gain confidence in negotiating salaries; bearing in mind 
that looking for clients comes with transaction costs itself. Therefore, the firm and the attorney 
build an idiosyncratic relationship which is supposed to benefit both transaction partners.  
One important element of firm-specific experience needs to be discussed. Patent enforcement 
has a very unique characteristic that makes the interplay between RBV and TCE thoughts more 
pronounced. Attorneys usually work together with managers and in-house departments 
regularly, so that personal relationships can be built. Hence, there might be another layer of co-
specialisation in many cases. Previous literature looked at the relationship of in-house counsel 
and external legal expertise (Fox, 1998; Somaya et al., 2007) as well as the relationship between 
general management and external attorneys (Foster, 1986). While getting to know firm 
characteristics, Attorneys form relationships with employees (in the legal department or other 




is the key to develop firm-specific assets from legal representation. Familiarity manifests itself 
in a substantial network-specific human capital, often crucial in the business context, and bound 
to the firm-contractor relationship which is not transferable to other firms (Mailath and 
Postlewaite, 1990; Huckman and Pisano, 2006). When the attorneys begin to work in a bilateral 
exchange relationship, they get dependent on these specific transactions up to a certain degree 
(Williamson, 1981). Furthermore, co-specialisation might emerge from relationships between 
the two (Somaya et al., 2007). 
It must be noted that the involvement of external attorneys is not always by choice, as many 
cases require the involvement of outside counsel to protect competitive knowledge. In-house 
counsel is not allowed to receive certain insider information about competitors15. Whereby, 
some small firms resort to outside counsel more heavily (Somaya et al., 2007), Lerner (1995) 
argues, that in-house and external attorney costs do not diverge significantly and that managing 
the interplay of both fosters learning and efficiency. Moreover, past literature suggests that an 
outside counsel is always supported by an in-house attorney (Foster, 1986). By repeating the 
assignment of the same lawyers to infringement cases, in-house or on a contract basis, these 
lawyers can develop firm-specific legal expertise and networks. Just as in alliances, both agents 
might benefit from interfirm trust and learning developed by repeated ties (Gulati, 1995). 
Furthermore, Beukel and Zhao (2018), presented, that prior ties with attorneys are also a critical 
aspect for firms when of choosing a place for litigation, as the local legal structures and 
relationships are already in place. Hence, knowledge accumulation on the firm and relationship-
building can be a very time-intensive but necessary endeavour, therefore, firms might be 
inclined to stick to hiring plaintiffs who are already familiar with the firm and its legal teams.  
To investigate the performance outcomes of the repeated use of the same legal personnel, the 
next chapter develops hypotheses, that enrich the resource-based view of the firm with 
knowledge from transaction cost economics to explain how reoccurring transactions with the 
same attorneys built a bridge between strategic patent litigation and firm performance. Thereby, 
some firms might perform better than others concerning profitability of strategic patent 
enforcement because their legal partners develop firm-specific experiences from repeated 
representation on litigation cases. 
 
15 “A prosecuting-litigator can also be disqualified by the advocate-as-witness rule, and can also face efforts by the accused 
infringer to prevent that lawyer from having access to "trade secrets" disclosed by the infringer-ostensibly to prevent the lawyer 





Over time, attorneys might create knowledge and networks due to their repeated experience 
with litigation for one firm. By building on previous experiences with the firm, attorneys might 
be more successful in implementing strategic litigation, improving the firm’s possibilities to 
benefit from it. Reitzig (2004a) presents the work of an attorney in litigation as a decision-
making position under risky conditions. Thereby, each decision can enrich their knowledge of 
the company and its competitors, increasing their decision-making skills. Building on this 
experience will, in turn, improve their future work, for example, by perfecting their decisions 
in strategic litigation to achieve competitive advantage. Such firm-specific knowledge can 
benefit the organisation in two ways: by decreasing costs of strategic patent litigation due to 
transaction costs savings and by increasing the effectiveness of patent litigation and, hence, 
sales. 
Costs  
Patent litigation is a complicated process that requires legal experience and legal support from 
attorneys. Firms can hire in-house or external legal representation. Independently from the 
mode of employment, each involvement of an attorney represents a transaction. When a 
company is compensating for the legal representation, it is paying for in-house as well as 
external law firms, whereby, each transaction carries costs with it. Attorney fees are an 
important component of the direct financial requirements of litigation (Lumineau and Oxley, 
2012). Such costs might not only comprise the direct compensation but also hiring activities, 
monitoring and checking the performance of the attorneys as well as managerial costs inherent 
to the relational maintenance (Williamson, 1979; Huckman and Pisano, 2006; Bessen and 
Meurer, 2008b; Bessen and Meurer, 2008a). Such managerial costs can cause business 
disruption, when too much time is allocated to the litigation process, away from other business 
activities (Bessen and Meurer, 2008a). Setting work expectations and monitoring lawyers and 
their time commitment to specific tasks can save costs of litigation, especially because lawyers 
usually do not keep their focus on the financial investments for litigation (Foster, 1986). If the 
relationship is reoccurring, such controlling and monitoring costs can be decreased, while 
keeping the efficiency and time commitment at an equal level. Following alliance research for 
the second time, repeated relationships may decrease transaction costs due to the formation of 




Companies increasingly choose to litigate their patents in a court of law, resulting in increased 
numbers of patent cases per firm every year. While those firms try to cope with the demanding 
processes, they also have to control the financial aspect of IP protection. Presumably, such cost 
savings might result from the repeated interactions with attorneys. Whereas expensive legal 
representation can increase the overall costs, attorney fees could be diminished if a firm’s legal 
representation is repeatedly consulted. Legal representation, in-house or external, requires 
indirect costs due to time commitments and salaries and fees of attorneys (Lerner, 1995; Chen 
et al., 2016). However, if lawyers already possess experience with a firm, they might be familiar 
with its history and litigation procedures. Hence, they might be able to reduce preparation time 
and administrative tasks that might otherwise be a cost-intensive duty for a lawyer that 
represents a firm on just one occasion. During all cases, independently of the structure of 
employment, attorneys may internalise firm-specific organisational und structural 
contingencies, for example, which entity to contact for certain information, how processes are 
managed, or the social networks. Huckman and Pisano (2006) also state that company-specific 
assets, inter alia, the local facilities, stock of tools provided or expertise of managers impact 
outcomes independently from individual knowledge. Therefore, each transaction might reduce 
the administrative costs for the firm. Hence, asset specificity will benefit the firm and this 
benefit can grow from case to case whereby firms obtain economies of scale the more cases the 
attorneys are operating. 
Experience with patent litigation might also ultimately decrease the costs involved for the firm 
for developing and executing strategies. As Lerner (1995) argued that the knowledge 
accumulation of repeated patent litigation increases the firm’s ability to direct in-house and 
external legal personnel creating a “learning curve”. When decreasing the organisational burden 
for attorneys to get to know the internal structures, technologies and human resources of a 
company, they might be able to direct their focus on the lawsuit and save preparation time in 
advance or during the litigation process. When firms are litigating against multiple firms or in 
several lawsuits, these advantages could be even more pronounced, saving time and money for 
the plaintiff. One example of costs benefits when repeatedly using the same attorneys is their 
unique abilities to arbitrate. For example, Lumineau and Oxley (2012) found that involvement 
of legal personal often resulted in a private settlement because of objective decision-making 
skills even after filing a lawsuit. According to the authors, these settlement skills prevent high 
legal costs and lengthy lawsuits. When arguing in the case of strategic patent litigation, repeated 
ties with such attorneys might foster their arbitration abilities even further to be in line with the 




Lawyers that have experience with one firm are more likely to be the familiar with the patents, 
the technology and the firm’s litigation strategy, which could lead to time savings when it comes 
to the familiarisation with the litigation case. Such attorneys probably need less time to get 
familiar with relevant patents and litigation strategies and have to overcome fewer 
communication barriers to receive needed information from other departments. Therefore, the 
experience of one lawyer with the same firm repeatedly might reduce the firm’s costs associated 
with litigation strategies by freeing up the time of key personnel which otherwise would be 
needed to educate and explain firm-specific technologies and processes. Hence, the higher the 
Attorneys’ knowledge of the firm, the more costs are saved due to higher productivity and 
accelerated proceedings as well as their independence from management. Furthermore, attorney 
experience might be useful when minimising disruption from strategic patent litigation. 
Ultimately, repeated interactions will minimise the transaction costs of the exchanges outside 
the organisation and maximise the productivity and precision externally during patent litigation. 
Therefore, I hypothesise:  
Hypothesis 1: If a plaintiff is hiring legal personnel repeatedly, the positive influence of 
strategic patent litigation on firm costs is decreased. 
 
Sales 
Lawyers that are repeatedly employed by the same firm can familiarise with its technologies. 
Familiarity with the organisation’s technological background can help attorneys to understand 
the firm-specific patents to apply this knowledge during the lawsuit. Repeated experience does 
not only involve intricate background knowledge on technological matters, but it also comprises 
the sheer task of reading through extensive materials often provided by companies to illustrate 
the patenting history or accumulated by the USPTO for documenting complex patent cases 
(Hricik, 2004). Hence, based on this knowledge, lawyers can speed up the process and secure 
important sales at a crucial time of commercialization, the early stages. Hence, a lawyer gaining 
familiarity with the firm builds “economies of scale” for the next case. By being already 
familiarised with the often-complex technological backgrounds of patents, the attorney has past 
experience with technological details to draw upon when hired repeatedly. This might make the 
attorney better equipped to help the firm to exclude products using the same patented 




Sales advantages are also anticipated to result from networks built from the repeated  
interactions between attorneys and the plaintiff firm. Transactional experience makes 
bureaucratic hurdles easier to tackle and reduces the effort of communicating within different 
divisions and layers within the organisation. Somaya et al. (2007), argued that in-house 
attorneys often have a better picture of the company, facilitated access to information and 
relationships to other departments. Extending this argument to lawyers familiarised with a 
particular firm due to repeated litigation experience on the firm’s litigation cases, it may be that 
such experienced lawyers have an increased level of access to information and other 
departments due to relational network building. Hence, the repeated representation of the firm 
by the same lawyers means that those lawyers can become more familiar with their client and 
the jurisdictional environment they are operating in. 
When litigating, firms might be able to refer to legal teams that are familiar with the 
organisation’s litigation procedures and processes at specific courts from previous litigation 
cases. This allows the legal representatives to identify relevant local information needed for 
lawsuits and litigation strategy formation. Which, for example, improves the access and ease of 
initiation of court proceedings at locations that were previously litigated in with the same legal 
teams (Beukel and Zhao, 2018). Furthermore, familiarity with the litigation history of a firm in 
specific venues can increase potential success, inter alia, because the court receives tailored 
documents and can be more satisfied with the provided information (McGuire, 1995). Hence, 
firms with repeated use of the same legal representation can take advantage of their attorneys’ 
experience with the firm-specific legal environment and procedures and, therefore, are more 
equipped to navigate cost-intensive and challenging litigation procedures in a satisfactory and 
controllable way. This enhances the firm efficiency of handling patent litigation and excluding 
others from commercialising imitative products. Both factors likely lead to increased sales 
possibilities due to declining competition on the market.  
Patent litigation strategies may be more accurately constructed and implemented, and 
infringement detected more easily if the attorneys had the chance to accumulate knowledge on 
the firm and the market it is operating in. James et al. (2013) found that attorneys familiar with 
the firm are more likely better skilled in detecting infringement. Identifying infringement is an 
integral part of patent litigation strategies. If infringement is detected, the possibility to prevent 
imitation increases and opportunities occur to restrict competition and increase sales. 
Moreover, it might be that Attorneys that accumulated firm-specific litigation knowledge are 




within the industry. Litigation experience at the same firm allows them to sufficiently perform 
litigation according to the strategic direction of the firm, thereby, deter imitation to defend 
against competitors and secure sales. Ultimately, firms with repeated legal representation by 
the same attorneys might record higher sales than firms that lack this continuity in their legal 
representation. This is can also reflect in the negotiations of settlement conditions, like licenses. 
Increased experience with the firm and its competitors might place the attorney in a unique 
bargaining position, able to draw upon past knowledge to achieve favourable sales 
improvements. Hence, 
Hypothesis 2: If a plaintiff is hiring legal personnel repeatedly, the positive influence of 
strategic patent litigation on firm sales is increased. 
 
Profitability 
From the literature, we know that attorney experience often decides about litigation success 
(McGuire, 1995) and Somaya et al. (2007) found that internal patent law expertise, which is 
tied with R&D, significantly influences firm-patenting performance. Whereas the authors focus 
on patenting-performance, the same result is expected for to repeated use of the same attorneys, 
may it be internal or external personnel. If attorneys work for the same firms over and over 
again, they get to know their unique technologies, product portfolios, networks and procedures 
as well as industrial and institutional peculiarities. Hence, they accumulate insights about the 
company-specific structures and ultimately become specialists in firm-specific litigation, 
increasing the sales possibilities and decreasing the costs involved. This eventually leads to 
value appropriation in from innovation which positively reflects in higher profitability. 
In sum, attorneys learn from all the firms on the case, not just the one that he or she is 
representing. Hence, the Attorney creates firm, technology, patent, process, court, competitor 
and industry-specific knowledge. Firms with repeated use of the same lawyers may increase 
the positive influence of patent litigation strategies on sales and lessen the costs involved in the 
process so that post-litigation profitability is higher. Therefore, I hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 3: If a plaintiff is hiring legal personnel repeatedly, the positive influence of 




5.4 Data and Methods 
5.4.1 Sample 
To create attorney specific measurements, the attorney dataset from the USPTO needed to be 
consolidated with USPTO litigation data. In the first step, I excluded duplicates within the 
attorney data (i.e. when the same attorney was listed for the same case number several times). 
From the data, it can be distinguished between attorneys on the defendant side and attorneys on 
the plaintiff side in infringement suit. The next step was to exclude all party types that proved 
to be redundant for the analysis. Again, I distinguished the party types between original 
defendants, original plaintiffs, additional defendants and additional plaintiffs and selected and 
separated the attorneys for the plaintiff side. Then, I added attorneys for each case number in 
wide format.  
Before the case numbers from the attorney dataset and the USPTO dataset could be merged, 
the attorney names had to be cleaned. Many attorney names were duplicated due to abbreviation 
issues, for example, “John Doe Williams” also showed as “John D Williams”. Merely removing 
the abbreviated middle name was not a right solution because it could have caused problems 
with other names, for example, “John D Williams” and “John E G Williams”. Hence, I 
abbreviated the middle name for all attorneys, meaning that, for example, “John Doe Williams” 
changed to “John D Williams” but is different from “John E G Williams”. I also cleaned the 
attorney names of any punctuation, brackets, slashes, quotations marks, mathematical signs, 
numbers, addresses, company names, at-sign or name-additions (for example na, phd, van, de, 
la ,von, not sworn, dba dbd, company, re de). At first, the Attorney database contained more 
than six million attorney-year observations, which is why I handled the database separately to 
create the needed firm-year specific variables which I then merged with the final dataset.  
The sample to test the provided Hypotheses contains active and inactive publicly traded and 
private U.S. companies. The data is unbalanced panel data ranging over 16 years, from 2000 to 
2015. The sample concentrates on manufacturing firms (SIC codes 20 to 39). Litigation and 
attorney data was used from the PLD provided by USPTO and merged with financial data from 
the TOB dataset. Whereby attorney data accumulated for 3,269 firms in 278 industries, which 
reflects in 21,745 firm-year observations, 711 firms from 726 litigating firms provided 




5.4.2 Additional Independent Variable 
Repeated Use of the Same Legal Personnel  
In order to operationalize the measure of repeated use of legal personnel, I estimated a 
measurement that reflects current and past reoccurring assignment of the same attorney(s) of a 
plaintiff. To capture repeated relationships between a firm and its individual attorneys over the 
years, I followed a comparable logic from corporate governance and alliance literature 
(Goerzen, 2007; Field and Mkrtchyan, 2017). The following comparisons are operationalized 
because, up to my knowledge, there has not yet been a similar firm level measure in the context 
of strategic litigation and attorneys. 
From consulting Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) and Goerzen (2007), I identified two important 
similarities. First, similar to the repeated use of attorneys, the repeated relationships between 
firms in an alliance network or the repeated experience of directors are individually occurring 
associations, which are then accumulated to the firm-level. Second, these past relationships are 
directly linked to current firm performance. Hence, similar to the authors, I progress with 
measurement operationalization by using past individual attorney data to form a firm-level 
variable. As operationalized in previous research (Goerzen, 2007; Field and Mkrtchyan, 2017),  
I created the firm-year specific variable by counting the repeated use of the individual attorneys 
and created a cumulative variable dividing the total number of initial and repeated assignments 
by the number of attorneys on infringement lawsuits of each individual firm in each year.  
(1) Total number of prior and current case assignments (NA) of a single attorney (i) for 
each firm and year, summed for the total number of attorneys (D) of the firm in each 
year = ∑ NAi𝐷𝑖=1  
 
I decided to choose a ratio measure to account for difference in size of legal teams, avoiding a 
simple count measure, as legal teams can differ significantly in size and reliance on legal 
personnel is very variable over time (Coates et al., 2011). Thereby, transferring the count 
measure of past attorney assignment into a firm-specific ratio measure follows the same pattern 
as Field and Mkrtchyan’s (2017) approach of transferring past individual directors’ acquisition 
counts to a firm-specific ratio. As this dissertation deals with panel data, I calculated the ratio 
for each year.  








As I focus on the previous ties of attorneys and the firm and, hence, the effects of repeated 
relationships, I incorporated each year of the attorney-company relationship to account for the 
size differences of cases and the unique firm-specific ties that can be built over time (Somaya 
and McDaniel, 2012). This is also necessary, as legal teams may change over the course of a 
case. However, to investigate if attorney experience is increasing solely from case to case, I 
tested an alternative measure that only captures cases once at the time of entering an 
infringement lawsuit. I used this measure to run a robustness test of the findings. The results 
from the robustness test can be examined in 5.6.2 Additional Tests. 
Furthermore, concentrating on the repeated use of the same legal personnel  does not account 
for experience that attorneys can gain by working on declaratory judgement cases or cases for 
other firms. However, it can be argued that such cases are less relevant for the firms in the 
sample because ties with other firms do not deter gaining familiarity with the focal firm. 
Moreover, as technologies, patents and cases diverge significantly, defence cases are considered 
less common and structurally different from infringement cases. Hence, the alternative 
operationalization did not fit the proposed theoretical concept properly.  
Additionally, I created a moderator variable with patent litigation using standardised measures. 
5.5 Descriptives  
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: RQ2 
 
Table 14 illustrates the means, standard deviations and the correlations. The correlation matrix 
shows acceptable values among the independent variables. However, it is striking that repeated 
use of the same attorneys is correlating with the duration of the litigation cases measured on 
days with (0.68). This is not surprising, because the repeated use of the same attorneys is 
incorporating case duration by counting each case year as a separate experience as well as each 




1 12.881 1.108 -0.05 ***
3 ROS
1 -0.238 4.095 -0.49 *** 0.59 ***
4 Firm Age
1 3.177 0.600 -0.17 *** 0.27 *** 0.37 ***
5 Firm Size
1 5.921 2.605 -0.30 *** 0.42 *** 0.60 *** 0.45 ***
6 R&D Intensity
1 2.533 2.070 0.52 *** -0.46 *** -0.64 *** -0.20 *** -0.31 ***
7 Organisational Slack
1 0.799 0.449 -0.30 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.12 *** -0.05 *** -0.54 ***
8 Litigation Duration
1 0.042 0.154 0.01 ** 0.08 *** 0.10 *** 0.07 *** 0.14 *** 0.03 *** -0.04 ***
9 Heckman Exit 0.315 0.232 -0.08 *** 0.13 *** 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.33 *** -0.04 *** 0.01 0.15 ***
10 Patent Litigation 0.001 0.022 0.07 *** 0.02 ** -0.02 *** 0.00 -0.02 *** 0.04 *** -0.02 ** 0.16 *** 0.00
11 Repeated Use Legal Personnel 0.249 1.330 0.02 *** 0.07 *** 0.08 *** 0.07 *** 0.12 *** 0.02 *** -0.03 *** 0.68 *** 0.13 *** 0.22 ***
Number of Observations=21.745 ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1




case in each year as a separate experience. However, I conducted a robustness test to test the 
robustness of the findings when using a case experience measure that does not take case-length 
into account. The outcomes of this test are presented at the end of the results section.  
To rule out multicollinearity issues, I calculated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each 
variable using the “collin” command in Stata. The mean VIF for the full model was 1.53, with 
ranging scores between 1.05 for Patent Litigation and 1.73 for R&D intensity. These VIFs are 
below 10, which is the cut off value defined by Myers (1990). Even though the test suggests 
that multicollinearity is not an issue for the analysis, I performed a robustness check to rule out 
any multicollinearity issues. Excluding R&D intensity, showed that the measure does not distort 
the results from the main model. To further curb multicollinearity issues, I mean centred the 
attorney variable of the respective moderator interaction term (Aiken et al., 1991).  
5.6 Results 
The results from the moderation model can be examined in Table 15. Model 1, 4 and 7 show 
the results of the model including only control variables. Model 2, 5 and 8 include the 
independent variables for patent litigation and the repeated use of the same attorneys. Model 3, 
6 and 9 then represent the full model, including the interaction term.  
Table 15 Multilevel Mixed Method Analysis: RQ2 
 




















Coef.       
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.          
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Firm Age
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.166***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054]
Firm Size
1 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.884*** 0.885*** 0.885***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
R&D Intensity
1 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.858*** -0.858*** -0.858***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Organisational Slack
1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.670*** 0.670*** 0.670*** 1.796*** 1.796*** 1.797***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048]
Litigation Duration
1 0.025*** 0.016* 0.010 0.038 0.044 0.020 0.077 0.050 -0.015
[0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.028] [0.034] [0.035] [0.098] [0.120] [0.123]
Heckman Exit 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.154** -0.152** -0.154**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.067] [0.067] [0.067]
Independent Variable
Patent Litigation 0.002** 0.006*** 0.005 0.019*** 0.027** 0.064***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.006] [0.014] [0.020]
Repeated Use Legal 
Personnel 0.002 0.003* -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.012
[0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.006] [0.019] [0.020]
Interaction effects
Patent Litigation x                        
Repeated Use Legal 







Constant 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 11.609*** 11.608*** 11.608*** -6.059*** -6.061*** -6.059***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.219] [0.219] [0.219]
Year Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms] ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
1
Variable is IHS-transformed. 




Hypotheses 1 suggested, that if a plaintiff is hiring legal personnel repeatedly for representation 
in infringement lawsuits the positive influence of strategic patent litigation on firm costs is 
decreased compared to plaintiffs that do not rehire attorneys. The results show that the positive 
and significant influence of strategic patent litigation on firm costs is turned negative when a 
firm is repeatedly using the same attorneys. This does not mean, that litigating more frequently 
results in fewer overall costs, however, it shows that if firms repeatedly use the same attorneys, 
they save more costs than firms who do not rely on transactions with the same attorneys. Hence, 
for firms that have a high litigation intensity and repeated use of the same legal personnel, the 
influence on costs is negative and significant (coefficient = -0.019, p< .01). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
Hypothesis 2 suggested that if a plaintiff is hiring legal personnel repeatedly for representation 
in infringement lawsuits, the positive influence of strategic patent litigation on firm sales is 
increased compared to plaintiffs that do not rehire attorneys. The results show that the influence 
of strategic patent litigation on firm sales is positive and insignificant, whereas the relationship 
between the repeated use of the same legal personnel and firm sales is negative and 
insignificant. When looking at the moderator, hence, patent litigation and attorney experience, 
the influence is shifting to a negative and significant influence on firm sales.  
Surprisingly, the results show that the positive influence of strategic patent litigation on firm 
sales is diminished when the firm is repeatedly using the same attorneys (coefficient = -0.070, 
p< .01). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  
Hypothesis 3 proposed that if a plaintiff is hiring legal personnel repeatedly for representation 
in infringement lawsuits the positive influence of strategic patent litigation strategies on firm 
profitability is increased compared to plaintiffs that do not rehire attorneys. Surprisingly, the 
results show that the positive and significant effect of patent litigation on firm profitability is 
turned negative and significant if the firm repeatedly uses the same legal personnel. The 
analysis shows that patent litigation and the repeated use of the same attorneys have a negative 
and significant influence on ROS (coefficient = -0.190, p< .05). Hence, with every one standard 
deviation increase of the moderator, the dependent variable ROS decreases by 19%. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
To further examine the effect of intensive litigation while using the same attorneys repeatedly 
on firm sales, costs and profitability, I refined the analysis by drawing predictive margins at 





Figure 10 shows the predictive margins illustrating the divergence of the effect of repeated 
representation of the firm by the same lawyers at different levels of litigation intensity. It is 
visible, that although increased levels of litigation can lead to higher sales outcomes, this is 
only the case if the company is not relying on the same teams of attorneys repeatedly. A higher 
rate of repetition, thus, leads to diminishing effects on firm sales. This could mean, that the 
plaintiff firm often does not benefit from attorneys’ firm-specific knowledge and specialisation 
when it comes to firm sales.  
Figure 10 Predictive Margins Sales per Employee: RQ2 
 
Figure 11 shows the effect of litigation intensity and repeated use of attorneys on ROS. Here, 
it can be examined, that when litigating only a small number of cases the effect of patent 
litigation is negative on ROS. With an increased number of cases, the influence of litigation 
intensity without the repeated use of the same attorneys on ROS becomes positive, whereas it 
stays and grows negative when attorneys are hired repeatedly. This phenomenon may be 
explained by the accumulation of trust between the parties, however, trust-building and cost-
saving might negatively affect monitoring and critical evaluation of the attorneys’ work and 












Figure 11 Predictive Margins ROS: RQ2 
 
The main goal of the current study was to determine if the repeated use of the same legal 
personnel influences the effect of patent litigation on firm performance. Legal representation is 
a vital part of strategic patent litigation and set out to be crucial when appropriating rents from 
patents. However, the results of this study indicate that employing the same attorneys over the 
years has negative implications for firms with a high patent litigation intensity when it comes 
to firm sales and profit accumulation.  
5.6.1 Magnitude of the Effects RQ2 
Keeping everything else equal and adjusted for random effects and mean centring, with a higher 
litigation intensity from the 90th to the 99.9th percentile, predicted sales per employee increase 
from 196,142.4 to 233,693.6, thus varying by 37,551.2 if the plaintiff is not relying on the 
repeated use of the same attorneys. For the medium rate of repetition in the legal team attorneys, 
the effect does not increase as steep, it varies by 23,681.7 increasing from 197,603.2 to 
221,284.9. Whereas it decreases by 562.2 from 200,365.0 to 199,802.8 if the company has a 
high rate of repeated attorneys. Between the 90th and 99.9th percentile, the predicted ROS 
increases from -0.2447 to 0.3493 which translates to an increase of 0.59 percentage points for 
firms that do not rely on the repeated use of the same legal teams. For firms with a medium 
reliance on repeated attorneys the effect ranges from -0.1900 to 0.2289, hence, 0.42 percentage 
points. For a high rate of repetition, the effect is increasing from -0.0890 to 0.0105, thus, 
litigation intensity accounts for a variation in with a variance in ROS of 0.1 percentage points 
for companies that do rely heavily on the repeated use of the same attorneys. The results can be 





Table 16 Magnitude of the Effects for Sales per Employee: RQ2 
 
Table 17 Magnitude of the Effects for ROS: RQ2 
 
5.6.2 Additional Tests 
I calculated the model fit criteria using the Akaike (AIC) (Akaikei, 1973) and Bayes (BIC) 
(Schwarz, 1978) information criteria. The AIC and BIC of the model for sales not including the 
predictors and the moderator variable were (36825.23 and 37024.91). These values are higher 
than the full model with (36817.94 and 37033.6). This is supported by an information loss of 
i = 7.29 > 2, if the predictor and the moderator are not included, calculated from the formula 
of Burnham and Anderson (2004) i= AICi – AICmin, which allows the interpretation of AIC 
scales. Therefore, the full model is significantly better fitting than the control model which 
justifies the additional complexity of the model. The cost model showed similar findings, where 
the full model with (-23646.66 and -23431.01) is better than the control model with (-23638.07 
and -23438.39) showing a i = 8,59 > 2. The ROS model behaves similar showing a better fit 
for the inclusion of the predictor variables with (89544.31 and 89759.96), than without (89546.8 
and 89746.47) and a delta difference of i = 2,49 > 2.  
To test the robustness of the findings, I created another measure for the repeated use of the same 
legal personnel. The measure is not incorporating the year-per case into the analysis but solely 
incorporates each case once. Hence, this measure is incorporating repeated use only if an 
Percentile Patent Litigation 
Value 




Medium Rate of 
Repetition 
(99th Percentile) 
High Rate of 
Repetition 
(99.9th Percentile) 
90.0 0 196,142.4 197,603.2 200,365.0 
99.0 0.0008 196,271.9 197,686.2 200,363.0 
99.2 0.0021 196,501.7 197,834.5 200,359.0 
99.4 0.0083 197,579.5 198,536.1 200,341.0 
99.6 0.1 214,095.2 209,108.0 200,082.7 
99.9 0.2 233,693.6 221,284.9 199,802.8 
 






Medium Rate of 
Repetition 
(99th Percentile) 
High Rate of 
Repetition 
(99.9th Percentile) 
90.0 0 -0.2447 -0.1900 -0.0890 
99.0 0.0008 -0.2424 -0.1884 -0.0887 
99.2 0.0021 -0.2384 -0.1856 -0.0880 
99.4 0.0083 -0.2196 -0.1724 -0.0849 
99.6 0.1 0.0501 0.0190 -0.0392 





attorney is listed on a different case for the same company. This does not pose a problem when 
looking at firm costs, as the majority of the costs are often at the beginning of the case, however, 
it could be the case, that sales and profits do not follow in the same year if a case lasts for 
several years. This might explain why the results show that while the negative influence on 
costs and sales is still significant, the influence on profitability is not. Thus, regardless of the 
differences, the results are considered robust.  
Table 18 shows the results from the robustness test: 
Table 18 Multilevel Mixed Method Analysis Robustness: RQ2 
 
5.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
To contribute to the current litigation literature by answering the research question: “How does 
the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance vary according to the repeated 
use of the same legal personnel? (Table 1)”, this chapter set out to investigate litigation as a 




















Coef.       
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.          
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Firm Age
1 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.167***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054]
Firm Size
1 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.884*** 0.884*** 0.884***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
R&D Intensity
1 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.858*** -0.858*** -0.858***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Organisational Slack
1 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.670*** 0.670*** 0.670*** 1.796*** 1.796*** 1.795***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048]
Litigation Duration
1 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.017** 0.038 0.046 0.038 0.077 0.031 0.020
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.028] [0.030] [0.030] [0.098] [0.104] [0.105]
Heckman Exit 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.154** -0.153** -0.153**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.067] [0.067] [0.067]
Independent Variable
Patent Litigation 0.002** 0.005*** 0.006 0.013** 0.026* 0.036*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.005] [0.014] [0.019]
Repeated Use Legal 
Personnel 0.001 0.001 -0.007 -0.005 0.007 0.009
(Excluding Case Duration) [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.016] [0.017]
Interaction effects
Patent Litigation x 
Repeated Use Legal 






-0.001     
[0.002]
Constant 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 11.609*** 11.608*** 11.608*** -6.059*** -6.061*** -6.060***
[0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.219] [0.219] [0.219]
Year Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms] ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1
Variable is IHS-transformed. 




means to create inimitability of assets. It showed that firms can take action to isolate their 
intellectual property against imitation by strategically litigating, however, that some are more 
capable of doing so. It is also shown that firm-specific contingencies of legal representation are 
a significant mechanism to clarify such inequalities.  
The relevance of firm-specific contingencies, such as legal representation, is supported by the 
current findings. They pose an overlooked linked between strategic patent litigation and 
performance and show that repeated attorney hiring practices can be detrimental for the plaintiff 
in terms of firm sales and profitability. The unexpected findings could be explained by arguing 
that firms which repeatedly rely on the same attorneys fail to integrate the contracted market 
relationships sufficiently with their internal processes and procedures. This could mean, that 
the plaintiff firm often does not benefit from attorneys’ firm-specific knowledge and 
specialisation when it comes to firm sales. Firms that hire the same attorneys repeatedly also 
might not be able to profit from their litigiousness because they develop an “inertia to change” 
whereby they stick to the same legal representation teams out of convenience and scale 
economy advantages due to familiarity. As De Carolis (2003) suggested, sticking to the same 
knowledge sets might enable firms to get trapped in rigid systems. When the relationship 
between the firm, its employees and attorneys gains on trust, the repeated transactions might 
lead to lower administrative costs due to fewer control mechanisms, similar to what can be 
examined in other forms of firm networks (Powell, 1990; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Singh, 1998), 
however, the same trust and costs saving can negatively affect monitoring and critical 
evaluation of the attorneys’ work and hence, firm sales. Alternatively, even the argument that 
firms might allocate to many cases to the same team of attorneys, increasing workload is 
important to consider.  
A particularly interesting finding stemmed from the incorporation of TCE, suggesting that 
repeated transactions with the same lawyers can reduce strategic litigation effects on costs. 
Firms that litigate more frequently with the same attorney teams can lower their administrative 
costs significantly. This practice might enable the firm to build economies of scales, minimising 
managerial costs and disruptive activity, especially when attorneys are able to draw from unique 
firm-specific experience. Hence, the strategic use of attorneys can influence the costs of 
strategic patent litigation. 
However, the cost-saving benefits of the repeated use of the same attorneys in strategic 
litigation seem to be outweighed by the negative effects of the same practice on sales. Thereby, 




firms that litigate repeatedly with the same attorney teams. This contributes to previous 
knowledge on the inimitability of assets in suggesting unique mechanisms that can alter the 
patent litigation-performance relationship. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), found in their study, 
that transaction costs can be reduced by building on social capital to diminish coordination 
complexity and increase knowledge accumulation. Nevertheless, they contribute to RBV by 
proposing the unique interplay of tangible, human and organisational resources as roots of 
competitive advantage. This thinking can be transferred to the contribution of the present 
research, where the relational and organisational efficiencies constitute firm behaviour and 
abilities to create value, or in most cases, reduce value of strategic patent litigation endeavours. 
Hence, firms must be capable of efficiently manage their legal representational relationships to 
reach inimitability of assets that leads to superior firm performance. Therefore, this chapter has 
implications for strategic infringement research by implying that although firms are efficient in 
diminishing their transactional costs by building economies of scale, they are not capable of 
managing relationships in a value-creating manor.  
De Carolis (2003), find that building on firm-specific knowledge is not enough to profit and 
establish a competitive advantage in the long term. Similarly, this chapter showed that 
competencies build from the experience gained from the repeated use of the same attorneys 
show an inverse effect on firm performance and sales the more a company is litigating. This is 
quite an interesting contribution as it appears that not only the RBVs notion of inimitability of 
assets and patents as isolating mechanism of such are essential to gain and maintain a 
competitive advantage. Also, the unique competencies of the firm to manage the litigation 
process are vital. This implies, that companies have to make sure that they do not become 
impeded by existing relational patterns and closely assess if saving transaction costs is also 
benefitting their overall litigation profitability.  
The principal implication of this study is that although organisational coordination of legal 
personnel and patent enforcement do link to firm performance, value appropriation is not 
secured per se by repeatedly employing the same attorneys. This finding will be of interest to 
researchers and practitioners that are concerned with firm-specific contingencies in the context 
of strategic patent litigation. Especially practitioners might find it useful to reassess the pitfalls 
of rehiring the same attorneys for multiple cases. Hence, managers need to stay flexible in the 
strategic patent litigation process as the risks associated with reoccurring transactions cannot 
be ignored. Especially in before repeatedly litigating with the same legal teams, it should be 
invested in building efficiencies that can be leveraged later to save costs, then the focus should 




Attorneys as a human resource, can (and often will) assert their bargaining power of experience 
and fast work in negotiations. Whereby the plaintiff firm can benefit from attorneys knowledge 
and specialisation, they also need to value it to obviate hold-up, a common problem of TCE and 
economies of scale (Reitzig and Wagner, 2010). Whereby Reitzig and Wagner (2010) proclaim 
the problem as solely given for outsourcing legal work, it is also predominant for in-house legal 
departments and the attorneys employed by the firm itself. The basic knowledge, to practise as 
an attorney is not firm-specific, the lawyer acquires it by obtaining a law degree. Consequently, 
attorneys are relatively free in their choice of employment, and thus, might negotiate their salary 
or fees. However, as Liebeskind (1996) noted, firms do have more power to control the actions 
of their workers, than their contractees. Although this study offered many exciting 
contributions, it was not possible to measure if attorneys were in-house attorneys or hired from 
an external law firm; therefore, it would be valuable for future research to investigate if such a 
distinction would conclude with similar results. Especially, the complementarities between in-
house and outside counsel provide a fruitful research opportunity, as this relationship is 
especially prone to organisation, control and agency issues (Foster, 1986). In addition, the 
mechanisms underlying experience building, for example, network building, seniority, internal 
structures or learning curves can add to our understanding of the role of attorneys in strategic 
patent enforcement.  
Another limitation of this study is that it was not assessable who the defendant parties were and 
if they had litigated against the same firm with the same legal team in the past. Attorneys can 
accumulate knowledge on technologies and competitors so that it gets easier to defend against 
previous defendants of the firm because attorneys do not only gain experience on their 
employer, they also can gain experience on the defendants. Although the study does not offer 
such a distinction, the findings suggest that knowledge accumulation of attorneys is a fruitful 
area for future research as they constitute the missing link between the knowledge on the work 
of attorneys and strategic patent litigation abilities that influence performance.  
A natural progression of this work is to analyse other firm-specific contingencies bearing the 
same characteristics as well as conducting detailed research on legal representation in the 
context of the RBV and TCE. This would be useful to understand further why some firms are 
better in managing their reoccurring relationships with attorneys and what capabilities a firm 






6 RQ 3: The Role of the Industrial Environment in Strategic 
Patent Litigation 
Following the chapter on firm-specific contingencies that influence the strategic litigation and 
performance relationship, the next chapter focuses on industry contingencies that influence the 
strategic value of patent litigation. Such value can stem from certain appropriability regimes, 
which can be exogenously given (Cohen et al., 2000; James et al., 2013). This chapter argues 
that strategic patent litigation value depends on industry-specific contingencies in multi 
invention and single invention industries.  
6.1 Introduction 
When looking at litigation, it is inevitable to incorporate details on the nature of the industry of 
operation. Industry factors can influence the relationship of strategic asset protection against 
inimitability in court. Thereby, “industry” is defined as the primary industry type a firm belongs 
to, for example, the pharmaceutical industry. In the literature, it is widely acknowledged that 
strategic patenting and litigation are industry-dependent (Cohen et al., 2000; Reitzig and 
Wagner, 2010; Rudy and Black, 2015). What is striking is that with regards to strategic 
patenting and litigation, some industries are considered more similar to each other than others. 
In litigation research, a distinction is often made between the pharmaceutical and the 
semiconductor industry (Agarwal et al., 2009; Rudy and Black, 2015), arguably because these 
are very patent-intensive industries. However, scholars already called for investigations of 
inimitability and performance that cut across multiple industries (De Carolis, 2003). 
Strategic patent litigation as a surrogate for inimitability has unique outcomes that should be 
examined in the context of industrial contingencies. The most prominent distinction in the 
litigation literature among industries is between multi invention industries, such as the 
semiconductor industry, (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Somaya et al., 2012; Rudy and Black, 2015) 
and industries such as the pharmaceutical industry, which I categorised as “ single invention” 
industries in the following chapter. Multi invention industries are predominantly defined by two 
different components: fragmentation of patentable elements of an innovation and fragmentation 
of ownership of patents (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Somaya et al., 2011; Somaya et al., 2012; 
Rudy and Black, 2015). The concept of many separable patentable elements is based on the 
“complex” technology categorisation from Cohen et al. (2000). In single invention industries, 




coherent technology protectable by one single patent which is owned by a single company. 
Therefore, single invention industries are based on the “discrete” technology categorisation 
from Cohen et al. (2000).  
The nature of the industry is distinguished by multi invention or single invention to investigate 
the differences both settings can have on the influence of strategic patent litigation on costs 
sales, and profitability. Beukel and Zhao (2018) argue that IP protection possibilities against 
infringement are industry-dependent, as IP is a useful appropriation tool in some industries but 
not in others (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000). Historically, patents are considered more 
useful against imitation (or used) in the pharmaceutical industries but elsewhere (Beukel and 
Zhao, 2018). Early research stressed different inclinations to apply for patents in different 
industries (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; James et al., 2013) 
and the purpose of accumulating patent portfolios was found to be different between industries 
(Cohen et al., 2000; Reitzig, 2004b). However, the possibility of the use or threatened use of 
litigation was found to be the reason for patenting uniformly across multi and single invention 
industries, independent of the quality of the invention and its protection (Cohen et al., 2000; 
Reitzig, 2004b).  
More recent literature on the matter of strategic patent litigation controlled for different industry 
effects (Somaya et al., 2007; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010) and distinguished between the 
semiconductor and the pharmaceutical industry to find that proprietary litigation strategies are 
more likely to be found in the former and defensive litigation strategies are more likely followed 
by firms within the latter (Rudy and Black, 2015). However, little is known about the effect of 
strategic litigation on performance in different industries.  
One study by Agarwal (2009) found that increased strategic patent litigation activity can reduce 
information disclosure in the semiconductor industry and Rudy and Black (2015) did find 
empirical evidence that firms employing defensive strategies within the semiconductor industry 
enjoy higher sales. Nevertheless, the same effect could not be found for strategic patent 
litigation in pharmaceutical industries. Building on these few findings, it is necessary to look at 
how firms can benefit from their innovations by employing strategic patent litigation and how 
this relationship is influenced by the external industrial environment. This will fill the gap in 





Looking at business today, litigation is becoming more and more widespread and utilised in 
multiple industries. Hence, if companies are filing lawsuits against imitators, does it actually 
improve performance in some industries more than it does in other industries? 
The following chapter shows why and how industrial contingencies are central to the study. 
Furthermore, the importance of the focus on strategic patent protection to reach inimitability in 
the context of different industry characteristics is discussed and the unique differences of multi 
invention and single invention industries are presented. Then, the hypotheses are developed, 
and the results are presented. Lastly, the chapter closes with a discussion of the findings and a 
link to the integrative framework Table 1. 
6.2 Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
In patent litigation, intellectual property rights are proactively enforced to stop imitative 
behaviour in order to gain a competitive advantage (Granstrand, 2000; Agarwal et al., 2009; 
Polidoro and Toh, 2011; Rudy and Black, 2015). Thereby, RBV criticism has stressed the role 
of contingencies that influence the effectiveness of efforts to curb imitability, emphasising 
market differences as one of them (Priem and Butler, 2001; Peng et al., 2009). Industrial 
contingencies can impact the litigation strategies that firms employ (Rudy and Black, 2015). 
Moreover, industry conditions do not only impact the choice of value appropriation strategy but 
also, the performance outcomes of such (Kusonaki et al., 1998; James et al., 2013; Rudy and 
Black, 2015). Hence, even when relying on the same strategies, firms from different industries 
can realise different financial outcomes. This can be explained by the unique nature of an 
industry that influences the litigation - performance relationship. To develop an integrative 
industry classification, I identified the fragmentation of patents and technology from innovation 
and isolating mechanism research as the main distinguishing industry characteristics.  
Previous scholarship on patenting concentrated on the distinction between discrete and complex 
inventions (Cohen et al., 2000), discrete and cumulative inventions (Levin et al., 1987; Merges 
and Nelson, 1990), simple and complex technologies (Kash and Kingston, 2001), material-
based, system-based (Kusonaki et al., 1998) or systems products industries (Somaya, 2003). 
Table 19 shows the different concepts including its descriptions and industrial categorisations 




Table 19 Industry Classification in the Literature 
Category Description Industry/Industries  Author, 
Year, Page 
 




“New, commercializable product or process is 
comprised [..] of few separately patentable 
elements. [..] typically are comprised of a 
relatively discrete number of patentable 
elements.” 





Metals and Metal 
Products 





“Easy to patent because the structure of the 
molecule of each product is unique. 
Easy to invent around because it is often possible 
to create a discrete but structurally similar product 
with similar properties.” 




“[..] do not typically incorporate a large number of 
interrelated components; they stand more or less 
alone.[..] tend not to comprise integral 
components of some larger product or system they 
therefore do not enable the development of a wide 












“[..] material-based industries, e.g., chemical and 




General Chemical  
Pharmaceuticals  








“A formula developed in the laboratory is 
comprehensible to all trained chemists and 
remains the same through patenting, regulatory 









“Innovations have fewer patentable elements that 
are owned or controlled be fewer or even a single 
firm.” 












“New, commercializable product or process is 
comprised of numerous separately patentable 
elements [..]. [..] electronic products tend to be 














“The innovation process is cumulative, with each 
invention built very distinctly on the previous one. 
The role patents play is to define the property rights 
[..] so that the proceeds of this cumulative process 
can be shared, and innovation can be encouraged.” 




“Advance is cumulative, in the sense that today's 
advances build on and interact with many other 
features of existing technology.” 
Automobiles 
Aircraft 









“system-based industries where products consist of 












“The quantity of knowledge is too large and diverse; 
and some of the knowledge is tacit [..]. A complex 
technology [..] contains diverse explicit and tacit 
knowledge as well as syntheses of that knowledge.“ 
“If any of the components is patented, and a firm 
cannot obtain a license for it, this creates a severe 
competitive disadvantage, [..]” 







“Larger number of patentable elements that are 
owned or controlled by a greater number of firms.” 
Communications 
Equipment 






“[they] combine multiple inventions in end-
products, mutually blocking patent rights can 
encourage settlement in patent litigation due to the 
threat of counter suits by rivals using their own 
patents. Numerous patented inventions, which may 
in turn be owned by many different firms.” 







It is striking that although definitions diverge in detail, two main factors are differentiating the 
nature of industries. These are the fragmentation of the technology, or the number of parts 
needed to assemble an innovative end product, and the fragmentation of patents attached to 
those parts. Cohen (2000) set out the same distinction naming them complex versus discrete 
products, however, the authors acknowledged that this distinction is historically mainly driven 
by the technology of the products rather than the fragmentation of patent rights. More recent 
work on innovation and IP rights by Somaya et al. (2011), therefore introduced a new 
categorical designation for industries dominated by complex innovation, multi invention 
industries. According to the authors, the termination includes systemic innovative activity but 
also complex systems which allows for the integration of industries where firms manufacture 
systems products (i.e. combining systems of different innovations in one end-product (Somaya, 
2003) and those that do not. Rudy and Black (2015) adopted the term multi invention industries 
to categorise between industries and is now utilised for the present work in order to refer to 
industries, that are characterised by putting out technological inventions that are highly 
fragmented, hence, assembled by many different innovations that are at the same time patented 
by many different firms. In multi invention contexts, firms are often specialised in parts and 
components that can be combined with other technologies to create an innovative end product, 
thus, the fragmentation of the patentable elements of a product in the industry is high. Most 
firms in these industries utilise multiple inventions from within the company as well as from 
external sources (Ziedonis, 2004; Rudy and Black, 2015). That means that the fragmentation of 
patent ownership is equally high because the patentable elements are often patented by various 
companies (James et al., 2013). 
To consolidate recent industry categorisations into a clear distinction for innovation and 
patenting research, discrete simple and material-based innovations are combined under the 
umbrella term of “ single invention industries”. This not only clarifies the terminology used in 
this dissertation, but it also ensures that a distinction is made on the industry level, not the 
technology level, as it is important to include the fragmentation of property right structures to 
understand the effects of strategic patenting and patent litigation. An industry-based distinction 
is also valuable for the present research as this study is not only looking at industries which 
widely researched in the context of patents and patent litigation but at multiple diverse 
industries. Therefore, single invention industries are in the following referring to industries, that 
are characterised by putting out technological inventions that are not highly fragmented, hence, 
In single invention contexts, the product does not contain various patentable elements but 




is owned by a single company or a only a few firms. This concept of few separable patentable 
elements is based on the “discrete” technology categorisation from Cohen et al. (2000).  
It is necessary to understand, that such a distinction is driven by the technological advancements 
of the twentieth century. Somaya et al. (2011) state that although previous innovation was also 
fragmented, the fragmentation was not even close to being as high as in multi invention 
industries today, where technology and patent rights are extremely dispersed and complex (for 
a more thorough comparison see Somaya et al., 2011). For example, more than 150 different 
technologies with fragmented patent rights can be found in one single IBM notebook (Jurgens‐
Kowal, 2010).  
The present study intends to integrate the characteristics inherent to the specific nature of an 
industry while focusing on patent litigation strategies, rather than patents themselves. Many 
previous studies suggest that patenting and patent value is dependent on industry characteristics 
(Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Schankerman, 1998; De Carolis, 2003; Ziedonis, 2004) and 
according to the RBV, successful imitation of technological competence is most likely to 
restrict the sustainability of competitive advantage and firm performance. De Carolis (2003) 
empirically tested and confirmed this effect in the context of the pharmaceutical industry by 
finding a negative effect of inimitability on performance. However, the author concentrates on 
patent citations as a proxy for imitability, thus, does not attempt to give sufficient consideration 
to the importance of patent protection, rather than patents, to reach inimitability.  
Rudy and Black (2015), on the contrary, succeed to capture the unique power of patent 
protection and present a direct link between patent litigation and higher performance. Looking 
at the pharmaceutical and semiconductor industry, the authors indicate that the adoption of a 
particular patent litigation strategy and its link to firm sales is dependent on the industry. In the 
semiconductor industry, the authors can confirm the positive effect of proactive defensive 
patent litigation on firm performance. However, similarly, to De Carolis (2003), Rudy and 
Black (2015) also focus on the pharmaceutical industry but find that the positive relationship 
between strategic patent litigation and sales improvements cannot be confirmed. Although the 
mentioned literature has demonstrated that the power of patents and strategic patent litigation 
is different in certain industries, together, both studies remain narrow in their industry focus 
which indicates that little is known about the importance of the nature of an industry and its 
underlying characteristics. Ultimately, the conflicting findings lead to the question if strategic 
patent litigation as a surrogate for asset inimitability can lead to higher firm performance and 




As firms use similar strategic patent litigation endeavours to respond to certain appropriability 
regimes, this will shed light on how industry-specifics influence the outcome of strategic patent 
litigation employed by firms within different industries. It is now necessary to shift the attention 
to industry characteristics that might influence the outcomes of patent enforcement.  
Industrial Contingencies 
The present study also intends to approach the integration of characteristics inherent to the 
specific nature of an industry rather than investigating a phenomenon within one industry. 
Industry characteristics are defined as several factors that describe the nature of the industry, 
for example, the predominant fragmentation of technology or patent rights. Industry factors 
comprised in previous literature, such as the intensity of competition, product differentiation 
and cumulative innovation within an industry (James et al., 2013) are considered as well. It is 
a common theme in recent research that the effectiveness of patents as an imitation barrier is 
industry-dependent (Mansfield, 1985; Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; James et al., 2013). 
In the literature, industry factors were found to influence patent licensing of firms within an 
industry (Hill, 1992) or suit settlement in the pharmaceutical and computer industry (Somaya, 
2003). Although a cohort of research investigated patents in the context of particular industries 
(Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Schankerman, 1998; De Carolis, 2003; Rudy and Black, 2015), most 
of the mentioned studies have focused on specific industries themselves rather than industry 
factors. The present study explicitly investigates this research gap by concentrating on a 
particular industry factor rather than the whole industry to spotlight the “cause” and not the 
“symptom”. This approach helps to redirect the research attention from the usually spotlighted 
pharmaceutical and semiconductor industry to new until now unrecognised industries of equal 
importance.  
As indicated in the last two paragraphs, it needs to be concentrated on the nature of industries 
rather than industries themselves. Also, the focus is on patent litigation, rather than patents, as 
a successful means of imitation deterrence and valid means of appropriability. The nature of 
industries with its underlying characteristics might provoke or diminish positive performance 
outcomes of strategic patent litigation due to differences in the facilitation of imitation 
restrictions. The present study argues that specific industry characteristics facilitate or impede 
patent protection based on patent protection strategies and influence their profitability 
implications. However, the usual extreme effect hypothesised in the pharmaceutical or 




characteristics. Thereby, light can be shed on the generalisability of the influence of proactive 
proprietary patent litigation strategies on costs as well as firm sales and profitability.  
Table 20, presents industrial characteristics that are proposed to impact the effectiveness of 
strategic patent litigation:  




Multi invention industries 
Patent ownership is fragmented 
& technology is fragmented 
Single invention industries 
Patent ownership is concentrated 
& technology is concentrated Author, Year 
Patent portfolios  Thickets for exchange  Fences to exclude Cohen et al. 2000,  
Ziedonis 2004,  
Reitzig 2004b 
Countersuits More likely Less likely 
James et al. 2013 
Cross-licensing  More important due to patent 
pools 
Less important Cohen et al. 2000,  
James et al. 2013 




Many infringers raise costs of 
suing 
Few infringers lower costs of 
suing 
James et al. 2013 
Infringement 
Detection 
Harder Easier  
James et al. 2013 
 
In multi invention industries, if fragmentation is high, firms are often interdependent on each 
other’s technologies and need to be able to have access to a broad range of patents (Cohen et 
al., 2000; Somaya, 2003). Furthermore, if proprietary control of technologies is considerably 
fragmented (i.e. patent rights are distributed), it is more likely the case that firms develop 
technologies that interfere with existing patented technologies from competitors and do not 
have full control over their own technologies. Which means that they have to build patent pools 
to increase their bargaining power (Somaya, 2003; Rudy and Black, 2015). Thereby, patent 
thickets might be used to access and exchange competitors innovations (Reitzig, 2004b). Due 
to these thickets, infringement detection becomes more difficult and litigation gets more costly 
because the firm needs to assess patent rights (Cohen et al., 2000). Patent right dispersion in 
multi invention industries fosters a climate of, inter-firm dependencies, negotiations, cross-
licensing and countersuits (Cohen et al., 2000; Ziedonis, 2004; Rudy and Black, 2015). 
In single invention industries, like the pharmaceutical industry, firms are increasingly 
concerned to create a unique market position by fostering R&D (Rudy and Black, 2015). Here, 




(Reitzig, 2004b), or the patenting of similar technology (Cohen et al., 2000). Without extensive 
patent pools due to high fragmentation of technology and patent rights, it gets easier to assess 
the number of infringers and defend against them (James et al., 2013). Moreover, countersuits 
become less likely which in turn increases litigation ease (Cohen et al., 2000; Reitzig, 2004b). 
Although the difference in enforcement behaviour is often in the focus of research, multiple 
studies stress that strategic patent litigation is practised across industries16 and that unique 
industry characteristics can influence the patent litigation – performance relationship.  
6.3 Hypotheses  
If a firm is initiating patent infringement lawsuits in multi invention industries the influence on 
sales and costs might diverge from single invention industries because of the following reasons. 
Multi Invention Industries 
Costs  
If multiple patents overlap with each other, it can create so-called patent thickets, which in turn 
can lead to an intra-industry tax on inventions (Shapiro, 2001). In high-technology industries, 
technologies often incorporate many different constituents, and firms often devote monetary 
stakes to their business incentives before patent ownership of competitors is quantifiable 
(Somaya, 2012). The patent thicket can aggravate a firm’s inability to timely predict the patents 
potentially held by competitors on the market. Hence, because of the fragmented technology 
and patent ownership, detecting infringement becomes more time-intensive, increasing costs 
for personnel. Multiple lengthy court proceedings in multi invention industries might increase 
the involvement of top management resources. Whereby managers might need to coordinate 
and monitor several infringement suits involving uncertain patent rights at the same time. This 
does not only affect indirect legal costs but also increases the disruption resulting from strategic 
patent litigation on other organisational processes. 
Filing infringement suits and the direct legal costs involved might increase because countersuits 
and multiple infringements result in increased legal fees due to attorney and legal personnel 
salaries even further (Chen et al., 2015). In addition, firms might experience increased monetary 
burdens during the discovery phase because IP right ownership has to be proven in court which 
 
16 Contrary to the arguments in existent literature that the firms in the pharmaceutical industry rely more heavily on infringement 
litigation, in the used dataset, 36,13% of the proactive proprietary patent litigation suits are located in the single invention 




can be time-consuming and difficult in multi invention contexts (James et al., 2013). Thereby 
the organisational effort and the monitoring of the litigation process and the resources and 
partners involved increasing the costs of patent litigation.  
Sales  
In multi invention industries, countersuits with the aim of mutual hold-up are more often filed 
than in single invention industries (Somaya, 2003; James et al., 2013). Thereby, because of the 
fragmented ownership of patents, it might be more difficult for firms to benefit from legal 
proceedings against infringement in court because other firms might effectively countersue 
(James et al., 2013) utilising their patent stocks. Counterclaims can also substantially lengthen 
the strategic patent litigation proceedings, increasing uncertainty and disruption of product 
development (Chen et al., 2015) and impeding the possibilities of value creation for the firm. 
Consequently, counterclaims can also block the plaintiff from commercialising the end product 
and, thus, from conducting or upholding sales. If court proceedings are favourable for the 
plaintiff, the unique characteristics of multi invention industries could nevertheless impede 
sales creation. Due to short-product lifecycles in multi invention industries, the technology 
might be outdated by the end of the proceedings. Hence, it might be increasingly difficult for 
firms to increase their sales as imitation is more difficult to condemn in the given time frame 
and the window to commercialise products on high prices is narrow.  
Another important factor of high fragmented ownership is that it could increase the possibility 
of multiple different firms infringing on the patent owners’ patent rights (Ziedonis, 2004; James 
et al., 2013). Therefore, to protect the invention from imitation, the plaintiff might have to sue 
more than one infringer to block imitation. This is because strategic litigation decisions are 
patent-dependent. If the plaintiff, for example, has to sue three different firms for infringing on 
the same patent, three different proceedings have to take place, each time only excluding one 
of the defendants from commercialising the patented invention. Then, the other defendants 
would still be able to commercialise the innovation, providing consumers with the option to 
buy their product. Thereby, the plaintiff’s sales are diminished. Arguably, high fragmentation 
in patent ownership could also increase patent owners’ sales, for example, if the plaintiff can 







Single Invention Industries  
Costs  
In single invention industries, the costs of strategic patent litigation might be less substantial 
than in multi invention industries. This is because firms most likely have to sue only one or two 
infringers due to low infringement practices in those industries (James et al. 2013), that can be 
traced back to, inter alia, high costs for R&D (Rudy and Black, 2015). Consequently, disruption 
due to a high number of suits and costly organisation are kept low. Furthermore, because of the 
discrete technology features and concentrated patent ownership, detecting infringement 
becomes faster and less costly (James, 2013). If companies only have to litigate against a limited 
number of infringers, the time commitment of top-management teams is less pronounced, 
diminishing costs. Furthermore, with fewer competitors involved, monitoring and controlling 
activities may be reduced, saving administrative costs.  
Sales 
The effects strategic patent litigation on firm sales might be reversed in industries of single 
invention nature. In single invention industries, firms have to deal with fewer substitutes due to 
cost and time-intensive R&D procedures (Cohen et al. 2000, Reitzig 2004b, Rudy and Black, 
2015). This enables the firm to better predict the patents potentially held by competitors on the 
market and detect infringement in time. Hence, infringement lawsuits against competitors can 
be forecasted more easily and are most likely directed at fewer firms (Rudy and Black, 2015). 
If fewer competitors have to be stopped from infringing on the plaintiff’s product, the options 
on the market for the consumer are also lower. This, in turn, can increase the sales of the plaintiff 
by securing a favourable market position. Additionally, the threat of effective countersuits is 
lower because high stocks of patents in defensive patent portfolios are less likely and they are 
mostly used as fences rather than “currency” (Cohen et al., 2000; James et al., 2013). Therefore, 
the product supply on the market is more concentrated on a few firms. Moreover, due to fewer 
complex fragmentations in patent rights, ownership decisions might derive faster, enabling the 
plaintiff of successful strategic patent litigation to commercialise the patented product without 
interruptions from declaratory judgement proceedings. 
However, long product -life cycles in single invention industries can also negatively influence 
strategic patent litigation benefits. In some cases, it is possible, that patents expire before the 
plaintiff can commercialise the innovative product (Pisano, 1997; De Carolis, 2003; Markman 




In sum, the effect of a specific patent litigation strategy on costs, sales and profitability is 
hypothesised to be dependent on the technological and patent characteristics within industries. 
Thereby, it is distinguished if the specific nature of an industry is multi- or single invention. 
Because infringement detection and sales generation are more difficult and costly if an industry 
is characterised by multi invention, compared to single invention industries, I derive that:  
Hypothesis 1:  in multi invention industries, strategic patent litigation has a more positive effect 
on firm cost than in single invention industries.  
Hypothesis 2: in multi invention industries, strategic patent litigation has a less positive 
influence on firm sales than in single invention industries.  
Hypothesis 3: in multi invention industries, strategic patent litigation has a less positive effect 
on firm profitability than in single invention industries. 
 
Table 21 depicts these effects for the two industries, illustrating the weakening and 
strengthening effects of the industrial contingencies. 
Table 21 Sales, Costs and Profitability in Multi- and Single Invention Industries 































6.4 Data and Methods 
6.4.1 Sample 
The sample to test the Hypotheses contains active and inactive publicly traded and private U.S. 
companies. The data is unbalanced panel data ranging over 16 years, from 2000-2015. The 
sample concentrates on manufacturing firms (SIC codes 20-39), excluding firms with the Sic 
code 39, other manufacturing industries (see: Cohen 2000). I used litigation data from the PLD 
provided by USPTO and merged it with financial data from the TOB dataset. I excluded 
industries of the 4-digit Sic codes with less than 5 firm-year observations. The final sample for 
the analysis comprises 3,269 litigating and non-litigating firms from 278 Industries with 21,745 
observations.  
Table 22 2-Digit Sic code Industry Distribution of Firm-Year Observations  
 
Table 22, shows that, as expected, most observations are centred in the Sic codes 28 chemicals 
and allied products, comprising the pharmaceutical industries and 36 electronic and other 
electrical equipment, comprising the semiconductor and electronics industry. However, other 
Food and Kindred Products 20 822
Tobacco Products 21 51
Textile Mill Products 22 98
Apparel and Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Similar Materials 23 196
Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 24 143
Furniture and Fixtures 25 138
Paper and Allied Products 26 300
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 27 376
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 4,999
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 29 168
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 30 404
Leather and Leather Products 31 96
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 32 204
Primary Metal Industries 33 549
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transportation Equipment 34 593
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 35 2,522
Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except Computer 
Equipment
36 4,726
Transportation Equipment 37 1,138
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical 
and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks
38 4,222
Total 19 21,745
Industry analysis (3,269 U.S. Manufacturing Firms, 2000-2015).




industries, such as industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment, measuring, 
analysing and controlling, transportation equipment or even food and kindred products also 
show significant representation which further stresses the importance of inclusive theory 
development and data analysis.  
Figure 12 shows the distribution and means of cases per firm in each of the 2-Digit Sic codes 
ranging from 20 to 38. It is, again, clear that the pharmaceutical industry (28) and industrial and 
commercial machinery and computer equipment, measuring, analysing and controlling 
instruments (38) are both front runner in patent litigation. However, when looking at mean cases 
per firm, the difference is not as striking. It can be seen, that in other industries, for example, 
leather and leather products (31), firms litigate with a similar mean number of cases. It is also 
interesting, that although the electronic industry contains many firm-year observations and was 
a setting for litigation research before, firms that litigate in these industries litigate with fewer 
cases than firms in other industries. 
Figure 12 Litigation Lawsuits Per Firm and Industry  
 
The following Table 23 shows the percentage of cases from the litigating firms alone. It can be 
concluded that nearly one-third of all litigation cases are filed in the pharmaceutical industries 
(28). After that, the semiconductor and electronics industries comprise the second most 
prominent group of litigators (36). Followed by industrial and commercial machinery and 




industries, such as tobacco products, lumber, wood and furniture (21) and petroleum refining 
industries (29) litigation is very rare. Collectively, 31% of all cases filed were filed within the 
single invention industries, while the remaining 69% were filed in the multi invention 
industries. 
Table 23 Frequency of Litigation  
 
6.4.2 Additional Independent Variable 
Multi invention Industries 
Multi invention environments might moderate the relationship between strategic patent 
litigation and firm performance. Therefore, I created a multi invention measure which identifies 
the industry according to their respective SIC codes. This method has been used in previous 
studies within the litigation domain (Kusonaki et al., 1998; Cohen et al., 2000; Somaya et al., 
2007; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010). The classification of the industries is derived from Cohen 
(2000), who used ISIC code dummies to distinguish between complex and discrete product 
Food and Kindred Products 20 1.24%
Tobacco Products 21 0.14%
Textile Mill Products 22 0.41%
Apparel and Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Similar Materials 23 0.41%
Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 24 0.28%
Furniture and Fixtures 25 1.1%
Paper and Allied Products 26 0.83%
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 27 1.24%
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 25.07%
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 29 0.28%
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 30 1.65%
Leather and Leather Products 31 0.69%
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 32 0.83%
Primary Metal Industries 33 0.96%
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transportation Equipment 34 2.34%
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 35 13.09%
Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except Computer 
Equipment
36 23.42%
Transportation Equipment 37 3.31%
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical 
and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks
38 22.73%
Total 19 100%
Industry analysis (726 U.S. Manufacturing Firms, 2000-2015).








industries. To fit Cohens classification, I adjusted the primary and predominant Sic Code 
measure according to the ISIC classification system. I matched the SIC codes with the ISIC 
codes before their revision number three17. When the ISIC codes requested a different 
classification, I performed it by their example.  
I achieved the classification of the industries by creating a dummy variable (1: multi invention, 
0: single invention), splitting the dataset into SIC codes > 2900 (multi invention) and SIC codes 
≤ 2900 (single invention). Sic codes lower than 2900 represent pharmaceutical manufacturing, 
for instance, chemicals and other allied products as well as food, tobacco, textile, apparel, 
lumber, furniture, paper, printing and petroleum and coal products. Sic codes higher than 2900 
represent, rubber and plastic, leather, stone, clay, glass, primary metal, fabricated metal and 
industrial machinery products, as well as, electronic and other electric equipment, transportation 
equipment, instruments and related products as well as miscellaneous manufacturing industries. 
As suggested by Kreft and De Leeuw (1998), I excluded industries with less than five individual 
observations from the analysis to ensure sufficient representation for each Industry. 
6.5 Descriptives 
Table 24 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: RQ3 
 
Table 24 illustrates the means, standard deviations and the correlations. The correlation matrix 
shows acceptable values among the independent variables. However, the value between 
Organisational Slack and R&D Intensity (-0,54) as well as Firm Age and Firm Size (0,45) 








1 12.881 1.108 -0.05 ***
3 ROS
1 -0.238 4.095 -0.49 *** 0.59 ***
4 Firm Age
1 3.177 0.600 -0.17 *** 0.27 *** 0.37 ***
5 Firm Size
1 5.921 2.605 -0.30 *** 0.42 *** 0.60 *** 0.45 ***
6 R&D Intensity
1 2.533 2.070 0.52 *** -0.46 *** -0.64 *** -0.20 *** -0.31 ***
7 Organisational Slack
1 0.799 0.449 -0.30 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.12 *** -0.05 *** -0.54 ***
8 Litigation Duration
1 0.042 0.154 0.01 ** 0.08 *** 0.10 *** 0.07 *** 0.14 *** 0.03 *** -0.04 ***
9 Heckman Exit 0.315 0.232 -0.08 *** 0.13 *** 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.33 *** -0.04 *** 0.01 0.15 ***
10 Patent Litigation 0.001 0.022 0.07 *** 0.02 ** -0.02 *** 0.00 -0.02 *** 0.04 *** -0.02 ** 0.16 *** 0.00
11 Multi-Invention Industries 0.536 0.498 -0.16 *** -0.05 *** 0.00 -0.02 ** -0.12 *** 0.07 *** 0.07 *** -0.01 0.07 *** -0.02 ***
Number of Observations=21.745 ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1




To rule out multicollinearity issues, I calculated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each 
variable using the “collin” command in Stata. The mean VIF for the full model was 1.32, with 
ranging scores between 1.03 for Patent Litigation and 1.74 for R&D intensity. These VIFs are 
below 10, which is the cut off value defined by Myers (1990). Even though the test suggests 
that multicollinearity is not an issue for the analysis, I performed a robustness check to further 
rule out any multicollinearity issues. By excluding R&D intensity, it showed that the measure 
does not distort the results from the main model. 
6.6 Results 
Table 25 Multilevel Mixed Method Analysis: RQ3 
 
Hypothesis 1 suggested that, in multi invention industries, strategic patent litigation has a more 
positive effect on firm cost than in single invention industries. The analysis shows that the 
influence of patent litigation intensity on costs is negative and insignificant in multi invention 
industries (coefficient = -0.001, p> .1). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. 




















Coef.       
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.          
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Firm Age
1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.168*** 0.165*** 0.164***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054]
Firm Size
1 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.884*** 0.886*** 0.887***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
R&D Intensity
1 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.323*** -0.324*** -0.324*** -0.858*** -0.861*** -0.861***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Organisational Slack
1 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.670*** 0.670*** 0.670*** 1.796*** 1.792*** 1.794***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048]
Litigation Duration
1 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.038 0.032 0.033 0.077 0.043 0.048
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.098] [0.099] [0.099]
Heckman Exit 0.006 0.007 0.007 -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.154** -0.157** -0.159**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.067] [0.067] [0.067]
Independent Variable
Patent Litigation 0.003*** 0.003** 0.005 -0.002 0.027** -0.016
[0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.005] [0.013] [0.016]
Multi-Invention Industries -0.044*** -0.044*** 0.233*** 0.234*** 0.756*** 0.760***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.079] [0.079] [0.158] [0.158]
Interaction effects
Patent Litigation x                    
Multi-Invention Industries






Constant 0.238*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 11.609*** 11.515*** 11.515*** -6.059*** -6.369*** -6.368***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.082] [0.088] [0.088] [0.219] [0.227] [0.227]
Year Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms] ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1
Variable is IHS-transformed. 




Table 25 shows the main results. In model 6, we can see that the influence of strategic patent 
litigation in the multi invention industries is positive on firm sales. Hence, the influence is 
increasing to a significant influence. Hypothesis 2 suggested that, in multi invention industries, 
strategic patent litigation has a less positive influence on firm sales than in single invention 
industries (coefficient = 0.02, p< .05). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported as the results 
suggest that in multi invention industries, patent litigation has a more positive influence than in 
single invention industries. The results show, that with a one-standard-deviation increase in 
litigation intensity, the dependent variable sales increases by 2% more than in the single 
invention industries.  
Hypothesis 3 suggested that, in multi invention industries, strategic patent litigation has a less 
positive effect on firm profitability than in single invention industries. The analysis shows that 
the effect is positive and significant for patent litigation in multi invention industries 
(coefficient = 0.133, p< .01). With a one-standard-deviation increase in litigation intensity, the 
dependent variable ROS increases 13,88% more in the multi invention industries than in the 
single invention industries. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is not supported 
To further examine the effect of intensive litigation on firm perfromance in the multi and single 
invention industries, I refined the analysis by drawing predictive margins at different levels of 
patent litigation. To do so, I transformed the IHS values back to their original scale.  
Figure 13 illustrates the predicted margins for the influence of litigation intensity on sales in 
the different industries. Whereas an increased litigation intensity has a slight inverse effect on 
sales per employee, it is positive and growing in multi invention industries.  





Figure 14 depicts the influence of patent litigation on ROS. Whereby the influence is becoming 
slightly negative with an increased number of cases in the single invention industries, the 
positive effect of infringement suits on ROS in multi invention industries is growing positive 
significantly fast. 
Figure 14 Predictive Margins ROS: RQ3 
 
The most prominent finding to emerge from this study is that contrary to all predictions, 
strategic patent litigation seems more beneficial in multi invention industries than it is in single 
invention industries. This finding is similar to past research, which could not identify a positive 
relationship between patent litigation or inimitability and firm performance in the 
pharmaceutical industry (De Carolis, 2003; Rudy and Black, 2015).  
One of the more significant findings is that firms in multi invention industries which are 
strategically litigating in court can increase sales and profitability, hence, appropriate value 
from their innovations while protecting their patents from imitation. Furthermore, even though 
expected otherwise, strategic litigation is found to be less costly when it comes to administrative 
costs in multi invention industries compared to single invention industries.  
6.6.1 Magnitude of the Effects  
Accounting for random effects and mean centring, from the 90th to the 99.9th percentile of cases, 
the predicted sales per employee decreases from 173,191.8 to 170,488.8 in single invention 
industries, thus varying by 2,703.0. This predicted effect is less pronounced than in the multi 
invention industries with an increase of 39,997.6 from 218,655.9 to 258,653.5. The effect on 

















points for firms in single invention industries. For firms in multi invention industries, the effect 
reverses increasing from 0.1101 to 1.4467. Thus, here the litigation intensity accounts for a 
variation in ROS of 1.3 percentage points for companies in multi invention industries. Table 26 
and 27, depict the results. 
Table 26 Magnitude of the Effects for Sales per Employee: RQ3 
 
Table 27 Magnitude of the Effects for ROS: RQ3 
 
6.6.2 Additional Tests 
I calculated the Akaike (AIC) (Akaikei, 1973) and Bayes (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) information 
criteria to assess if the model benefits from including the multi and single industry distinction. 
The AIC and BIC of the model for sales not including the predictors and the moderator variable 
were (36825.23 and 37024.91). These values are higher than the full model with (36814.07 and 
37024.91). This is supported by an information loss of i = 11.16 > 2 if the predictors and the 
moderator are not included, calculated from the formula of Burnham and Anderson (2004) i= 
AICi – AICmin, which allows the interpretation of AIC scales. The same could be examined for 
the cost model, where the full model (-23651.75 and -23436.1) is better than the control model 
(-23638.07 and -23438.39), showing a i = 13,68 > 2. The ROS model behaves similar 
showing a better fit for the inclusion of the predictor variables with (89506.65 and 89722.3), 
than without (89546.8 and 89746.47) and a delta difference of i = 40,15 > 2.  
Percentile Patent Litigation 
Value 
Predicted Sales per Employee 
Single Invention Industries Multi Invention Industries 
90.0 0 173,191.8 218,655.9 
99.0 0.0008 173,181.4 218,793.7 
99.2 0.0021 173,162.3 219,038.9 
99.4 0.0083 173,077.5 220,191.9 
99.6 0.1 171,834.1 237,814.1 
99.9 0.2 170,488.8 258,653.5 
 
Percentile Patent Litigation 
Value 
Predicted ROS 
Single Invention Industries Multi Invention Industries 
90.0 0 -0.6890 0.1101 
99.0 0.0008 -0.6896 0.1141 
99.2 0.0021 -0.6907 0.1212 
99.4 0.0083 -0.6961 0.1544 
99.6 0.1 -0.7760 0.6814 





6.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
The present chapter contributed by stressing the importance of industrial contingencies in 
strategic litigation for the performance of firms by looking at multiple industries and 26 
consecutive years. Thereby, this chapter followed a call by Somaya (2012) and Rudy and Black 
(2015) for more generalisable findings. The suggestions of these findings are twofold, one, 
industry-specific contingencies are vital in profit generation from innovation and efforts to 
secure inimitability of assets, and two, firms in multi invention industries show a higher ability 
to appropriate value from their innovations, despite exogenous restraints. Thus, firms in the 
multi invention industries can more effectively protect their innovation from imitation than 
firms in the single invention industries.  
For the expanding field of strategic patent litigation, these contributions imply that the 
integration of industrial contingencies is necessary to reach clear explanations for competitive 
advantage due to abilities to ensure inimitability of assets with strategic patent litigation. 
Furthermore, this chapter contributes to the innovation literature by suggesting that even when 
firms operate in the same appropriability regime their effectiveness in shielding patents from 
imitation can significantly differ. Rent generation from IP rights in multi invention industries 
might not solely dependent on the exogenous appropriability regime, it might be endogenously 
pursued by firms to protect themselves from imitation. 
Contrary to the expectations, firms in multi invention industries which are strategically 
litigating in court can increase sales and profitability, and hence, appropriate value from their 
innovations by protecting their patents from imitation. The beneficial effect on sales compared 
to the single invention industries might be explained by the characteristics of multi invention 
industries and the firms that are operating within it. The multi invention industries are shaped 
by cross-dependencies because of fragmented technologies and patent ownerships. Firms might 
utilise this environment to litigate against multiple infringers when promising patents are not 
designated for cross-licensing. Hence, the patent owners’ sales might increase significantly as 
multiple firms can be blocked from selling important technology that might be in use in many 
different products. Firms might initiate one lawsuit first and if promising outcomes derived, 
proceed with taking multiple other infringers to court. These proceedings are then expected to 
be settled in a similar way, therefore, the risk and uncertainty of litigation are less pronounced 
than in single invention industries. Furthermore, trials might provide less organisational hurdles 
as the plaintiff can build efficiencies in the process, reducing overall administrative costs. As 




industries firms can neutralise the negative significant effect on strategic patent litigation on 
firm costs.  
Moreover, strategic patent litigation can entail a significant signalling effect on competitors by 
showing a tough stance against imitation and a willingness to defend intellectual property 
(Somaya, 2003). While previous literature expected this effect to be one of the main reasons of 
improved performance in the pharmaceutical industry (Rudy and Black, 2015), the current 
findings suggest that it could also be important in the multi invention industries. In multi 
invention industries, where technology and patent rights are fragmented, signalling could be a 
very important strategy to scare off multiple competitors or to negotiate better outcomes for the 
plaintiff. Here, because of the mere dependence of the firms on each other, it might be that 
tough firms excel in profiting from their innovations by showing rigour. In single invention 
industries, however, showing rigour might deter infringers but because of the industry structure 
and R&D importance might not come with additional benefits due to a lack of dependence. 
Another explanation could be the comparably low intensity of R&D, patent intensity and 
product introductions of firms in the pharmaceutical industry (i.e. single invention industries) 
as found by Rudy and Black (2015). The authors conclude that while firms in the industry rely 
more heavily on patent litigation, they are not putting enough products on the market, arguably 
because of stronger industry regulation, to generate sufficient sales and impact their profitability 
with strategic litigation. This could also be the case for other single invention industries.  
In sum, the unique contribution of this chapter lies in showing that the trade-off between sales 
and costs in different institutional settings can determine the outcomes of strategic patent 
litigation on firm profitability. A strengthened effect of patent litigation on firm sales and a 
neutralised effect of it on sales are shown to positively influence firm profitability in multi 
invention industries. On the contrary, the reversed effect on sales and costs in single invention 
industries conditions negative profitability.  
The research question on how the influences of strategic patent litigation on firm performance 
vary according to the industrial environment was examined in this chapter. Contrary to previous 
knowledge the chapter clarified the role of the institutional environment of firms and looked at 
multiple industries to assess the effectiveness of patent litigation as a surrogate for patent 
protection and imitation. It was shown that even though the environmental constraints in multi 
invention industries are severe, firms, however, skilfully apply patent litigation in those 
industries. The chapter provided a comprehensive set of industry characteristics that can 




knowledge on why some firms profit from their IP protection more than others. However, on 
limitation of this chapter is that the direct link between those characteristics, strategic patent 
litigation and performance could not be tested. Future research could refine that knowledge by 
testing the mechanisms and their individual influence on the results.  
One main weakness of this study was the paucity of patent-related data on technological fields 
that did not allow industry classification based on another measure than Sic codes. Previous 
studies have criticised the usage of Sic codes as an industry measure due to the possibility of 
affiliation to multiple industries and diversification (Somaya et al., 2007). An additional 
uncontrolled factor is the distribution of litigation cases which are mainly clustered within the 
chemical and allied and instruments and related products industries. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, the study suggests that firms in the multi invention industries profit from their 
innovations more effectively than firms in the single invention industries, utilising strategic 
patent litigation in a way that allows them to appropriate value from their assets.  
This research has thrown up some questions whereby there is room for further investigations 
into the reasons why firms in the multi invention industries can increase their sales and 
profitability from strategic patent litigation more than firms in the single invention industries 
while keeping their administrative costs lower. The findings will be of interest for future 
research on the specific capabilities of firms, which allows them to profit from strategic patent 












7 RQ 4: The Role of Institutional Targeting in Strategic 
Patent Litigation 
The last chapter investigates institutional contingencies in strategic patent litigation. Moving 
from industry contingencies to a wider angle that incorporates the institutional specific 
knowledge of firms that will further refine scholarship on the link between strategic patent 
enforcement and competitive advantage. Chapter 4 is providing the completion of the set of 
contributions that are developed by answering the research questions from the integrative 
framework Table 1.  
7.1 Introduction 
The U.S. patent enforcement system offers a strong appropriability regime, where plaintiffs can 
defend their patented innovations in court effectively (Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; James et al., 2013; Beukel and Zhao, 2018). 
However, even though the system holds up well in the international comparison in facilitating 
patent enforcement, there are significant regional inter-district differences that paint a picture 
of an ununified patent enforcement system transforming the process to an opportunistic “hunt 
for venue” (Moore, 2001). These significant institutional inter-district differences might foster 
firm-specific strategies that companies employ to profit from their institutional environment in 
litigation.  
Strategic patent litigation, as any strategic behaviour, is conditioned by the context of the firm. 
Peng et al. (2009), argue that to bring context to firm and industry-based strategic research, one 
has to integrate the perspective of the institutional environment of a firm. And in 2004, 
Hillmann et al. write, that strategic corporate activity directed at institutions and firm 
performance offers vast research opportunities. Thereby, by definition, institutions establish a 
formal and informal set of rules and constraints that condition behaviour and interaction (North, 
1990; Peng et al., 2009). Hence, the focus on the firm and its abilities to appropriate value from 
innovation as well as the industry conditions that impact strategic appropriation is not sufficient. 
To fully understand strategic behaviour in patent litigation that enables a firm to isolate against 
imitation and create superior performance, one has to look at the firm-specific response to the 
United States patent system institutions. If firms operate in the same exogenously given 
institutional environment, they still might appropriate value from their innovations by 




of this chapter is to contribute to by incorporating institutional targeting as a mechanism to 
decrease costs, increase benefits and improve the profitability of strategic patent enforcement. 
Ultimately, this will give an insight into how some plaintiffs can capture value from their 
innovation while utilising their institutional context, and others are not. 
Strong appropriability regimes must be exogenously given by institutions to create an 
environment where patents can be challenged in a court based on rules and laws (Teece et al., 
1997; Cohen et al., 2000). Thereby, the purpose of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by 
providing a framework which sets boundaries to actions. However, although they pose a limit 
to the behaviour of firms, institutions also give room for firms to make choices within these 
boundaries (Lee et al., 2007; Peng et al., 2009). Consequently, the strategies of a firm, although 
made within the constraints of the institutional environment, are still rational choices to pursue 
internal goals and gain competitive advantage (Peng et al., 2009). More so, literature postulates 
firms can create institutional capabilities influencing competitive advantage (Rumelt, 1984; 
Oliver, 1997). Related literature has looked at how firms manage their ties with institutions, for 
example, regulatory agencies or courts, to increase performance in different environments 
(Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2008), targeting of pivotal institutions (Vanden Bergh and 
Holburn, 2007), and how creed and responsiveness of courts influence firm lobbying (De 
Figueiredo and De Figueiredo Jr, 2002). However, despite the growing popularity of studies 
concentrating on patent enforcement strategies (Somaya, 2003; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
2004; Agarwal et al., 2009; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Rudy and Black, 2015), only a few 
papers concentrated on litigation strategies responding to the institutional environment of a firm 
(Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Rudy and Black, 2015).  
Scholars in the litigation field, have studied “non-market” strategies related to institutions in 
litigation by looking at the firm-level experience as determinants of institutional targeting 
(Somaya and McDaniel, 2012), firm, country and industry characteristics that influence 
institutional targeting (Beukel and Zhao, 2018), as well as the global effect they might have for 
international firms (Chen et al., 2015; Beukel and Zhao, 2018) or resulting institutional or 
policy changes (Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Beukel and Zhao, 2018). Furthermore, Paik and 
Zhu (2016), looked at how potential patent litigation can determine court targeting of firms with 
different patent portfolios in strong and weak institutional settings. Hence, whereby the 
determinants of court targeting in weak and strong appropriability regimes have been discussed 
(Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Paik and Zhu, 2016; Beukel and Zhao, 2018), scholars in the 




targeting and the effect it can have on the costs and benefits of strategic patent litigation in the 
same appropriability regime, the United States court system.  
Taking the importance of strategies in risky litigation endeavours into account, this chapter will 
clarify if the firm-specific efficiencies that companies built to profit from their institutional 
environment influence costs, sales and profitability of patent litigation. Hence, this chapter 
seeks to present institutional targeting as a strategic ability of companies to take advantage of 
their experience with their institutional environment to maximise profits from their innovations.  
In the following, a theoretical framework for strategic location choices in patent litigation is 
developed and the proposed hypotheses are presented. Then, the influence of repeated 
institutional targeting on firm costs as well as performance measures on firm sales and overall 
profitability is tested. Afterwards, the results are discussed, and it is concluded with a link to 
the integrative framework Table 1.  
7.2  Theoretical Background and Literature Review  
Institutional targeting or forum shopping are terms describing the act of a plaintiff strategically 
choosing a venue to bring forward a claim (Somaya and McDaniel, 2012). Forum shopping is 
a common practice that is often recognised and thoroughly discussed within the legal 
community (Moore, 2001; Hricik, 2004; Leychkis, 2006; Love and Yoon, 2017). Especially in 
patent litigation, the chosen venue can be one of the most crucial factors determining the course 
of a lawsuit. In patent litigation suits, the plaintiff(s) are responsible for choosing an appropriate 
court to file their suits. Venue statutes are in place that traditionally regulated the venue of a 
suit, however, their loose interpretation gives plaintiffs freedom to choose jurisdiction in any 
district (Moore, 2001). Hence, plaintiffs developed a habit of forum shopping, choosing venues 
that might be favourable towards them (Black et al., 1999; Leychkis, 2006) or that they are 
familiar with.  
Institutional targeting results in a landscape of litigation where some courts being chosen more 
frequently by plaintiffs, creating hotspots for patent litigation. Forum shopping is driven by 
substantial differences among district courts that are often caused by discretionary choices of 
jurisdictions and procedural differences. The benefits of institutional targeting strategies, 
however, might inter alia derive from institution-specific efficiencies that companies built from 




In 2007, the top ten targeted districts accounted for half of the filed patent cases (Leychkis, 
2006). The Eastern District of Texas rose to be one of the most popular venues for plaintiffs 
(Moore, 2001; Leychkis, 2006; Love and Yoon, 2017; Beukel and Zhao, 2018). Many 
practitioners ironically pick on the fact, that Marshall, Texas, where the court is located, is a 
small town that does not host many innovative businesses and is most famous for its annual 
Fire Ant Festival (Leychkis, 2006), questioning the motives of venue choice. Other districts, 
for example, the Northern District of California are also well-targeted. However, less surprising 
as it is located in Silicon Valley and serves twice as much population (Moore, 2001; Leychkis, 
2006; Love and Yoon, 2017). According to a study by Leychkis (2006), the northern district of 
California decided in more than half of its cases in favour of the plaintiff. Nevertheless, under 
the most frequented courts, there are also such that only win less than a third of their cases in 
favour of the plaintiff. From an economic perspective, looking at the outcome rate, why would 
firms target these courts so frequently? Practice-oriented scholarship seems to be inconclusive 
in answering that question. For example, Leychkis (2006) argued, that Texas popularity stems 
from three factors: the knowledge and experience of the judges with patent litigation, discovery 
practices and verdicts in favour of the plaintiffs. Others claim, it is targeted because of it being 
a “rocket docket”, where cases are brought to trial quickly (Zhu, 2010). However, Love and 
Yoon (2017) argued, that in direct comparison, Texas is not the fastest district and less plaintiff-
friendly than others. While Texas does offer some favourable procedural benefits for plaintiffs, 
for example, early timing of discovery (hence, expensive for defendants), and might be targeted 
because of other factors, such as speed, and judge’s experience. In sum, from a practical 
strategic perspective, we know that firms target specific courts for benefits such as judges’ 
experience, time advantages and favourable verdicts (Leychkis, 2006). 
One of the main arguments in this chapter of why some firms might be able to increase their 
outcomes from patent litigation is that they are better in building their ability to learn from their 
previous experience with institutions. While venues offer the same framework for all plaintiffs, 
some might be able to create institution-specific capabilities (Somaya and McDaniel, 2012) 
which enable them to profit from strategic litigation. Research postulates that institution-
specific capabilities can foster firm performance (Hillman et al., 2004; Somaya and McDaniel, 
2012), in saying that nonmarket strategies of firms are aimed at utilising their legal and political 
environment in the form of institutions (Baron, 1995; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Rudy and 
Black, 2015) to generate value. This is an important observation because strategic location 




of strategic patent litigation for the plaintiff (Zhu, 2010; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Beukel 
and Zhao, 2018).  
Firms can develop institution-specific resources and capabilities from repeated experience at 
the same jurisdictional venue (Somaya and McDaniel, 2012). Such experience might include 
knowledge about networks within the institution, judges and court-employees, procedures, the 
verdict history of an institution (Beukel and Zhao, 2018) or with an institution. These might be 
factors, why firms become more tied to a single or a few courts. Regardless of the case and 
judge, it might be that firms accumulate court specific organisational knowledge, making them 
more reluctant to litigate elsewhere. Hence, firms that actively engage in repeated targeting of 
the institutions that they are familiar with, might create advantages towards their competitors. 
If that is the case, repeated litigation at the same institutions can link strategic patent litigation 
to decreased costs, increased benefits and improved profitability.  
7.3 Hypotheses 
The following shows, that firm’s targeting practices might influence the effect of strategic 
patent litigation on performance if the firm is repeatedly litigating at the same venues. 
 
Costs 
From past scholarship on forum shopping, it can be derived, that specification varies across 
courts in the United States. Judges can collect experiences by being targeted repeatedly by firms 
of a particular industry. For example, judges in the Delaware district court are especially 
experienced in pharmaceutical litigation because many pharmaceutical firms have headquarters 
there. In turn, litigating in courts with experienced judges reduces uncertainty and increases 
predictability for the plaintiffs (Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Beukel and Zhao, 2018). 
Therefore, firms litigating in the same courts repeatedly might increase the judge’s knowledge 
of their patented technology. This can have the effect, that future cases reach a verdict sooner 
which can decrease costs of trial for the plaintiff as shorter litigation periods disburden 
employees and management teams from disruptive court proceedings.  
With increasing transactions with the same court, judges not only gain knowledge about firm-
specific technology, but firms also get to know unique practices and procedures, requirements, 




the court and its prior decision on cases have been evaluated, the costs of data collection will 
eventually reduce for future cases. Costs involved transactions with courts as formal institutions 
not only comprise direct costs, such as court fees, they also most likely incorporate fees of 
managerial time involvement, compensation for attorneys who have to familiarise themselves 
with the specific court and processes as well as other relational costs, such as networking. All 
of which, and maybe more might be inherently tied to transaction cost savings resulting from 
repeated transactions (Riordan and Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 2002). Thereby, each 
additional lawsuit filed at the same venue potentially influences the costs of future transactions. 
That is because gathered knowledge might reduce the perceived risks associated with a given 
court and facilitate speed and execution ease of administrative work (Beukel and Zhao, 2018). 
Procedural costs can be saved as it reduces litigation expenses, and allows managers to 
reallocate resources while meeting demands of shareholders and collaborators, it also deters 
defendants from inflating procedural costs, for example, with unnecessary delays (Somaya and 
McDaniel, 2012). Hence, litigating in the same court repeatedly might lower the administrative 
costs associated with patent enforcement. 
Hypothesis 1: Repeated use of the same courts weakens the positive effects of strategic patent 
litigation on firm costs. 
Sales 
If firms target the same courts repeatedly, they do not have to familiarise themselves over and 
over again with procedural differences, new judges, and other venue-specific particularities. 
Customising infringement lawsuits to different courts takes time and entails risks, which might 
lead to delays that postpone decisions. More crucially, judges need to be familiarised with and 
capable of reaching a verdict on the patented technology (Beukel and Zhao, 2018). Furthermore, 
timing is crucial in patent litigation endeavours because technology often has short product life 
cycles with small windows to benefit from innovation (Cohen et al., 2000). Concentrating on 
courts known to the plaintiff and preferably already familiarised with its technology can 
increase the speed and quality of a verdict urging infringers to stop commercialising products 
sooner and thus, sales benefits can be increased by a unique market position.  
Firms can develop knowledge on the past verdicts at one jurisdiction and increase their 
knowledge on the peculiarities at specific courts if they have litigated there frequently. 
Moreover, besides experience, firms can create social capital at a specific court derived from 
networking. Firms get familiar with decision-makers, local service firms, business partners, and 




2012). These ties might facilitate their learning and increase the potential of successful strategic 
patent litigation due to risk minimisation or other benefits from the personal network. These 
benefits might lead to successful outcomes of legal endeavours and increase the possibilities of 
favourable or speedy proceedings. This, in turn, leads to a better market position when 
competition can be diminished and fewer substitutes are produced, increasing sales for the 
plaintiff. 
Also, independently of whether the actual infringement occurred, some courts are known for 
posing high discovery costs at the beginning of trials. Defendants will often settle for less if 
deterred by high costs of discovery early in the proceedings. Targeting a few courts that are 
expected to proceed the cases to trial quickly or present high discovery costs (expensive for the 
defendant) early on, can lead to faster decisions and possible actions to prevent the 
manufacturing of substitutes. 
Furthermore, if plaintiffs strategically repeatedly litigate in courts that are located in non-
business areas (for example, Marshall Texas) defendants are forced to dispute the case in 
unknown courts with no geographic or cognitive proximity to their familiar environment. This 
can increase their willingness to settle the dispute (Love and Yoon, 2017) but also diminishes 
their chances of winning the case. Hence, the plaintiff has better chances of ensuring that 
competitors have to stop commercialising the patented innovation.  
Hypothesis 2: Repeated use of the same courts strengthens the positive effects of strategic patent 
litigation on firm sales. 
 
Profitability 
In sum, firms can increase sales benefits by repeatedly targeting the same institutions while 
reducing administrative costs due to repeated transactions. Therefore, firms that repeatedly 
target the same institutions might increase profitability more than firms which do not target the 
same institutions repeatedly. 
Hypothesis 3: Repeated use of the same courts strengthens the positive effects of strategic patent 




7.4 Data and Methods 
7.4.1 Sample 
I used litigation data from the PLD provided by USPTO and merged it with financial data from 
the TOB dataset. Court data was originally consolidated within the USPTO dataset as 
information included for each case, hence, data cleaning and matching were redundant. To 
create a court specific measurement, I excluded duplicates within the court data (i.e. when the 
same case was assigned to the same court twice). Then, I consolidated differences in spelling 
to a clear and coherent name categorisation and created a firm-year-specific variable.  
The sample to test the Hypotheses contains active and inactive publicly traded and private U.S. 
companies. The data is unbalanced panel data ranging over 16 years, from 2000-2015. The 
sample concentrates on manufacturing firms (SIC codes 20-39), excluding firms with the Sic 
code 39, other manufacturing industries (see: Cohen 2000). I further excluded industries based 
on the 4-digit Sic codes with less than 5 firm-year observations. The final sample for the 
analysis comprises 3,269 litigating and non-litigating firms from 278 Industries with 21,745 
observations. 
7.4.2 Additional Independent Variable 
Litigating Repeatedly in the Same Court(s)  
Previous litigation research measured institution-specific capabilities by accumulating the prior 
patent enforcement experience of a firm, hence prior suits filed in each court (Somaya and 
McDaniel, 2012). While the theoretical rationale for targeting courts repeatedly does not 
translate to measuring direct experience towards a specific institution (operationalized by 
Somaya and McDaniel (2012) when looking at general purpose or specialized tribunals), I 
followed the logic of the construct and altered it to measure the proposed theoretical concept of 
repeated litigation in the same courts. Similarly, to repeated use of the same legal personnel and 
Somaya and McDaniel (2012), I counted prior and current suit-years for each individual court 
a plaintiff was litigating in, incorporating multiple infringement suits if necessary. Thereby, I 
can account for the differences in the significance of litigation cases and estimate a proxy for 





I proceeded with estimating a ratio, dividing the cumulative sum of the number of cases filed 
across all courts in a given year by the total number of targeted courts per year. Other than 
Somaya and McDaniel (2012), the panel data structure of the data required to measure each 
year based on the courts that a company was litigating in that given year. Moreover, because I 
did not distinguish between two type of courts (as Somaya and McDaniel did) but included 
multiple court locations, forming a ratio was necessary to account for the number of courts a 
firm chose to litigate at. Furthermore, I created a moderator variable with patent litigation using 
standardised measures.  
To test the alternative measure of a count of the number of lawsuits filed at different courts, I 
excluded case duration to focus on the repeated filing only. This alternative measure did not 
distort the results from the main model. Hence, I proceeded with incorporating litigation 
duration as this is in line with the measurement practice of previous scholars which used court-
specific lawsuit measures by counting the years and cases in a specific court accumulated for 
up to 10 years (Somaya and McDaniel, 2012) and measurement operationalisations in similar 
streams of research (Delios and Henisz, 2000).  
Previous literature on court targeting in litigation used the Herfindahl Index (Herfindahl, 1950; 
Kelly, 1981) to measure global litigation concentration based on the number of infringement 
cases across countries (Beukel and Zhao, 2018). Following the theoretical logic, that 
concentrating on a few courts increases predictability and reduces risks and costs associated 
with uncertainty. One benefit of targeting fewer courts is that firms do not have to familiarize 
themselves with different procedural processes, judges, and other venue-specific particularities. 
Customizing infringement lawsuits to different courts takes time and executive attention, which 
might lead to delays that postpone decisions. More crucially, judges need to be familiarised 
with and capable of reaching a verdict on the proprietor patented technology (Beukel and Zhao, 
2018). Hence, concentrating on fewer courts that might be familiarised with the technology can 
increase the speed and quality of a verdict, and hence, sales benefits can be increased. 
Furthermore, concentrating on fewer courts decreases the costs involved with repeatedly 
educating on the technology, uncertainty with the verdict, and, travel costs. Somaya and 
McDaniel (2012) and Beukel and Zhao (2018) noted that targeting courts educated in a specific 
context can be cost-saving with respects to the education of judges on special legal, political or 
technological circumstances.  
To measure the effect of court concentration (i.e. the rate of concentration on courts), I created 




infringement cases each plaintiff had in each court in each year (n) and dividing this measure 
by the total number of infringement suits each plaintiff had per year (N). Then, the result is 
squared and summed per firm-year. The sum of squared shares results in a plaintiff-year-cases-
court-concentration ratio. 






However, a huge drawback of the court concentration measure is, that does not take previous 
cases into account. It is calculated on a year by year basis. Hence, the measure is a mismatch to 
the theoretical argument of  the dissertation but would be beneficial to evaluate if companies 
that litigate in fewer courts increase their performance due to streamlining of the litigation 
process. Nevertheless, the alternative operationalization did not fit the proposed theoretical 
concept properly. 
7.5 Descriptives 
Table 28 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: RQ4 
 
Table 28 depicts the means, standard deviations and the correlations. The correlation matrix 
shows acceptable values among the independent variables. However, it is striking that 
Organisational Slack and R&D Intensity, as well as court repetition and the duration of the 
litigation cases measured on days, show a correlation of (-.54) and (.81) respectively. A 
correlation between litigation duration and repeated court targeting is not surprising, as 
targeting is measured for the entire duration of the litigation case.  
However, to rule out multicollinearity issues, I calculated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
for each variable using the “collin” command in Stata. The mean VIF for the full model was 
1.79, with ranging scores between 1.03 for Patent Litigation and 2.99 for Litigation Duration. 




1 12.881 1.108 -0.05 ***
3 ROS
1 -0.238 4.095 -0.49 *** 0.59 ***
4 Firm Age
1 3.177 0.600 -0.17 *** 0.27 *** 0.37 ***
5 Firm Size
1 5.921 2.605 -0.30 *** 0.42 *** 0.60 *** 0.45 ***
6 R&D Intensity
1 2.533 2.070 0.52 *** -0.46 *** -0.64 *** -0.20 *** -0.31 ***
7 Organisational Slack
1 0.799 0.449 -0.30 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.12 *** -0.05 *** -0.54 ***
8 Litigation Duration
1 0.042 0.154 0.01 ** 0.08 *** 0.10 *** 0.07 *** 0.14 *** 0.03 *** -0.04 ***
9 Heckman Exit 0.315 0.232 -0.08 *** 0.13 *** 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.33 *** -0.04 *** 0.01 0.15 ***
10 Patent Litigation 0.001 0.022 0.07 *** 0.02 ** -0.02 *** 0.00 -0.02 *** 0.04 *** -0.02 ** 0.16 *** 0.00
11 Court Repetition 0.179 0.800 0.01 0.08 *** 0.10 *** 0.08 *** 0.13 *** 0.02 ** -0.03 *** 0.81 *** 0.14 *** 0.12 ***
Number of Observations=21.745 ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1




These VIFs are below 10, which is the cut off value defined by Myers (1990). Even though the 
test suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue for the analysis, I performed a robustness 
check to further rule out any multicollinearity issues. By excluding Duration of Litigation, it 
showed that the measure does not distort the results from the main model. Furthermore, to curb 
multicollinearity issues, I mean centred the court experience variable of the moderator 
interaction term (Aiken et al., 1991).  
7.6 Results 
Table 29 includes the results from the multilevel mixed method analysis of strategic patent 
litigation and institutional targeting on costs, sales and ROS.  
Table 29 Multilevel Mixed Method Analysis: RQ4 
 
Hypothesis 1 stated, that if a plaintiff in infringement lawsuits is litigating in the same courts 
repeatedly, it will have a negative influence on firm costs. Although the results show a negative 
effect on firm sales, the result is not significant on the p<0.05 level (coefficient = -0.001, p>.05). 




















Coef.       
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.          
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Firm Age
1 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.168***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054]
Firm Size
1 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.884*** 0.884*** 0.884***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
R&D Intensity
1 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.858*** -0.858*** -0.858***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Organisational Slack
1 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.670*** 0.670*** 0.670*** 1.796*** 1.796*** 1.796***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048]
Litigation Duration
1 0.025*** 0.024** 0.023** 0.038 0.056 0.045 0.077 0.021 -0.025
[0.007] [0.010] [0.011] [0.028] [0.040] [0.041] [0.098] [0.143] [0.144]
Heckman Exit 0.006 0.007 0.006 -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.154** -0.153** -0.154**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.067] [0.067] [0.067]
Independent Variable
Patent Litigation 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005 0.020*** 0.027** 0.089***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.007] [0.013] [0.025]
Court Repetition -0.001 -0.0003 -0.005 -0.003 0.005 0.013
[0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.006] [0.022] [0.022]
Interaction effects
Patent Litigation x                       
Court Repetition






Constant 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 11.609*** 11.607*** 11.608*** -6.059*** -6.060*** -6.057***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.219] [0.219] [0.219]
Year Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms] ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1
Variable is IHS-transformed. 




Even though this implies that the positive effect is normalised by experience with the courts, 
Hypothesis 1 is not supported.  
In Hypothesis 2, it was suggested, that if a plaintiff in infringement lawsuits is litigating in the 
same courts repeatedly, it will have a positive influence on firm sales. From the results, it can 
be deducted, that litigating in the same court repeatedly negatively influences the effect of 
strategic patent litigation on firm sales (coefficient = -0.005, p< .05). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not 
supported.  
Lastly, Hypothesis 3 specified, that if a plaintiff in infringement lawsuits is litigating in the 
same courts repeatedly, it will have a positive influence on firm profitability. From the results, 
it can be seen, that the positive influence of strategic patent litigation is turned negative and 
significant when firms repeatedly litigate in the same courts and have a high litigation intensity 
(coefficient = -0.022, p< .01). This can be interpreted as for every one standard deviation 
increase in the moderator, return on sales decreases by 2,2%. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported.  
To further break down the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm sales and profitability, 
if a firm is litigating repeatedly in the same courts, I refined the analysis by drawing predicted 
margins at different levels of patent litigation. To do so, I transformed the IHS values back to 
the original scale.  
Figure 15 Predictive Margins Sales per Employee: RQ4 
 
Figure 15 depicts the effect of strategic patent litigation on sales per employee for four different 
rates of case repetition in a given court. It is striking that patent litigation at lower levels has a 




sales lessens if a firm is not solely litigating in a low repetition rate, hence, different courts. If 
they do so, however, the positive influence is strengthened.  
Figure 16 Predictive Margins ROS: RQ4 
 
Figure 16 shows the effect of strategic patent litigation intensity on ROS. Whereas the effect is 
close to zero for firms that litigate up to a medium rate of suit years and a medium rate of court 
repetition, the effect drastically becomes negative if firms litigate intensively in the same courts 
repeatedly. This suggests, that either, firms might become rigid in using the court system to 
their advantage in a way that inhibits their performance significantly, or it can be argued that 
the freedom of choice to litigate in the same venue repeatedly might not be as pronounced as 
expected.  
7.6.1 Magnitude of the Effects 
Keeping everything else equal and adjusted for random effects and mean centring, with a higher 
litigation intensity from the 90th to the 99.9th percentile the predicted sales per employee 
increase from 196,385.1 to 236,419.4 thus varying by 40,061.3 if the plaintiff is not litigating 
in the same courts repeatedly. For the medium rate of repetition of courts, the effect does not 
increase as steep, it varies by 8,844.1 decreasing from 193,432.3 to 184,588.2. Whereas sales 
per employee decreases by 46,402.3 from 190,523.9 to 144,121.6 if the company has a high 
rate of court repetition. Between the 90th and 99.9th percentile, the predicted ROS increases 
from -0.2450 to 0.6319 which translates to an increase of 0.88 percentage points for firms that 
do not litigate in the same courts repeatedly. For firms with a medium court repetition, the effect 




rate of repetition, the effect is decreasing from -0.1069 to -1.5930, thus, between the 90th to the 
99.9th percentile litigation intensity accounts for a variation in with a variance in ROS of 1.49 
percentage points for companies that have a high rate of court repetition. Table 30 and 31 show 
the results.  
Table 30 Magnitude of the Effects for Sales per Employees: RQ4 
 
Table 31 Magnitude of the Effects for ROS: RQ4 
 
7.6.2 Additional Tests 
I calculated the Akaike (AIC) (Akaikei, 1973) and Bayes (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) information 
criteria to assess if the model benefits from including the court experience moderator. The AIC 
and BIC of the model for sales not including the predictors and the moderator variable were 
(36825.23 and 37024.91). These values are higher than the full model with (36822.81 and 
37038.46). This is supported by an information loss of i = 2.24 > 2 if the predictors and the 
moderator are not included, calculated from the formula of Burnham and Anderson (2004) i= 
AICi – AICmin, which allows the interpretation of AIC scales. The same could be examined for 
the cost model, the full model with (-23636.37 and -23420.72) is better than the control model 
(-23638.07 and -23438.39), showing a i = 1,7 < 2. This delta is particularly low, suggesting 
that the findings of the G&A expenses value are not based on a model that significantly 
benefitted from parsimony. The ROS model behaves better showing a better fit for the inclusion 
of the predictor variables with (89542.49 and 89758.14), than without (89546.8 and 89746.47) 
and a delta difference of i = 4,31 > 2.   
Percentile Patent Litigation 
Value 




Medium Rate of Court 
Repetition 
(99th Percentile)  
High Rate of Court 
Repetition 
(99.9th Percentile) 
90.0 0 -0.2450 -0.1755 -0.1069 
99.0 0.0008 -0.2417 -0.1761 -0.1112 
99.2 0.0021 -0.2360 -0.1771 -0.1188 
99.4 0.0083 -0.2091 -0.1819 -0.1548 
99.6 0.1 0.1776 -0.2522 -0.7287 





7.6.2.1 Court Popularity 
As discussed in this chapter, plaintiffs might choose specific venues more frequently based on 
multiple factors, inter alia, such factors are proximity to the location of business, previous 
litigation experience at a venue and the anticipation for favourable decisions or procedural 
differences (Black et al., 1999; Leychkis, 2006; Love and Yoon, 2017; Beukel and Zhao, 2018). 
Moreover, forum shopping causes some courts being chosen more frequently by plaintiffs, 
creating hotspots for patent litigation. Litigation activity shows a certain level of concentration 
on a number of most targeted courts (Leychkis, 2006). However, some of these venues for 
example, the Eastern District of Texas are targeted by a specific type of firms, predominantly 
patent sharks (Leychkis, 2006). As this is a particular demographic that is not represented by 
the sample of this dissertation, I decided to control for court popularity by estimating a firm-
year measure of the average frequency of court popularity among the targeted courts. The 
sample of this dissertation contains lawsuit filed in 91 district courts. From a total of 9,454 
cases, 6,812 cases were filed in the top ten of the most frequently targeted district courts. This 
distribution shows similarities to the findings of previous studies (Leychkis, 2006). Whereas 
the first three most targeted district courts account for approximately two-fifth of the targeted 
venues. It is important to note, that the location decision is often made by proximity, hence, 
some courts experience a higher frequency of litigation because of their location, such as 
Delaware’s District Court as many U.S. corporations are incorporated in Delaware (1st most 
frequented court in the sample), New Jersey’s district court as it is close to the pharmaceutical 
and life science sector hub in the area (2nd most frequented court in the sample) or California's 
Silicon Valley as the California Northern District Court is close to the Silicon Valley cluster 
(3rd most frequented court in the sample). However, as many scholars stated before, (Leychkis, 
2006; Zhu, 2010; Love and Yoon, 2017; Beukel and Zhao, 2018) and as discussed in this 
chapter, these courts are also targeted because of their unique characteristics and the tendency 
of firm to repeatedly litigate in the same courts.  
To make sure that the results of this chapter are not driven by the most frequented courts in the 
sample, I estimated the number of cases that were filed in each court in each year from 2000-
2015 and used this measure to estimate a firm-year average depicting the average frequentation 
of popular venues. Hence court popularity shows how intensely a company was frequenting the 
most popular venues in each year across its cases. I used this measure in an additional robustness 
test as a control variable to account for court popularity effects. Table 32 shows that the findings 




Table 32 Controlling for the Effect of Court Popularity 
 
7.6.2.2 The Link Between the Repeated Use of the Same Attorneys and the 
Same Courts 
In order to investigate the link between using the same legal personnel and using the same 
courts, I conducted a correlation analysis. The correlation matrix in Table 33 shows acceptable 
and expected values among the independent variables. However, the correlation coefficient of  
0.73 between the repeated use of the same courts and the same attorneys indicates a stronger 
correlation. The square of the correlation coefficient r2 =.53 which translates to 53% of variation 
in the repeated use of attorneys can be explained by the variation in the repeated use of the same 
courts.  
This can be explained by the possibility, that the decision to choose a team of attorneys might 
not always be individually made but sometimes the decision to litigate within a specific venue 




















Coef.       
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.          
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Firm Age
1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.169***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054]
Firm Size
1 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.883*** 0.884*** 0.884***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
R&D Intensity
1 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.859*** -0.858*** -0.858***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Organisational Slack
1 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.670*** 0.670*** 0.670*** 1.794*** 1.794*** 1.795***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048]
Litigation Duration
1 -0.034 -0.028 -0.028 -0.086 -0.056 -0.060 -0.782** -0.762** -0.778**
[0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.091] [0.095] [0.095] [0.323] [0.337] [0.337]
Heckman Exit 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.158** -0.157** -0.158**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.067] [0.067] [0.067]
Court Popularity
1 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.101*** 0.093** 0.090**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036]
Independent Variable
Patent Litigation 0.002** 0.004** 0.004 0.019*** 0.023* 0.083***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.007] [0.013] [0.025]
Court Repetition
-0.001 -0.000 -0.005 -0.003 0.004 0.011
[0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.006] [0.022] [0.022]
Interaction effects








Constant 11.609*** 11.607*** 11.608*** 11.609*** 11.607*** 11.608*** -6.061*** -6.062*** -6.059***
[0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.219] [0.219] [0.219]
Year Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms] ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1
Variable is IHS-transformed. 




might result in choosing a legal team that has been previously worked with to litigate in the 
same venue (Beukel and Zhao, 2018).  
Table 33 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation: Link Between RQ2 and RQ4 
 
I estimated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) to investigate if the two variables are linearly 
related.  The mean VIF for the full model was 1.94, with 2.32 for the repeated use of the same 
attorneys and 3.59 for the repeated use of the same courts. These VIFs are below 10, which is 
the cut off value defined by Myers (1990). 
However, to further explore the possibility, that the results are influenced by the common 
variation between the two variables, I followed previous research (Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016b) 
and conducted a principal component analysis and re-estimated the model including the first 
principal component as a control variable. The results can be examined in Table 34.    




1 12.881 1.108 -0.05 ***
3 ROS
1 -0.238 4.095 -0.49 *** 0.59 ***
4 Firm Age
1 3.177 0.600 -0.17 *** 0.27 *** 0.37 ***
5 Firm Size
1 5.921 2.605 -0.30 *** 0.42 *** 0.60 *** 0.45 ***
6 R&D Intensity
1 2.533 2.070 0.52 *** -0.46 *** -0.64 *** -0.20 *** -0.31 ***
7 Organisational Slack
1 0.799 0.449 -0.30 *** 0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.12 *** -0.05 *** -0.54 ***
8 Litigation Duration
1 0.042 0.154 0.01 ** 0.08 *** 0.10 *** 0.07 *** 0.14 *** 0.03 *** -0.04 ***
9 Heckman Exit 0.315 0.232 -0.08 *** 0.13 *** 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.33 *** -0.04 *** 0.01 0.15 ***
10 Patent Litigation 0.001 0.022 0.07 *** 0.02 ** -0.02 *** 0.00 -0.02 *** 0.04 *** -0.02 ** 0.16 *** 0.00
11 Repeated Use Legal Personnel 0.249 1.330 0.08 *** 0.01 *** 0.10 *** 0.08 *** 0.13 *** 0.02 *** -0.03 *** 0.81 *** 0.14 *** 0.12 ***
12 Court Repetition 0.179 0.800 0.07 0.02 *** 0.08 *** 0.07 *** 0.12 *** 0.02 ** -0.03 *** 0.68 *** 0.13 *** 0.22 *** 0.73 ***
Number of Observations=21.745 ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1




Table 34 The Link between RQ2 and RQ4 
 
Even though the first principal component is not significant in all of the nine models, including 
it as a control resulted in a shift from a non-significant cost coefficient to a significant cost 
coefficient. However, as the pattern of results in the main model for profitability stay robust to 
the changes, meaning that the link between repeated use of legal personnel and repeated use of 
courts does not influence the main finding. However, this link poses a valuable research 
direction for further research on the role of attorneys and courts in patent litigation. The 
determinants of the choice of the legal teams as well as the venue for litigation lawsuits might 
enrich our understanding of why some firms experience a higher profitability from patent 
litigation. 




















Coef.       
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.          
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Coef.        
[SE]
Firm Age
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.168***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054]
Firm Size
1 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.884*** 0.884*** 0.884***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
R&D Intensity
1 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.858*** -0.858*** -0.858***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Organisational Slack
1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.670*** 0.670*** 0.670*** 1.795*** 1.796*** 1.796***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048]
Litigation Duration
1 0.019* 0.022** 0.020* 0.056 0.058 0.045 0.042 0.025 -0.028
[0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.040] [0.041] [0.041] [0.140] [0.145] [0.146]
Heckman Exit 0.006 0.007 0.006 -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.154** -0.153** -0.154**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.067] [0.067] [0.067]
First Principal Component 0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.006 -0.007 0.004
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.009] [0.009] [0.017] [0.031] [0.031]
Independent Variable
Patent Litigation 0.002** 0.005*** 0.005 0.020*** 0.028** 0.089***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.007] [0.014] [0.025]
Repeated Litigation       
Same Courts
-0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.012 0.008
[0.003] [0.003] [0.011] [0.011] [0.040] [0.040]
Interaction effects
Patent Litigation x                       








Constant 0.238*** 0.237*** 0.238*** 11.609*** 11.607*** 11.608*** -6.061*** -6.062*** -6.059***
[0.082] [0.082] [0.082] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.219] [0.219] [0.219]
Year Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Number of Observations=21.745 [3.269 Firms] ; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
1
Variable is IHS-transformed. 




7.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
The last empirical chapter of this dissertation investigated if forum shopping influences the 
relationship of strategic patent litigation and firm performance, measured on sales and 
profitability while also considering costs. Thereby, the purpose was to determine the role of 
institutional targeting for firm performance and enhance the RBV by looking at how firms can 
utilise institutional contingencies and protect their IP from imitation. Prior to this study, it was 
difficult to make predictions about the performance implications of using institutional targeting 
practices in strategic patent litigation. This research is one of the few first attempts to thoroughly 
examine forum shopping in strategic patent litigation and its role for firm performance.  
The unexpected findings could be explained by the rigidities a firm is confronted with when 
concentrating on one court repeatedly. Thereby, the negative influence of high repetition of 
patent litigation in the same institutions on firm sales could mean that firms are not sufficiently 
utilising the given institutional contingencies to create value from their innovations and IP 
rights. Firms that actively litigate in the same courts repeatedly at a high level might not be 
diverse enough in their choice of court, rather relying on the institutions they know. However, 
different courts possess different benefits and detriments for plaintiffs depending on the unique 
circumstances of the case, hence, firms that do not actively employ their strategies in patent 
litigation might not be able to sufficiently adapt to their institutional environment to provide 
them with the ability to generate profit from patent litigation. It might be that such capabilities 
are more valuable in generating sales than the experiences built from repeated litigation in the 
same courts. As the results show, peated litigation in the same venue does normalise the positive 
influence of strategic patent litigation on firm costs, however, it might not be pronounced 
enough to compensate for the losses of sales. Therefore, the trade-off between sales and costs 
results in negative profitability for the firm. 
The chapter contributes to strategic literature on patent litigation by enhancing our knowledge 
forum shopping. Thereby, the focus was set on institutional contingencies to research why some 
firms are more able to build efficient patent litigation strategies within the given environment. 
Firms use court-targeting practices to increase their possibilities to appropriate value from their 
IP rights, however, firms fail to generate profits from it, when they litigate and target in a limited 
number of courts. Future research on forum shopping might be able to take a closer look at 
institution-specific firm capabilities and targeting strategies to enhance our understanding of 
why some firms are managing strategic litigation better in their given institutional environment. 




this practice. Theory is developed by presenting the different levels of institutional targeting 
experience and its influence on the strategic patent litigation - performance relationship to 
determine the experience firms have to build to utilise strategic litigation as a surrogate for 
imitation. This chapter clarified, that with increasing litigation activity, repeated litigation in 
the same courts can have a detrimental effect on firm performance. Hence, to benefit from their 
innovations, firms have to find a balance between building experience and economies of scale 
with specific institutions and targeting more diverse institutions that might better fit the suit of 
dispute. 
The findings presented in this chapter pose interesting implications for practitioners. Firms that 
rely more heavily on experience with specific courts should carefully assess if they gain value 
from transaction costs savings or if their cases might be better litigated in a different, more 
suitable court to leverage the possibilities provided by the United States court system. 
Sometimes, managers might find that they have to adjust their strategies to generate value from 
their innovation. They should review these implications carefully and may consider a more 
diverse targeting practice aimed at sales generation to better appropriate rent from strategic 
patent litigation. 
This study leaves some limitations. First, it does not differentiate between different types of 
tribunals identified from previous research (Somaya and McDaniel, 2012). Such a tribunal 
distinction might have added additional knowledge of why firms target specific venues.  
Second, whereas the study does provide theory on the question why some firms benefit more 
from strategic patent litigation, the chapter does not address the differences in experiences that 
can be built by targeting and how firms build and utilise such experience to benefit from 
strategic patent litigation. This poses a promising route for future research to further refine our 
knowledge of the mechanisms that connect strategic patent litigation with firm performance. 
Third, institutional targeting might influence other non-financial outcomes, as firms use 
institutional targeting as non-market strategies (Somaya and McDaniel, 2012), that could be, 
for example, directed at policy changes. An interesting example from the recent years is that of 
the case “TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands” which directly affected forum shopping 
practices and had an immediate effect on corporate, institutional targeting strategies in patent 
litigation (“TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands”, 2017). The case set a precedent by 
ruling, that plaintiffs must sue in courts where the defendant firm is incorporated or regularly 
conducts business. Since the verdict in 2017, multiple sources reported, that companies, for 




this case, it is exceptionally striking that the focus on targeting is very important to explain the 
utilisation of institutional contingencies as it already influences policymaking. Hence, it does 
not seem farfetched to say, that firms will further refine their institutional targeting strategies 
to abstract value from their innovations, therefore, it will remain a lively research setting in 
strategic patent litigation research. Especially, the focus on policy implications in strategic 
patent litigation research constitutes a promising field for further research.  
8 Integrated Discussion and Conclusion 
There are several important areas where this study makes an original contribution to previous 
research, including the holistic consideration of costs and benefits of litigation, the mechanisms 
of patent litigation affecting these performance implications and the contingencies that provide 
strategic opportunities while enforcing IP. This dissertation presented, that firm-specific, 
industry-specific as well as institutional contingencies, can enhance or diminish the 
effectiveness of a strategic patent litigation on firm performance. 
8.1 Filling the Gaps from the Integrative Framework 
The integrative framework Table 1 outlined four research gaps for potential contribution. The 
framework proposed that knowledge on organisational as well as industrial and institutional 
contingencies has to be refined. This dissertation looked at the performance of strategic patent 
litigation in three promising research questions directed at strategic litigation abilities of firms 
and their contingencies.  
Chapter 1 concentrated on three outcomes of strategic patent litigation costs, sales and 
profitability while stressing the role of firm strategy in securing inimitability of assets. Thereby, 
the positive influence of strategic patent litigation on costs and performance could be 
confirmed. However, the influence on sales did not show significant results. Nevertheless, these 
findings contribute to the litigation literature by establishing strategic patent litigation as an 
important isolating mechanism.  
Chapter 2 highlighted that the repeated use of the same legal personnel can act as a link between 
TCE and the RBV. Whereby is was striking that although placing legal teams repeatedly on 
multiple cases, diminished strategic litigation costs with increasing litigation intensity, it also 
had negative influences on overall financial performance. Hence, repeated employment of 




intensity. Chapter 2 contributed to the literature by showing that appropriability from 
innovation, essential to gain and maintain a competitive advantage, can derive (in this case be 
diminished) by the unique competencies of the firm to manage the litigation process. 
Chapter 3 showed that companies in multi invention industries that increasingly litigated had 
better outcomes on sales and profitability than firms with the same strategy in single invention 
industries. Thereby, Chapter 3 contributed by showing that appropriability regimes are not 
solely exogenously given as firms can strategically respond to their industrial environment to 
appropriate rents from their innovations. This sheds light on the link between inimitability of 
assets and competitive advantage by not only suggesting firms need to pursue patent 
enforcement actively, but they also have to leverage (and are constrained by) their industrial 
environment. Hence, that is why the internal capability of integrating strategic litigation in multi 
invention environments lead to a higher increase in sales and performance than in single 
invention industries.  
Chapter 4 expanded the radius even further by integrating a firm’s practices to strategically 
target formal institutions as a link between patent enforcement and firm performance. Contrary 
to all predictions, firms seem to not benefit from repeatedly targeting the same courts for 
strategic litigation. Therefore, institutional targeting is not a sufficient appropriability 
mechanism to profit from innovations. The findings show that such experience influences sales 
and profitability more negatively, the more a company is litigating. Targeting the same 
institutions repeatedly does also not save costs. These findings contribute to our knowledge by 
showing that targeting the same courts for litigation repeatedly does not benefit the 
appropriability from innovation.  
This study showed that strategic patent litigation does influence sales and profitability in a 
similar way. However, even though the costs saving strategies of firms to diminish financial 
investments seem to work in some contexts, the trade-off between sales and cost implications 
of strategic targeting was only partly visible. Hence, it might be more complicated for firms to 
assess the risks involved in litigation to draft a strategy that increases sales and diminishes costs. 
Nevertheless, it can be deduced from the chapters in this dissertation, that the influence of 







The significant findings from this dissertation can be examined in Table 35:  
Table 35 The Integrative Framework Revisited 
Research Gap  
 
Research Question Findings 
 




1: What is the influence of strategic patent litigation 




Strategic patent litigation significantly 
increases costs and profitability. A 
significant increase in sales could not 






2: How does the influence of strategic patent 
litigation on firm performance vary according to the 
repeated use of the same legal personnel?  
 
Repeated use of the same legal 
personnel more negatively influences 
firm sales, costs and profitability with 






3: How does the influence of strategic patent 
litigation on firm performance vary according to the 
industrial environment? 
 
In multi invention Industries, increased 
litigation intensity influences sales and 
profitability more positively than in 
single invention industries. The effect 








4: How does the influence of strategic patent 
litigation on firm performance vary according to the 
repeated litigation in the same courts? 
Repeated litigation in the same courts 
more negatively influences sales and 
profitability with increased litigation 
intensity. The effect on costs is 
insignificant. 
 
8.2 Academical and Practical Contributions and Implications 
Whereby strategic patent enforcement is increasingly practised by firms, the mechanisms that 
link it with profitability were not yet fully understood. Hence, this dissertation contributed to 
the strategic patent litigation field and the resource-based theory of the firm by identifying 
organisational, industrial and institutional contingencies that affect a firm’s ability to capture 
value from strategic litigation and its influence on costs, sales and profitability. 
Comprehensively, the four different research directions of this dissertation developed 




organisational, industrial and institutional contingencies of strategic patent litigation. The 
dissertation also provides theoretical contributions that tie together the four different chapters 
by integrating not only research on the outcomes of strategic patent litigations moderated by 
internal and external contingencies and the abilities of firms to respond to such, it also shows, 
that some abilities are relevant in different contextual settings, as for example, experience and 
knowledge on markets and institutions. The completion of the doctoral study shows a threefold 
contribution to existent knowledge on strategic litigation and the resource-based view of the 
firm.  
First, this research contributes to the development of the literature to view strategic patent 
litigation as a surrogate for inimitability of resources in order to appropriate value from patents. 
Firms can protect their innovations from imitation with strategic patent litigation. Thus, firms 
can restore inimitability by employing a suitable and effective patent litigation strategy that 
constitutes a barrier against imitation. Hence, knowledge protection postulated in the RBV 
includes the strategic enforcement of property rights. From a theoretical standpoint, the 
dissertation adds to the resource-based view of the firm towards a broader focus of its 
assumption of inimitability of assets, highlighting the importance of strategic patent litigation 
as rent appropriation strategy. In particular, scholarship on firm, industry and institutions could 
be refined to unravel the contingencies that affect firms’ abilities to create barriers of imitation 
with strategic patent litigation to sufficiently protect patented assets and maintain or create a 
competitive advantage of the firm by appropriating rents from innovations.  
Second, the study contributes to litigation research by clarifying and testing how strategic 
litigation can lead to or sustain positive performance outcomes. Thereby, it shed light on the 
profitability of strategic enforcement by emphasising the important marginal effect between 
sales and costs of firms during patent litigation endeavours. The profitability lens is of particular 
importance because literature often indicates the critical trade-off between costs and revenues 
of patent ligation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2003). However, previous 
literature remarked, that even in the patent domain, investigation on inimitability and multiple 
performance measures is scarce (Markman et al., 2004). Consequently, many litigation studies 
also rely on single performance measures like sales (Rudy and Black, 2015), costs (Bessen and 
Meurer, 2008b) or stock market reactions (Bhagat et al., 1994). Thereby, this study differs from 
previous literature by incorporating two different measures of performance as well as firm costs. 
It contributes by showing a direct influence of strategic patent litigation on costs, sales and 





Third, this dissertation identifies firm, industrial and institutional contingencies that influence 
the ability of the firm to effectively create value from their innovation by employing strategic 
patent litigation to create firm performance. Both legal and industrial circumstances were not 
thoroughly considered in the consulted literature on strategic litigation outcomes (Agarwal et 
al., 2009; Rudy and Black, 2015). Addressing this gap contributes by identifying the repeated 
use of the same attorneys, multi invention industry characteristics and institutional targeting 
practices that explain the differences in strategic patent litigation outcomes on firm 
performance. For this purpose, the study differentiates from previous scholarship by 
concentrating empirically on legal representation, multi invention market characteristic 
differences among different industries and repeated court targeting as factors that influence the 
firm’s ability to build effectiveness of strategic patent litigation. Thereby, the practice of 
Somaya et al. (2007) is followed, who investigated resource combinations and integrated firm-
level and industry-level factors to embed the RBV within patenting research. Furthermore, the 
contribution of this study responds to Rudy and Black (2015) advocating for a closer focus on 
firm-specific legal and institutional moderators. By incorporating firm, industry and 
institutional perspectives to strategic patent enforcement, litigation literature and the resource-
based view are advanced by showing that some firms in the different contexts are more skilled 
in appropriating value through strategic patent enforcement than others.  
Theory building efforts should continue to focus on strategic patent litigation and the unique 
contingencies that influence its outcomes. Thereby future scholarly work could further define 
the unique characteristics of the firm, industry and institutional environment that link strategic 
patent litigation with firm performance. However, beyond the academic contributions listed 
above, the study has practical implications as well. The specific focus on experience with 
lawyers and courts helps to determine strategies for legal representation for patent litigation. 
The findings have implications for managers to keep their focus on sales and licensing 
generation to increase profits rather than solely on cost reduction of litigation. Similar to 
previous research by Rudy and Black (2015), this dissertation could not find a more positive 
direct link between strategic patent litigation and firm performance in the industries with single 
invention characteristics than in multi invention industries. Hence, especially in the single 
invention industries, strategic patent litigation should be reassessed carefully to respond to 





8.3 Limitations and Future Research 
It is always a challenge to find a balance between the breadth and depth of a research project. 
In this dissertation, it was a particular challenge because the field of strategic patent 
enforcement offers multiple promising research avenues that are oftentimes not limited by 
extensive scholarship. Therefore, the goal was to focus on three major contexts, the firm, the 
industry and the institutions. This allowed the study to occupy research gaps and provide a first 
research typology for further refinement. However, this also comes with unique challenges.  
One limitation of this dissertation is that to create generalisable results throughout the chapters, 
the study concentrated on a smaller sub-sample of the collected data. This resulted in a smaller 
but reproducible sample. However, the sample size is still bigger than comparable studies in 
this area (see: Rudy and Black, 2015). For additional analysis, the data could be further cleaned 
to counteract some inherent data issues, as for example, subsidiary linkages. 
Another limitation of this research project is that it could not additionally include the country 
of litigation as the last missing piece for a complete context study. However, this offers a 
promising area for future research, as many firms in the sample are global enterprises and 
litigation laws and practices are country specific. Hence, it is a promising area of future research 
to investigate the influence of strategic patent litigation on firm performance in different 
countries. Nevertheless, concentrating solely on the firm, industry and institutional 
contingencies, allowed to add a layer of depth to each investigated context by identifying 
specific contingencies and practices of the firm in each context.  
The present study highlighted the contingencies of the firm (repeated use of the same attorneys), 
industry (multi and single invention industry distinction) and institutions (repeated institutional 
targeting). However, all of the three contingencies contain multiple mechanisms that can link 
them to firm performance, including but not limited to the mentioned sales and revenue 
generation, exclusion of competitors, indirect costs, disruption, licences and royalties time and 
speed. Further research should aim at identifying additional mechanisms and characteristics 
that influence the relationship between patent litigation and firm performance in the given 
environments. Hence, the firm, industry and institutional contexts should be filled with 
additional strategies to build efficiencies in patent litigation and additional mechanisms (for 
example, non-market or non-financial) to provide a more fine-grained picture of a firm’s ability 




8.4 Conclusion  
In conclusion, this doctoral research has exciting contributions to theory and praxis as well as 
opportunities for publications in highly ranked journals. In this dissertation, the influence of 
patent litigation strategies on performance was discussed, and multiple hypotheses for the 
analysis of the research questions were presented. The doctoral project aimed at investigating 
strategic patent litigation and its influence on firm performance, in particular, sales and 
profitability while considering costs. Moreover, the influence of strategic litigation was shown 
to differ in multi and single invention industries. Furthermore, it was intended to create an 
understanding of the influence of the strategies directed at legal bodies involved, with a specific 
focus and legal representation and institutional targeting. 
In the introduction, this dissertation was hinting at the flaws of patent protection and the 
difficulty for firms to appropriate value from their innovations. After a thorough investigation 
of the strategies and politics of strategic patent litigation, these issues were again visible. 
However, what hopefully prevailed are the plentiful chances of firms to protect themselves 
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